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THE CONCEPT OF.JUSTICE IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
"Social justice begins with conflict and ends with reconciliation. A 
world without conflict is a world in which social justice is not an issue; 
a world with unreconciled conflicts is a world in which justice has not· 
been achieved". 1 
The concept of justice is about the consideration of parallel issues, concerns, needs, 
deserts and entitlements of people and worlds in various circumstances. And the 
significance of justice is to ensure that there is a justly balanced order of things and the 
way entitlements, needs, deserts, merit and burdens are distributed across time, peoples 
and worlds. This involves a conflict, and the consideration of such conflict, is what 
calls for theories of justice. 
Why I say theories and not a theory, is because no single theory so far has managed 
to successfully solve the justice question. Each theory comes with its new conflict to 
the existent theories. Perhaps considering and examining a wide spectrum of issues in 
existing theories can help us to see more clearly how the justice question and the 
resultant conflict could be solved. 
And, since the concept of justice is about competing claims, then we must consider 
and examine its theories and how they vary and interrelate with each other. It is in this 
L. C. Backer, 'Economic Justice: Three Problems', in Thomas Morawetz,
Justice. (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., 1991) p. 386.
3 
way that we can be able to come out with a balanced concept or some sort of universal 
approach by which everyone can get their due (what is best for them vis-a-vis what is 
best r'or ,Hhersi rnd not what is in cheir interest only. 
The ideas that have theorised the concept of justice are in two groups: chronologically 
and by approach. Chronologically, we have classical theory and modern theory. 
While classical theory relies heavily on virtue in analysing justice, modem theory -is 
on the whole based on rationalism. 
In approach, there are those theories which consider the interests, rights and liberties 
of the individual C self interests' theories), and there are those which consider the basic 
rights and entitlements of all. And, though chronologically modem theory foVows 
after classical theory, it definitely has its own culture of theorising justice and can be 
distinguished from classical culture. But fundamentally, justice has always been 
discussed on two planes: rational and natural dialecticism and metaphysical 
dialecticism. 
These are the same planes that were used by the earliest known philosophers on the 
concept of justice. Because modem culture is witnessing a surge in the writings on 
justice, modern theories of justice invariably take up the lion's share in this thesis. Of 
major concern, are the prolific writings on justice in the latter half of this century 
particularly those of Rawls, Nozick, Kelsen, Honore, Brian Barry and Miller and a 
spate of articles in learned journals. 
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And then there is the problem of justice and internationalism, and justice and gender. 
This is· a new area of growing concern in matters of ju�tice, and I will explain a little 
bit of it here before examining it in detail.· Under international justice, the discourse 
is about rights to fair co-operation in international trade and commerce, in 
international relations and in t�e use of world resources on the high seas, international 
waters or inland. 
In this discourse, the argument is about existence of a just international order in which 
natio�s and multinationals act responsibly. This is a call for all nations to act as 
agents for global welfare. But this also operates under certain conditions of justice. 
These are: that states have to show and act with an inclination towards global justice, 
operate within principles of mutual (global) responsibility and give due consideration 
to the basic needs of particular nations and peoples especially in the third world. All 
these are discussed within the role of modem theories and one or two classical 
theories. 
In discussing modem theory of justice v1s-a-v1s the idea of international justice, 
Rawls's theory of justice is mainly the subject of discussion. This is because, the 
question of international justice is about the need for redistribution of economic and 
social welfare. But because international justice also concerns consideration of the 
entitlements to national resources, Rawls's theory is compared and contrasted with 
Nozick's theory of entitlement. 
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The discussion of Nozick's theory of entitlement also helps us to question the 
feasibility of the theory of interaction, intervention and the principles of co-operative 
reciprocity in issues of international justice. In addition, we also discuss and weigh the 
views of cosmopolitan and communitarian justice. Both of these, have certain 
reservations for international justice. Cosmopolitans believe in the interests of 
individuals and want to see people's interests furthered, whatever the consequences on 
the global level. Communitarians argue that people belong to certain communities and 
it is this they want to improve in the global order. 
My argument is that, in issues of international justice, two principles are indispensable: 
justice as fair reciprocity and justice as mutual responsibility of nations. From the 
angle of moral responsibility, nations have to understand that the question of justice 
between countries is like that between individuals: it operates under a presumption of 
moral equality. 
Under the principle of fair reciprocity, justice between nations operates via the dictates 
of interdependence. In one way or the other, we need to reciprocate or else, some 
countries will be emprovished by others. In fact, justice as fair reciprocity requires 
that those nations of the North which once conquered and exploited the South, must 
distribute part of their economic development through equitable terms to benefit the 
emproverished South. 
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This is because, in the past, people in the third world "through domination and 
exploitation", have been made worse off by the imperial and colonial policies of 
countries of the North. 
"They have been driven into bargains they would not have made if they 
had not been driven to the wall. They are plainly being coerced and 
they are surely not being treated as moral equals". 2 
The vital issue to consider is that nations are naturally interdependent, that the scarce 
resources for basic needs have been unfairly placed and that the necessity for massive 
redistribution of international wealth and welfare is the inevitable mode of international 
justice. 
Feminists too have challenged the existent notion of justice. Their argument is that 
current trends in law and justice neglect important feminist ideals. This is particularly 
because, for centuries, many theories of justice and the literature on justice have taken 
women's rights for granted and do not address them as equals with men. 
Like the argument for countries of the South in international justice, the concern for 
feminists is that women have not got their dues for far too long. There is thus a need 
to address the question of justice in view of the feminist critique of law and justice. 
Again, like in international justice, this requires us to recognise the fact that some kind 
2 Nielsen. K., 'Global Justice, Capitalism and the Third world' in R. Attfield 
and B. Wilkins (eds), International Justice and the Third World. (Newyork: 
Routledge, 1992) 28. 
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of redistributive theory has to be considered before women can be brought within 
current mainstream justice. 
But, whatever the theory of redistribution, the important thing to consider and which 
I hope will be realised in this thesis is that the existent .theories of justice are not 
without problems: They are inconsistent, inadequate, implausible and contradictory. 
Take for example Rawls' s theory which is based on a very assumptive premise that to 
understand justice we need to be similarly situated and ignorant of our particular 
interests. Or, Nozick's theory of entitlements which is too rigid to facilitate a 
balancing of people's claims. Or, consider that of Kelsen which begins with arguments 
for relativity but ends up in absolutist assertions, etc. 
Therefore, in the wake of all this, it is relevant and I believe necessary, to discuss and 
analyse in detail, the various theories of justice, and then consider whether a concern 
for the variations between them can possibly lead to a more adequate theory of justice. 
Methodology 
This thesis investigates the concept of justice through the study of various works on 
justice, particularly through an analysis of the major philosophical and theoretical 
formulations on the subject. The selection of theories and formulations of justice 
discussed in this thesis is· based on their relevancy to the contemporary debate on 
justice, the conflicts -they pose to [h�·aJre:idy existing writings on the subject and the 
criticism they incite for the consideration of 'burning' issues. of justice in modern 
umes. 
In discussing the theories exammed in this thesis, I have attempted to arrange the 
discourse in a ·historic sequence so that we can see and compare how the ideas emerge 
and flow with time. This is basically in regard to classical and modern theories of 
justice. But, because utilitarianism, Marxism and Islamic justice are distinctly unique, 
I have chosen not to discuss them under this sequence but preferred to analyse them 
separately. 
Generally, chis thesis seeks co answer the following questions: 
l. 
11. 
111. 
IV. 
What criteria and formulae are followed in defining the concept of justice? 
How do established tradition and literature in jurisprudence and legal theory 
approach the concept of justice? 
What :ire the difficulties and inadequacies to consider in this tr:idition? 
What a.re the variations, contlicts and interrelations in the different theories and 
formulations on the concept of justice and what do they point at? 
9. 
v. What is the future of the justice question in law and theory? In view of the
inadequacies, conflicts and interrelationship between theories of justice, how
far is it possible to ·uggest (formulate) a feasible and more adequate concept
of justice in modem times?
Essentially, a substantial portion of this thesis is devoted to illustrating that almost 
all theories of' justice are quite varied and yet similar in one way or the other, 
sometimes speaking of justice in a common vocal cord with different tones, and at 
other times talking justice in utterly different cords with the same tones. 
Chapter I introduces and briefly discusses selected approaches to an explanation and 
definition of justice, as well as analysing the central features and themes of what 
justice entails. 
Chapter II discusses the principle theories of justice viz: classical and modern theories 
and the particular conflicts and variations. Throughout this chapter, a critical 
discourse is emphasised. Chapter III is an analysis of the Utilitarian and Marxist 
views on justice and their interrelation. 
10 
Chapter IV is devoted to a discussion of the grand theory Islam presents in explaining 
justice. The fulcrum of our discussion here will be Shari'a (Islamic Law) and 
philosophy. This will involve an examination of Qur' anic and prophetic injunctions 
on justice, as well as an analysis of the views of Muslim scholars - both modern and 
medieval. 
Chapter V and VI discuss the critique of the concept of justice in modern issues, 
particularly, under the feminist critique of law and justice, and the demand for a more 
just global co-existence. 
Chapter VII discusses the general similarities and differences between major theories 
of justice and the contributions that can arise from such a comparison in so far as the 
meaning of justice is concerned. 
Chapter VIII discusses the existence of a universal conception of justice. In this 
chapter I shall argue that the natural and plausible conception of justice is that one 
which functions under the dictates of the universe and the natural ties of human kind. 
This basically means that a single but comprehensive, constant and consistent approach 
to justice must be reached. 
I shall conclude by arguing that if there is to be a successful and true conception of 
justice, then both reason and nature ought to be given a harmonised view in any theory 
that attempts to explain the meaning of justice. This, I propose, is perhaps the right 
approach to justice. 
Abstract 
CHAPTER I 
DEFINING JUSTICE 
The idea of justice can be identified in six forms; legal, philosophical, ethi.ca1, 
theological, political and social justice. In the legal sense of the word, justice can be 
defined as that measure, scale or standard which binds and weighs human conduct. 
This is by creating entitlements and rights which bind a person with another and with 
society. In this context, justice is that by which ideals are put into practice and it 
stems from rationalisation and human reason. 
Philosophically, and ethically, justice is contained in 'expressions of expectations' 
which make it a mere ideal viewed in the 'ought'. In the ethical sense, justice is the 
expression of human virtues derived from laws (of nature and God). Therefore, 
ethically, justice resides and is to be found in that which aligns with the highest virtue. 
That is to say, justice is no more than that standard which conforms people to the 
highest (conduct of) virtues. This makes justice itself a virtue of the highest 
eminence.' 
Aristotle.Nichomachean Ethics V(I), at I 74(Thomson J.K. Trans. 1953). 
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In the philosophical sense, justice is also a standard measure but is one that is only 
determinable and intelligible by reason. Both ethical and philosophical conceptions 
categorise justice into natural, divine and rational justice. The distinction between 
ethical and philosophical conceptions is largely rooted in the idea that ethically, justice 
is conceived in terms of moral and religious terms, while philosophical conceptions are 
hugely dependent on reason. For example, ethically, Islam equates justice with 
righteousness and therefore sees that which is just (in the ethical sense) as that scaie 
prevalent in religious (divine) obligations, duties, rights, morals: theistic love and 
beauty2 etc. 
Theologically, justice is resident in the realisation of God's (divine) essence and 
perfection of human beings. This is twofold. A person's innate nature possesses a free 
will; he or she can choose to tread the path of evil and wrong doing (injustice) or that 
of doing good and righteousness (Justice). To achieve the latter, a person has to strive 
to live his or her life and conduct as a translation of God's commands and prohibitions 
into a reality. 3 This, in other words, perfects those who walk their life with God's
essence translated into their conduct in life. This involves people taking full 
responsibility for the acts of their free will. 
2 
3 
The Islamic myst1c1sm (sufism) see justice as that which stems m the 
maintenance of moral values which repel evil and create goodness. 
A Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an Translation and Commenta,y. (Maryland: 
Amana Corp., 1983), 8:53, 10:45, 17:47.
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Justice can also be defined in the political and social sense. Politically, it can be 
defined as that standard measure determined by the 'sovereign' in the government of 
human affairs. This may be in the sovereign constitution of the state, the Parliament, 
the absolute monarchy, e.t.c. Whoever it may be, political justice demands that the 
measure of governing human affairs i� by the law of the sovereign. This equates 
justice to conformity with the Jaw of the sovereign. 
In the social sense, justice is positive in nature and has been defined in distributive 
terms. It is usually definable according to human experience and acceptable 
(established) convention. Social justice is now the most popular and debatable 
concept. All in all, the task of defining 'justice' revolves around one key word: 
balance, standard, scale or measure. The problem of finding justice has been not so 
much the crux of distribution but rather its content. In this regard many approaches 
have been adopted in the quest to define justice. 
Some have tackled the question of justice by way of the metaphysics of virtue, others 
through a reasoned and rationalistic analysis of values. Plato is among those who 
tried to approach justice from a metaphysical mind - that is, considering justice as an 
absolute moral concept metaphysically perceived under a dialectic cognition. This is 
perhaps because (as can be seen in The Republic II) he considers justice- as the 
absolute good that can only be attained by a return to the natural arrangement of 
things. 
1� 
order in hidi '\ay one! 1-. 1n indcpl:mknt mcmbt:r of a Ullt\er al order whi h 
operate \ ithin an organi unit} of a \\hole. In u h r er all 
pec1t'ic (uni..:uon to perform .tnd , ll · 1� .ma111ubk b} :11.:h oing their proper 
funcuon. 
ri tot! vie, ed ju tice under rhical perception and r pre ent the rationali tic 
approach to JU ttce. Hi· vie\ i · that , hat I la fut. or fair. i 'ju t'.-1 To ri totle. 
defining ju rice i omething identifiable in equality and equitable eating -. hich i 
di tingui hed in the di tributive and orrecti e form of ju tice. Defining ju tice in 
the naruml ·en e require redi ·co enng natural law and finding ju tic . Thi 
, here JU t1ce fall within the uni ersal di tate. But on entionall . JU tice tern from 
authority and po 1ti"e law which beg u to approach JU Lice from le0al calculu . 
In the di tnbutive f mi. Ari ·tot le argue that JU ·ti e mean· r \ ard . ri=ht and 
honour-. J ·ordm0 to roport1onate -!quality. But in th orre ·tiv form. ju ti 1 • to 
e defined m tenn · of that " h1ch ;:,uarantee · uch equitable allocation . and mani e t 
r _ tor:.Hion r maintenanc f the caru: qu . 0th 'r phi! opher have t nd d to 
explain JU t1 in tenn of preci value· ·uch a· fre dom. quality and ntitlem nc 
r �1 vm0 ach their ue. 
or c .• unplt:. n t tic aw n thing wr ng with lJ\'CI) in h1 . lav ·1 ty
1 ng 1-. h · n r · a ·1 rdi 1g < 1:iw and lr:uli ic n tr· the ni: th.u 
ar ,1dc lav s. 
t. quinas argued on a imil r note po rulating th t: "Justic i habit of r nd ring 
each their due under a perperual will" .5 Herbert pencer describes it more pr ci ely:
the cardinal definition of ju tice i in equal fr edom and ju tic i in "Ever on 
doing that which he [or he] wills provided he [or she] infringe not on the qua! 
freedom of others. "6 
Thi i lo er to Kamism, for a broad under randing of Kant's categorical imperati e 
require that just per ons conduct themsel with a view that harm co other ' righcs 
and a pirations must be a oided. Basi Uy, to th Gre ks tbe law was very important 
since in it is contained the content of justice and the latter was seen as the nd of the 
law. But generally, ancient Greek philosophers a father of th earch for the 
meaning of justice employed maxims uch a .:,ood for good. e ii for vii and ach 
a cording to their due as channels from , hich the oment of ju tice an be deri ed. 
The e maxims and many other are but ab olute elf e idem elem ntS of narur . 
From the religious (particularly Judaic-christjan-mo lem cone prions. ju tice i agian 
een in terms of the ideal perfect Law. But reli,::,iou concepti ns are limited to 
ubjecti icy. After all. religion i a matter f the heart a th at f human motions 
and c ntrol. On th heart i under ontrol th n a uni er al. human and di in 
p culate i m t id al. I lam tt mp t 
ill r, ocial Justic 
n, O\' red my. n Inquiry into th 
niv r it hi l 
niv ity 1979 , 1 
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law which i extra human, but act as the bea on light ho\ ing th w, co human 
perfection. 7 
Such perfection is anainable through a community of believer who cran cend an cla 
distinctions in the conduce of human ffair . The \ hol human ra 1 a ingle 
indivi ible order rooted in upholding the truth and righteou ne as the ba ic cale 
of right conduce. Thus, in defining justice among individuals. religiou notions in thi 
manner will urge distinctions in term of fun tions, only the b sc being that who i 
foremost in righteousness. Thi i the ju t conduct and i only re 1isable by following 
the lener of the ideaJ - perfect Law of God. 
Basically thi i a rnaner of faith and can only b expre sed by existence of a 
community of people who collecti ely and indi idually believe in the divine law as the 
ource of perfect judgement. But leaping through the works of modem philo ophers 
it can be een that it i the influenc of la ical philo oph r that till ontrol the 
debate on justice. It is through thi ein that current theori ts have come out with 
etter and rationally acceptable altemati e definitions of ju tice. 
r example. Ari t tie' clivi ion of ju tic int i tributi and ommutati e bran h . 
which i hith re u urpa d ha· en at tht! h Im f n w th rie . 
Thu·. r m lar. 1 m. Hurni m. tililatariani m an al ii riani m t urr m the rie 
f th L\ micth century. th n cpt f di triburi n f \ alth and r eny ha t • n 
A. u ·uf Ali. Th 1/0/1,• comm 111 ry - _;l.
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the lion's hare of tht: ear h to ju ti e mu h o tht c. in oncemporary time \ h n
we t lk o 'ju ti e • nd f: irne ', the mger ine it bl point at emit! menc to nd
, llo cion of right and re, ard . rath r than ekin.:. c find the inn r one nt o chi
s emingly illu i e and undefinable virtue. 
Hov e er, in all attempcs to define ju tic on fearur r mains illuminati ly triking: 
the debate on justice is on that reflect a disturbing t n ion b tw n conflicting 
demands commonly claim d an what ju tice eek to do i to draw a line between 
these demands through a me ure th t strikes a balance. 
Therefore. co arri e t a meaningful onception of ju tice would r quire that we 
examine all po ible rational classification of justice· v hether ommutative, 
distributi e. ub tanti e or procedural. But in emphasising this requirement. we must 
nor forget that the root of anaJy ing ju ti e. like all other analy ise of virrues. begins 
v ith its ontenr. or far long ago. th utilitarians ought to how that defining ju tice 
i een in the re ults of human onduct and p tulated that ju tice m ans valuing human 
behaviour in terms of it ffect . That which aim t producing the greate t po ible 
um of happin i n t onl th 
Thi· i au c. th ar hit 
happin and ha pin it If i 
th key t dt:tinin ju ti 
I emit! d t an rhin ith r 
t but al the ju t onduct. 
f utilitariani m th u ht th r 11 hu n triv 
tut m ral prm ipl ondu c. 
of mmurur 
y ndu t r then i . unJ
ar fi r 
them 
d fl C
happine in tho e term . Thi . a hall be een I t r n, arri s \ ith it a lot o 
question . In a much a ju tice i tended to be explained in terms of plea ur it th n 
be ome a matter f ubje ti e intere ts, whether geographic II , on prually or 
c ntexrually. 
More recently modem cheori t like Rawls and Brian Barry ha e come forward and 
explained ju tice in rational terms - nothing new but a ort of ba khanding on the old 
approach to defining justice. Besides these two, Honore's attempt to explain the 
always nagging question about ju tice goes along the ame line and falls within the 
ame critique: backhanding an old approach with nothing ab olutely new in the new 
approach. everthele s, it is an illuminating adventure to analyze the theorie that 
these people stri e to pre ent a an attempt to further explain the m arung of what 
justice is. Perhap it would be more helpful for u to have a quick look at the 
principle of ju rice (Honorean tyle) and what they offer in defining ju rice before we 
go into a eep an ly is of the e theorie . 
The H n r an tan e i that n m le formula can di pla ' the m anin f Lh 
f JU uce, � r ·c 1 illu i nary t lie an im in lhat in�I f nnul f ju ti 
mu t exi t � re hat i · JU t r n t. 
ju ti e ar uc · c ndary • ct f ju uce. 
n prin ipl 
the ar um nc 
that ju cice i , m ct r e u I cl im to e 
1 
in all d ant ge \ hi h ar 
ommonly d ired and , hich are on lu ive to human welfar . Thi eem t be th 
main principle through which justice can b xplained. B cau p opl ar mainly 
equal in nature. chi prin iple (of equal claim ) therefore eem the only ne that i 
ju t, for it lead to ocial cabilicy. Thi i b cau e such principl cone in the 
requirement of affinnati e di criminatory treatment in favour o the le pri il ge 
a to bring people clo r to equality with other . But th explanation of ju ti in th 
term doe not equate to a claim for equal tre tm m, for pracricall all people are 
greacl varied although such variation i not great enough to o ershadow th argum m 
for ju tice a claims to equal opportunity. That i it is narural that people must ha e 
equal claims but it is natural coo that uch claims may be dis imilar. 
Along these line . Honore attempts co define justice in social term by putting up two 
propo itions: 
a All ople are entitled, th a human being and from their ondu t or ch ic , 
to ha e a claim to and an equal hare in th ad antag whi h ar g nerally 
d ired an which ar con lu i to th ir 11 ing. Thi 
whi h explains ju tice a equal ntitlemem to ba i n d 
;\. . H Mc ill Law Joum l 7 . 
j • p. 7 
rin iple 
_Q 
b There i a limited et o factor which can ju tify d parrure from principle 
emb died in the ba ic principle. This pr ides the principl 
which modify the laim chat people are entitled to qua! har in all 
ad ancage . 10 
The principle of di crimination rotate around the choice and conduct of the claimant 
and are ideally reali able in ecuring equali ation through the econdary aspects of 
justice \ hich are: 
i) conformity to rule. 11 
ii) ju rice according to need. 12
111 ju tice according to merit or de ere. 13
1v justice according to choice. 14
v ju rice according to pecial relation . 15 
vi ju rice a re. toration of tatu quo. 16 
10 I id. p. 79. 
II I id. p. ... -6. 
I? Ibid. p. 91-
IJ Ibid. p. 6- 1. 
Ibid, p. 
1$ I id. p. 1---
l 1d. p. -1.
-1
The ea pe t f ju ti e perate xc ption to argum nc of equal claim . Under the 
prin iple f c nf rmiry t che rule. ju tice i een a man r f leaving thing a they 
are r m incaining the taru qu . Thi make ju tic per ade the regular and habicu I 
conduct of affair in a given o iery. When such habit change then ju tice too will 
und rgo change. 
Conformity to rule. therefore, a an a p t of justice epend on th xi ten e of 
regular practice \ hich gi es the impres ion to tho e affected that the rule (practice) 
ought co be adhered to. In the Honerean terms, onformicy to rule manife ts ju rice 
under the prernis that: · e pectations reasonably entertained ought to be respected and 
that there hould be consistent treatment.' This i what reflects ju rice a a matter f 
treating everyone equally (by conforming to rules) through the maxim 'treat like ca es 
alike' - , hich imply means that people falling under the ame pre criptions mu t b 
treated alike. not that ase alike in ome other resp ct hould be o treated. o to
Honore it appear that onformity to rul a a matter of ju ti e doe not email creating 
unlike 1 ca e differently. al eit it equal to giving each hi or h r du . But Honore 
accep the ide of conformity to rule a an el m nt f cial ju tice although he 
ar�ue that the rule mu t not unfair. 1 
that tr unlik ca 
wJoumal. 
unlike i part f 
nJ p rt f 
e A. 
Ju tice as m tt r of restoring the taru quo, Honor argu , 1 r ccifying ju cice and 
makes no di tinction betv een p r on and p r n, r per on and tate. 19 II that 
matter i re toring the identical thing tran tigur d either in value r phy i al i rm. 
In es ence, the ju tice according to restoring the tatus quo i nly intere t d in 
re rirution or restoring the original po ition and doe not lead to a fair allocation of 
rewards. So in thi way it perhap appears just to invoke an eye for an e e without 
funher inquiries. 
Under the ju tice of pecial relations and that of choice, the pointer of justice ha to be 
traced from particular situations. Under choice, justice is co be traced in oluntarine s. 
\Ve consider whether this trea_tment matches , ich a per on' oluntary a t . Under 
pecial relation ju rice i restricted co obligation bet, e n clo e a ociarion . Her 
people are not considered as person per e but as closely r lated m mber of society, 
e.g. father and child.
On justice a a matter of de ert or merit, Honore argues th t h re the prin iple i in the 
allocation of reward according to apacicy and p rformanc , be it actual or potential.::o 
That i 
fi r go 
111 
.o 
ay ea h i to b tr ated ac ording co hi or her conduct and ability. G 
and e ii for e ii. 
1 td. p. 0-1 
hi i h m rit. 
_3 
Ju ti a a m uer of merit is th refore weighing reward in r rm of prop nion ro 
conduct and bility well a the act of being upplemenced by priorit am ng 
competing claims. Thus. where th re ar ompeting cl im the principle of de en 
dictates that justice will be derived by giving prior right of entitlement to th per on 
who ha the highest merit. 
Thus, under desert, justice is the fair treatment c ording to \ hat one d er . Bue 
this doe not extend to demerits like punishment. The major problem of d fining 
justice in these terms lies in how to determine merit and demerit and how to fix the 
levels of deserts to each. 
oreo er, it is viral co note that the rules by i.: hich the principle of de err is to be 
applied must be just. Therefore, justice a a maner of de err. argue Honore. need 
the aid of ome other principle that can make it possible o a to ha e fair claim a 
members of ociery and not in ingular form a uch. Thi cause e er one 
de erves a little di ad antage and a much advantage a c n be managed.:? 1
oreover. en in di tributi term , th ju rice of d ns fail to ha e a wide 
pectrum f allocation of advantag and cann t uffi iently how h \ a fair all ation
of re idual urplu n be a ii d. m n r f de rt.
h \ can \ e arriv at a fair on lu i n f, h d ne t live an , h d e n't'.
::1 
It mativcly, if all de ·er e t liv , h \ mu h f life hould ea h d rv ·. 
ial Ju ti e' (1 6 ) lcGi/1 w Journal l.
II in all, Honore ee d rt a a principle f ju ti if approach d from a broad iev . 
but not so if cackled from a narrow per p cti e. It i prin ipl of justi e b cau it 
i based on the argument that each ha right t entitlem nt ac ording to hi or h r 
contribution in the ociety. It i not a principle of ju rice becau e it allocate reward 
according to particular conduct or contribution nd not considerations of hum nity. 
This in ariably brings in the r quirement of ju tice according to ne d. Under thi 
principle, con ideration of merit or contribution and ability are outweigh d by 
con ideration of fundamental requirements of person (need fulfilment in definin.:,
justice. 
That i why Honore argues that in understanding ju rice in thi manner. the principle 
of need is more fundamental than that of merit. 
"It is more fundamental in the ense that it i held to out weigh th latter 
principle when tho e advantage which are of fundamental importance, 
that i , rho \ hich are mo t generally st emed and are mo t 
conclu i to a full exi tence, are cone med, .g. lifi . h alth. helter 
and food. "22
Thu • the claim of ju rice that deri e from ne d r quire entitlem m of rights to the 
ba ic ne e iti s to any dy who i in v ant f the am . Thi oblige other to 
contribut o a to reli e tho e in need. ut n d mu t obj ti e. n 
Ibid. 
lbi 'p. ... 
,­_:, 
. Hl)nor trgucs that. lik mer r. ·eed c0O. s pnnc1pk or' jus c--. r Ii s on the
ailoc cion uf vancages Jnd isadvamages. But here whac maners mosr is che 
er ve long the ;Jeed . rmc1ple resi es m che fa c rhac chere re c nam 
- n amenc�l! advamages which :ire �enera!ly desired and which if not provided will
mean rhe end of exmence an elfare ro chose rhac e esirous of the same. 
Therefore. m the Honorean cerms. justice according to need means thar people must: 
e encitlea co claun those a vanrages which they objecti ely ack \ hen seen ro be in 
ee . his .1eed is lirnite in ·ime an space but m be · red in mything · ac · s 
ssemial for human existence and decenc ontinuation of life. 
here ·ore. ·o detenmne \ hat J.mouncs :o ee .. e a 'e o see ow much :i th.in:: :s 
c:ssenc1a �o . uman welfare l!ld existence life). The more ·nctesipensible it is. the 
more iL oecornes .1 ·ru 1al as pee ur"; sti .. ch r's bsenc .. will mem o :isten ·o ay 
for JUSt1ce. 
o It ap ear rul� ·en·, le f r H nore t con id r, need. a c rollary a pect of ju tic
ut it I mi. leading t JUde \Vhat amount. t ne d tn t rm· f merel \ hat o le
d I r what th 1·,,., nerall.v think. le:.1 · t we I for ! Tht \\ 111commonl: r •gar a es1ra e -
I · 111cc nee I mu t e c nc 'I\ <l in 1ectiv t rm . tt c· n rnak ne d clu I ely r alt\C. 
ther f( re not ubj ct· th tnaJ ntarian tid ' In oth r r sp ccs. Honor also
argu s that ju ll c 1 -. ichrn Lhc ·onfin · f g d · and ad anc
1 d finabl and oul be foun in equality pportunicy \ h1 h r quire th t: 
E .. r oc :> moer of so� e ·. : :is 
t ;<!:i.sc y m l:!SS nrial vantag s and his emails 
equa1isat10n of at least cercain advantages. -4 
prior -: m :o 
is nbuuon Jr 
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·senc
not all a antage an b availed to each and e ery indi i ual. but 
once e eryone afforded equ I opportunity to all ad antage , then quity in 
di tribution of ad ancage will en ue. Equality of opportunity  manife t in gi ing each 
that which make it po ible to compete fair! in acquiring e ir d happine . It doe 
not mean acquiring the ame f cilitie . 
This mems :· ere ou=:hc o e equa aims ·or lll in as ·ar as me:lllS an .-acilities of 
acquiring va1lable opporrunicies Jre one med. This miers ex.1s ence of an bsoluce 
posrulace of just -.. only llter:ible through secondary aspects of social justice. Honore 
·urns c m If - rem style:
_:i-h houl e 
dis nnunation based 
opporrurury ' :s 
n ... qual .:bun o 11 
n the pnnciple of 
dvama=:e. subje... o 
esen an equallry of 
So in J nu she I. Honor e Js us thac 3usu I J eman ·or qua! nc emems an 
::., 
I h d " ,., s T 1s meJns at iscnmmauon 1s 1ncoler:ible unless 1t is.u lf S In 'uOui= . 
fbid. p. 00. 
blil. p. o.,.
man ·or qualisa on f utlement. 
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hi works along the econdary principle a p cts o ju tice among \: hjch need app ar 
to be by far the mo t influential for it operate under the premi e that certain needs are
priQr to ocher and dictate th t ju tice require a reallocation and equali ation f
advantages, o a to put each in the same position before any kind of discrimination is
e tabli hed. 
Basically, justice concerns the balancing and equitable (fair) exchange of claim in a 
world of competing intere rs. Thi is the role but what is the goal? I would venture 
to think that the answer to chi lie in the desire to remove all arbitrary inequalitie and 
the need to maintain a social order based on social wellbeing for all.
Justice can al o be looked at from t\: o angles: 'justice a murual advantage' and 
'justice a impartiality'. This is the view of Brian Barry. Ju tice as muruaJ ad antage 
require the recognition that humans are elf-imere ted indi iduaJ who must depend 
on mutual co-operation to achie e a balan ed ord r: , hile ju tic a impartia1ly 
e entiaJ!y means fairn in terms of what i generally ace ptable to rational being . 16 
qua I itariani ts a pr ach ju ti from th pre umption prin ipJe f equality. nd r 
thi , e find ri totJ ' di rum: "Tr at equal cas qually and un qua! a 
C \ 
Ju ticc' 
n' re it!, f Bri n rry' Th ories of Jusri e in ' h m: f 
10 l 11,e Philosophic I Re ie, . 
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unequally". In it too lie divine arguments of justice based on a view of human
equality. ince equalitarian approache to justice are based on a presumption of human 
equality their argument i that justice is in treating people with exact equalit . This
principle work along two premises: 
1) Treat all as equals
2) Unles and until there are good reasons to justify a departure from equal
treatment.
Thi means that under equalitarian principle, justice should be perceived as the art of 
viewing individuals from the outset as equals and not entenaining any differentiations 
whatsoe er until sound reasons come into play to dictate otherwise. But Aristotelian 
equalitarianism is different. For him there is a pre-existing presumption that 
individuals are alike and different and therefore the just principle is that which 
categories them into rwo: 
Treating ome (equals) equally and other (the unlike) differently 1.e. 
unequally. 
einburg e plain that the e ualitarian principl ught to operat n the pr mi chat
f it appr a h ne d ju tification. That i : 
th the d artur fr m treatin ( emin::.lY lik p ople 
th dep rur fr m tr ating un ually. p opl who em or are alike, 
need material ju tification or el e justice fails to exi t in the en of 
equality. 27
B ically, equalitariani m works on the basi that people po es rtain trait whi h 
group them in certain categories that require similar or dis imilar approach to how they 
are to be treated. Thi has been termed a pre ump ti e ba i . 
"The pre umption in favour of equal treatment holds when the 
individuals involved are belie ed, as urned or expected to be equal in 
the relevant respects. whereas the presumption in favour of unequal 
treaonent holds when the individual involved are expected to be 
different in the relevant respects". 28 
• 
This is very true but it doesn't hold for all equalitarian approaches to justice. For 
instance Islam is one of. those di ine religions that tackle the question of justice from 
an equalitarian principle but Islam does not hold much on the relevant a pects of like 
or unlike. Equalitarianism in Islam, as we hall see, re olves around uniformity of 
presumptive principles. 
Equalitariani m, a a principle of ocia1 ju tice has its core or roots in the belief in the
idea of perfect equality. Thi in turn is based on the belief that the ery nature and
characteri tic of human being emand that ju Lice be en a that whicb maintain .
reinforce or preserve the equality of p ople. gain thi argument i mo t acceptable
m di ine r religiou theorie f ju tic H we er. m 
prop ni nate equality we cann t Ii e th trict (in th 
�7 inbur J. ocial Philosoph_ (1 7 , pp. 1 -1. 
2 Ibid. p. 101. 
of 
f the , ord)
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equalitarian principle of ju tice a some cholars have posrulated. 29 For in 
ristotelani m, it i not much the humanity of mankind that counts but its status or 
c tegory. 
Strictly, equalitariani m if given it true meaning, requires that there be ab olute 
equality of treatment. This is what and how the equalitarian principle of justice is 
relevant to the concept of justice. But strict equalitariani m on its own will make 
discussions on ju tice impossible to a certain. After all just as we presume and see 
that people are equal in nature and characteristics so we can also as ume that they are 
different too. This can be in either their characteri tics or manneri ms. 
With chi in view, equalitarian principles then need to adjust from the strict stance and 
move to moderation. This relieves the problem of justice for then we can define justice 
under equalitarian principles but with room for the categorisation of people's natures 
and characteri tic . Thi i what accommodate the Ari totelian 'desert principle' 
within the equalitarian principle of ju tice. But even under moderate equalitarianism 
justice till remain restricted to a umptions of a ingle equality. Thi further 
demand that ju ti e be defined under numerou principle and not through a ole 
basic principle of equality. 
Tak for example, ca e -. h re th r ar om handi ap d indi idual and om 
n rm l unhandi app 
Ibid. p. 1 
p r n . The principl f ab elute e uaJity \ ill not d fine 
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justice here without causing harm. Neither an we ay that moderate equalitariani m 
will olve the problem. For if we are to ay that let us apply the dictum: treat like 
cases alike and unlike ca es unlike; what if among the unlik the handicapp ct ar 
funher differences which are singularly unique? Even among the like ca uch 
difference may exi t. There are many criteria of classifying people and it eem 
wrong to argue that under the doctrine of classification of people into equals and 
unequals justice will be done. This i b cause among every ingle group of people 
there are infinite differences and similarities. 
Thus, individuals have unique biological social and psychological differences which 
dictate that, although equality is a basic principle of justice it is not the only vital 
principle. All people share much in common with others but some are srronger. hard 
working individuals, while others are lazy and idle, yet ome may be hard working 
and lucky and others hard working and unlucky uch a those busines persons who 
al d
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happen to ha e natur 1sa ters. etc. 
These reasons bring u co the econd principle of ju rice; which is the non-equalitarian 
principle. Under thi principle justic can be defined in term of merit and need. The 
latter in olves le ser component principles and unlike the former cann t be e tended 
to in lude u h a  pe cs a ability. effi rt. hie emenc. et . 
einbur , Opt. it. p. 117. 
32 
That i , need i a description of the ab ence f natural nece iti v hich everyon 
ought t ha e, while merit pre uppo es the ab enc of a corre ponding entitlement 
r ulting rom people' input or conduct. But under trier equali rianism. the concept 
of need i not a principle of justice for trict-equalitarianism presuppo es absolute 
similarity of individual . 
Yet the concept of need mandates that some people may be entitled to more allocations 
than others; so as to do away with the distinction between the haves and have nots. 
And I think it is because of th.is requirement that need as a concept can be used to 
rectify the pitfalls of trict equalirarianism. This is one way in which need can be 
considered part of the principles of equalitarian justice. The otber way is where we 
understand need as a matter so essential to human existence that its absence means 
material hann to those who lack it.31 In this case also need will be used as a principle 
of justice by creating individuals differently in accordance to what they lack so as to 
bring them in line with tho e others who ha e it. E enrually, by evening the haves and 
have nots the concept of need then become a principles of equalitarian justice. 
Therefore Feinburg i right to ay that: 
31 
32 
" ... co di tribute good in proportion co ba ic need i not really to
depart from a ·tan ard of equality. but rath r to bring tho v ith om 
greater initial burden of deficit up t the am 1 vel a their fellow ". 32
ein urg, ibid, p. 111. 
einburg, pt. it .. p. 111. 
.,3 
This i \: here we can align with Feinburg for here hi argument is that there are certain 
basic need that are pr nt in all (normal) human beings which mean that in thi 
regard all re equal and the ba ic approach to ju tice would be the equalitarian 
application of (ba ic) need . 33 Effort and contribution are closely related aspects of the 
non-equalicarian principle of justice. Thi is becau e in one way or the ocher, they all 
attempt to define justice under the concept of merit. It all depends on what we 
under rand by the concept of merit. 
For Feinburg, merit is eparable from the other two principles of equalitarianism. This 
is because, he argues, merit unlike effort and contribution, defines justice according 
to what a person is instead of what he or she does. 34 I find this puzzling for the two 
major feature of merit are the skills and virtues a person carries, yet we cannot merit 
or demerit a person unless he or she expresses the skills and virtues he or she 
po se ses. 
Thus, having skills or virtues per se does not determine where one falls for it matters 
most what he or he doe with them (particularly the skills). Then it follow that merit 
inevitably interrwined with effort and contribution. Moreover. a Feinburg hints: 
a a matter of illu tration no ju tice can be defined through that which punishes people 
3J einburg divid s need into natural and artificial. The fonner ar natural
human n itie and the latt r are all th e n d imp rt d in ople y th ir 
urr unding r y up-bringing. Th.i anificial n d ) rhap appe r . in the 
ein urg' view t fall in ch non-equalitarian mp.
34 
inbur , p. cit., p. 11 - . 
34 
for what they ar instead f what they do!35 We cannot consider a matter of merit,
h ving certain natural trait a just or unjust - uch traits must be put into material 
application b fore being entitled to the appellation.36 
Thu contribution and effort come into play. According to Feinburg contribution is 
not a principle of mere desen but works along the lines of commutative justice 
effecting proportionate returns. Put in marxisc arguments, it is a principle which 
defines justice in terms of abilities. 37 For example. in a situation of equal abilities 
those who do more or bener will gee bener and more entitlements. Bue in a situation 
of uneven abilities, each will be treated according co how far his or her capacities can 
reach. It means. that none will be given a burden beyond what his or her capacities 
can bear and none will receive rewards beyond what his or her real needs are. Thus 
broadly contribution as a mini principle of equality should be seen in such a way in 
which everyone' effort (contribution) is weighed as pan and parcel of the resultant 
aeoreoate whi h all hare. In thi regard. need will be added to contribution in matter _,.:, .:, 
of di tributive ju tice. 
J5 
J6 
7 
[bid. p. 113. 
H \: ver. merit an u ed t d me ju tice in t rm fall ati n f due .
Her Feinburg' int rpretation of merit hold . Thi i au e cordin c 
merit rac ea h h hi r h r p iti n. tho e \ ith c rtain kill and 
virtu . fi r exarnpl , r ntitle to what i th ir in that r gard. pp d 
t their unt rpart . 
·einbur it. pp. 114-6. 
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Thi i und r th argument that if we only con ider contribution without need - then 
ultimately there will b no contribution at all, for the contributors have needs crucial 
to su t in th ir ability to contribute. Effort a a principle of ju rice works under the 
ba i of individual toil. One would merit the reward and burdens according to one's 
toil. However. as Feinburg rightly argues, the principle of effort like that of 
contribution cannot afford a broad approach to defining justice for it fall hon of fair 
play and fair opporruniry. This is because there are tho e who for causes not of their 
own making, cannot just toil or contribute even if they desire to do o.38 This funher 
seeks the mini principle of need. Nevertheless altogether it ought to be seen that 
basically non-equalirarian. the need principle. is crucial to all approaches to a definition 
of justice, be they perfect equ_alirarian approaches or strict non-equalitarian approaches. 
On either ide. there has got to be a mediating aspect before an absolute definition of 
justice is attempted. 
Generally. to embark on a definition of justice we must give a trong consideration to 
the question of rights in our midst and rights outside. In imple language it mean 
adopting some ort of a Kantian approach: Considering our rights and tho e of others. 
but this entail and means putting ourself in other ' ho without for-=ettin
.:, 
our 
own. Then the principle cardinal to a d 1nition of ju tice ar in the re ultant onduct 
that emerge from thi approach. It i a on uct that i guided the ti e ri
.:,
ht. 
) J id, p. 117. 
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Thi m an that to defin ju cice i a que tion of con id ring the m aning of objective 
conduct. That i , when one deal with is ues concerning appropriate right conduct. 
It is that conduct whi h watche over and tands between competing needs, de ires 
effort etc. and rewards each in accordance to the objective right. It i this that 
determine which issues ar to be considered most and with what emphasis. 
Justice must therefore be discussed under reali tic term for that is what it is: A real 
value aimed at real issues for real beings. So justice is not something imaginable and 
therefore it always fails to be conceive_d in things unattainable or models incapable of
being translated into reality. 
Justice and the concept of rights. 
Here ju rice can be defined in three way : as redistributi e, a restoration and as 
interv ntion. Ho\ ever generally. the concept of rights introduce the idea that justice 
is re pee ting what is ours a well a what is other '. That i to say. we need to 
under tand and accept the mutual inter ection of enticl m nc . Thi prima facie 
po rulate ju tice a a matter of due ; gi ing ach what they de r or \ hat i their .
Howe er. on a deeper examination. thi oncept al intr due th id of an e c rn 1 
warden who alwa rand a to ta Ii h. maintain an d fin the 
due f each. Thi \ arden i in term f an id al l w r id al ial 
ver ee the fun ti rune of entitl ment . hi th n i hat onn ct la\ t ju ti 
37 
it also does between government and ju tice. That i . the ideal law under ideal social 
systems, ensures that each i given hi or her entitlement and treated justly. These 
ideal social sy tern are the perfect government of ocial justice. 
Justice as redistribution means bringing back the exclu ive rights of individual or 
group of individuals. Defined in substantive terms this equate justice with 
restoration. To borrow de Jouvenel 's model it is a ju rice that can be illustrated in the 
claim: This is peter' s (peter lacks it) give it to him. 39 Here 'Peter lacks it' signifies 
deprivation and nor need based justice. Otherwise, in justice as rights or entitlement 
it may not matter whether persons crave for what is theirs or not. In any case what 
is hi or hers belongs to him or her and must be given to him or her. 
However under the same illustration we can say· this i Peter's but peter unnecessarily 
has it (does not need it . John lack it, give it to him (John . Thi introduces justice
as lawful intervention. As lawful intervention ju tice is thu a need-ba ed ocial 
concept which still works upon giving each their dues, the dues being 
compartmentali ed into ocieta1 dues and individual dues. Thus. on the face of it, 
justice a a matter of rights is to accord each, hat i their . but deep inside. humanity 
or ociety al o ha due and it i here that ju tice top to operate along a ingle 
principle and admit f many other uch a n ed. ffort, merit. w !fare. etc. 
39 e J u 1el. 
hi o: he 
o,1ereig11ry . An Inquiry inro the politic l good (-n 
ni er ity f hicago Pre 19 • , 141. 
d., 
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Justice and the idea of social perfection 
Here the cone pt of ju rice operate under the premise that we need to align it with the 
'ought'. In question about justice therefore instead of a king 'what is' we ask 'what 
ought to be'. Thi means that justice i an already pre-exi ting order of things and how 
they ought to be. Adjusting things to this ought is what creates the ideal (perfect) 
social order; which in effect is a state of perfecting existing social arrangements to the 
ought. In this, everything is catered for in its entirety as well as in its panicularity. 
It is thus important to construe justice not just as pan of social perfection but the 
perfection itself, for its sole concern is about "repulsion of discord" and the restoration 
of perfect order. This is what makes it an ideal and objective equilibrium. However 
such an equilibrium does not exist unless there are perfect conditions upon which its 
functions are guided. This again i what relates justice to a state of action according 
co Jaw if at all the law i perfect and not merely po itive in nature. 
The theological tandpoint is that the law in this regard must command faith and 
belief in its entirely. Then it be orne cl ar to see why all theologian agr e to the 
po tulate that what is just i that which accords to God's commandment and what 
i unju t i that which contradict the e ommandment . The philo ophi al and th 
juri tic tandp int i al uniquely relat t thi . For e ular) phi lo ph r nnd juri t 
who rn y not belie er in religi n as uch al o accept the po rulat that there i 
mething in the law \ hich make ju tic di co era le. 
We ee then, that justice a conformity to the law ha many followers and is v ry 
relative. However, it i most table in the theological conception for her ju rice 
does nor change according to circumstance but rather the oppo ire happ n : 
circumstances change in rune to the law. 40 This is the real justice as conformity to 
the law. This is because in theology particularly Islamic theology the law i con tam 
and therefore justice as conformity to the law is always known and predictable. 
Otherwise justice as a matter of rational exertion alone is nor in line with perfection 
for reason changes with circumstances and therefore cannot postulate the ideal in 
isolation of other relevant factors· and circumstances. 
Justice as a relative and emotional feeling 
Justice as a feeling is both universal and rational as well a emotional inclinations to 
the subjective good. In this laner sense it becomes a relati e and diverse conception. 
However generally justice as relativity, is both objective and ubjective. This means 
that justice is having an objectively common stand on common issues. for all being 
are ommonly similar in feeling. But it also means randing in diffi r m p ition 
gi en varied circumstances. 
hi c unter argue the notion f th po irivi tic ba is of defining ju rice. For 
\ h n it i id ncified \ ith po iti law th n it e ome the law and not ju tic 
uch. fter all \ hat i law today may become illegal tomorr w and 
ju tice to b me elu ively di · rcult to d fin . hi i how ju ti e a 
con ormity to p iti e law f; ii t fie in the appr ach t the i ·ue thr ugh • 
n eption f ju rice. 
40 
It make a single concept in principle, bur one which varie in application. That i why 
ju rice i a relative feeling, sense, or arrangement of things, etc. It does not mean that 
justice exists in different people differently, depending on their emotions. for then a 
billion people will have a billion conceptions of justice and a thousand people a 
thou and conceptions, etc. This makes it impossible to find justice. 
Justice, entitlement, liberty and desert 
Defining justice in terms of entitlement presupposes the existence of rights and 
therefore demands that it is in a conception which takes rights seriously. This resides 
in intertwining distinct and shared rights between individuals and society. Justice as 
entitlement however requires and again presupposes a Jaw (whether written. or 
othenvise) which determines what is due and how it is applied. In other words 
entitlement is "justice displayed by the law but not limited to the law". ·11 That i , it
relies on the existence of the Jaw or general rules of behaviour for it application. 
Justice as entitlement extracts principle of justice in term of a rights conception and
in thi way relates to a conception of de erts. This in essence mean that to explain 
ju rice through an entitlement premise. we have to look at justic a that which give 
rightful dues of each and everyone. In other word . it mean that ju ti e a emit! ment 
dictate that whfoh one i allo ated by certain outside pr ripti n . 
.JI homa M ra\: etz. 111 rice, The International library of Essay in Lai and 
Le al Theory, School 2, Dartm uth: rtm uth pu Ii ·hing C mp n Lt
1 1 . 6. 
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This means that there i only a thin di tinction between ju tice as desert and justice a 
entitlemenc.n, For the latter. in deriving justice. governs the former. Thu in so far 
a ju tice is concerned, de ert only differs from entitlement becau e desert includes a 
prescription which stems from the inner or basic unique characteri tics of a per on. 
But even here entitlement comes in for the e two contain certain aspect of justice 
such as rights. 
It can also be argued that in defining justice desert and entitlement should be seen as 
opposite sides of the same coin. This is because while entitlement examines justice 
by assigning rewards only, desert goes funher and explains justice by both positive and 
negative assignments to the individual, state or group of persons. For example, in 
everyday language we say· they deserve the rewards, or are entitled to the rewards, but 
one cannot say that they are entitled to the burdens or entitled to puni hment as one 
would say that they deserve the burden or the puni hment. It is here that the (thin) 
distinction occurs. For desert unlike entitlement ignifie a contribution that is 
attached to a moral responsibility. It is more associated with both merit and 
demerit which extends also to general character and achievement than entitlement 
does.4J In ju rice entitlement then i limited to advantages while de ert extends to 
42 Profe or Weinreb argue that there i a di tinction b tw en ert and 
entitlement, on the ba i that the latter arise from a rule while the former 
arise from moral re ponsibility. But vi w d from a wider p r p cti e, 
entitlem nt to ari e from re pon ibilit . ju t as eserr can ari e from a rul . 
Thi j more vivid thr ugh theological conce ti ns. For xample all r vealed 
religi n agree chat wh n ne i r pon ible in the way h r h conducts 
him elf r her If, then h or he is ntitled to a good lifi in lhi \: orld and
her after. 
-n M rawelz. p. cit. p. 45. 
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both advantages and disadvantages. This mean that unlike m desert justice in
encitlemenc is only a positive claim. 
Under the concept of right, justice can also be discussed as that which determines 
entitlement and desert. What one deserves and what one is entitled to are what we 
point to as aspects of justice - but these can exist without the concept of right. So we 
normally ask before entitlement and desert, whether it is right to entitle such and such 
or deserve this or that. This is what makes justice a complex moral question which 
exhausts morality itself for anything moral cannot be unjust. 44
As for liberty it means a prescription of dues and entitlements. For example, to say 
that one is to do or enjoy what they are entitled to is signifying a liberty and also to say 
that one is to be what they deserve to be is a signification of liberty too. Thus justice
as liberty does not mean a state of unrestricted will to do whatever one desires. This 
is because justice presupposes a harmony and such a conception of liberty creates 
discord. Thus, while in defining justice, entitlement and desert are central principles 
liberty can only be so if conceived in a way fixed to its basics. On the whole true 
justice is deri ed from that which strikes a harmony between the relevant principles of 
justice -it i some sort of a complex unity of conflicting questions. It means combining 
de en with entitl ment. liberty with quality n d with merit. and fr edom with 
re ponsibility, etc. 
Weinr b hold a contrary view on the ba i that a I k of moralit 
infer a corre ponding la k of justice (Morawetz ibid, p. 38-45). 
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For thi way, principle of justice direct us towards an objective conception of justice. 
This i the concrete approach in which there is no preference for one principle to the 
other, for all are collectively and objectively required to the discovering of justice. 
Therefore, it goes without saying that an introduction to the idea of justice presupposes 
existence of objective principles of justice. 
Justice and the conception of the good 
In defining justice, it becomes inevitable that one has to argue the meaning of what 
justice is in terms of what is good. This combines both the individualistic conceptjon 
of justice with communitarian conceptions as well as the meritorious conceptions of 
justice with the equalitarian conceptions. And it unites the abstract with the practical, 
for justice requires a symbiosis of both. Thls makes justice both a means and an end, 
the latter being the theoretical good aimed at by the individual and the public, while 
the former remains the practical method that anains this (end as the) good. 
But, it would be wrong to argue that ju tice stems from specific circurn tances of 
di cord in society for this commits conceptions of justice only to the primary ends of 
the general public. There are tho e wh would lik Rawl ) oppo e thi argument 
becau e of the belief that ju tice i fundam ntally private nd re id s in a on en u on 
equal lib rtie . This is wrong. El ewher it an b argu d that ince humanbeing 
ha e th indi iduaJi tic and ocia1 characteristics. it i only po ible to d rive ju tice 
..,. 
from the ..:on .. pt1on ot the .400<.l i. · sell 0n symbio is of both people's narures s 
individuals nd their natures s a community. 45 Thus. all those theorists like Rawls 
who in w ole ale. neg lee rhe :once ion f eople' n:irur . also neg.leer ,he 
conception of the good which 1s so indispensable to finding justic . 
In defining justice vis-a-vis the concep.rion of the good, many other correlatives such 
s law and reason come into view. However, they are relevant to defining justice not 
co legitimising posrulates of it. This is where an examination of the ideas of Plato, 
Aristotle and Rawls, or in a word, classical and mo�ern theorists, should be related 
0 justice as the good. Classical philosophies. particularly those of Plato and Aristotle. 
hold a conception of the good but this is overshadowed by the fact that they presuppose 
existence of political states and positive law o legitimize what is good vis-a-vis what 
is justice. The reverse ought co be the beaer approach that can derive a real, and aue 
meaning of justice in the good. On the other hand. modern philosophers such as Rawls 
Jnd Sand I. rel,' heavily n :-eason :ilone and thus also overshadow the controlling 
onception of the good, thereby subjecting justice to the authority of reason. 
Here too, justice ought to be merely a derivative of rea on. 
Thus when philosophers neglect reason or law. emphasising one above the other they 
in dfecc end up neglecting the ·onceprion of the .::,ood and thus miss the real ha.riot of 
J snc . For ·ustice demands chat the:-e e a unity f all �ontlicting demands and 
approa hes or methods in terms of the _,ood. Knowing the .:,OO then becomes 
s1s See Harold Berman's ar.:.umenc which is relati ely simil:lr o this standpoint 
·ee. [orawetz . Justice op. ·ic. pp. _-J. 
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knowing the just. For the good is also in term of the law and in terms of reason as 
well as in tenns of the individual and in terms of the public; which in essence means 
that it i in reference to the particular as well as the general. etc, with the absolute aim 
of attaining good in itself as a goal. 
And, it can also be suggested that justice will not be understood until we adopt a 
historical consideration of the idea of what it entails. But, the major dilemma here is 
how are we going to answer the questions: whose history? and what history?46 True 
it is that in answering these questions we derive a whole range of conceptions of 
justice; but don't they lead us to far more relativity than the_ idea of the good vis-a-vis 
what justice requires? For example, ancient theories are in the �cient history of ideas 
and modern theories are in the modern. But there is the terse intervening between these 
two eras, this is where lies the history of religions.47 Those who argue that justice is 
merely part of the good, and is not an all embracing or comprehensive vision of the 
good, are actually confusing justice with virtue.48 
-111 ee also Thomas Morawetz. ( d) .. Justice. The International Library of
Essays in Law and Legal Theory, School 2. pt. cit. p. 97-99. 
47 For a historical analysis of justice see Harold Bennan in Thoma Morawetz. 
Justice op. cit. p. 92-117. 
Rawl is one of the chief advo ate of thi argum m: but hi inclination to chi 
i verthrown y hi agreement t th c nc nti n chat ju rice mail a alanc 
f c mp ting claims ( ee Rawl . A 171eory of Justice 1971 p. 06). 
CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
Modern theory starts in the 16th century and 18th century. The central is ue that 
distinguishes it from cla ical theory is the relation of justice to liberty, freedom 
equality and human rights. These, particularly the first three, were hinted on by 
clas ical writers. But they come out most prominently in the justice of modern 
theorie . For example. without the concept of equality Aristotle's justice cannot be
discussed. But similarly without equality and fairness justice in the modern sense
too cannot be discussed either. 
Basically what unites classical theories of justice with those of modern times is the 
degree of the u e of reason and such concepts as equality and inequality in the 
approach to defining justice. The same degree can be u ed as an i sue of distinction 
between the two sets of theories. Between classical and religious theories of justice 
the common factor is the conceptualisation of ju tice as an ideal. The main 
concept which are commonly used here ar : legality nature or narurali m. rea on 
and metaphy ics. 
However, the prominen e f r a n 1 not o much a unifyin::. r id ntifyin::. fa t r 
in the relation hip f r ligiou di in justice an cla i al ju ti a an be een 
b t" een th r ligiou and m d m rt eption of juscic . Th keynot her i that 
47 
th w y reason r rationality is used in b th modem and religiou conception is 
fund mentally di tinct. In r ligious rheori of ju tice. r a on i limited by the power 
f metaphy ic . while in modern theorie this is fundam ntally ab nr.
There is al o the con id ration of justice a a matter of rights and the wellbeing of all 
human . This exists in both modern and classical theories as well as religious ones. 
But here too it is in modern th orie that we distinctly see a stronger idea of justice 
as rights and wellbeing. Perhap it is in the religious approach that there is some 
imilarity of emphasis. The nascent or current modern theories are now at the helm 
of any debate on justice. Hov ever, the attention that current theories hold, has its 
roots and anchorage in the provoking wisdom of ancient theories. 
CL !CAL THEORY.
Plato (427 - 347 BCl 
Plato' justice lies in the irtue of morality. In hi 'Dialo�ues' he a errs that justice 
is the high t moral irtue di co rable only in an ideal ociety. Thi in ariabl 
po tulate that to deri e justice. we have to find an ideal ciety. He then define an 
ideal iety a that in ,. hi h erything i pla e in its natural pro er pla of 
cupation. 1 
Pl ro's Republic I1 p. 341 nd I p. 4 
u kl nd: he Vikin 197 . 
-+8 
Therefor . Plaronian ju tice aims at preserving the tatus quo by placing everyone in 
their natural place: " man should do hi work in the station of life to which he is 
called by hi apacitie " :!
This calls into play the enforcement of a class system based on (natural) abilities and 
not accident of binh. Those naturally destined to be what they are should remain as 
such. Lawyers, or teachers, etc. should remain as such. This, in Plato's conception. 
is ju tice becau e doing so will maintain an ordered society in which everyone 
performs his or her natural role. 3 Since everyone is assigned a duty by nature, 
performance of roles would be obeying natural laws and hence doing justice. 
Here, Plato like Ari totle does not question whether all 'natural laws' are just laws and 
thu seems to equate justice to law though in different words. Hence, Plato's sense of 
justice resides in the maintenance of the inequalities of nature as seen in people's 
unequal abilities. 
In simple term , what Plato doe is to search for justice via the mirror of an ideal 
society. Therefore, in a just society everyone is where they are fatted and fitted by 
their natural capacities. Plato arrives at this conclu ion becau e his justi i ba e on 
promotion fan amicable society and he think that placing ach wh r h or h
fit , p aceful c -existenc will prevail and hence forth ju ti e will e attained. 
Ibid IV, p. 435. 
Ibid IV p. 435. 
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Thu , hi ju rice an be compared to an aristocracy or feudali m with th only 
di tin tion b ing th t Plat doe not accept placement of people according to birth.4 
Like ri totle, Plato too has been blamed for not giving room to consideration of 
need, freedom, liberty and benevolence in his conception of justice. He a ens that
ju tice is a moral virtue but neither does he give a conclusive definition of morality nor 
i he ,. illing to accept that morality as a virtue includes feelings of sympathy and 
benevolence. 
His positive contribution and credit can perhaps be found in his realisation of justice 
as a supreme virrue. But thi is blurred as soon as he a sens that justice cannot be 
explained rationally and that it resides in the law of natural inequalities of people' 
capacities. In a nutshell Plato's justice can be stated as a postulate which advocates
that everyone hould stay in her or his own natural position. And that such po ition 
is determined by placing people where their capacities uit them best. 
Ari totle put forward a rationali tic definition of ju rice by analy ing hi divi ion of 
ju rice int ommutati e and di tributi 
all cation r reward ( n fit and urdeo 
refer t a re toration fa di turbed equilibrium. 
-I !bi . p. 185.
on u t an commutati e
50 
Hi theory is based on the principle of desert which is rooted in the belief that people 
should be treated according to merit. That i , giving each hi or her due. He thus 
looks at justice as a moving equilibrium through \ hich comp ting demands are 
balanced. 
Ba ically, he defines justice by equating it to that which conforms to the law. 5 So to 
him, justice is in what is lawful. This is what he calls general justice or 
righteousness. 6 So to him, what is lawful is that which is prescribed by the law and 
obeying the law means deriving justice. This is perhaps because he believes the law 
is the unwrinen custom and hence its content is the province of Justice. 
In the distribution of honours and qurdens he advocates proportionate equality as the 
rule by which justice is derived among competing claims. This means that people are 
to be rewarded according to the principle of desert: each to be treated in accordance 
with his or her natural position. He thus believe in both equality and proportionate 
treatment under the Maxim: Treat like cases alike and unlike cases differently. Thus, 
Aristotle would oppose George Orwell's contention that 'all animals are equal' but be 
would I think) agree. in the a sertion that ' ome animals are more equal than others'. 
So on this ground, he would reaffirm his maxim in the treatment between lave and 
5 ri totle. Nichomachean Ethics VI), at 17_ (Thom on J. K. Tran . 1953). If 
ri totle were a ked to analyze ocrates' po ition in deciding to drink the 
poison up, I think that und r thi premis h would consid r uch action a 
an act f ju ti e. 
6 Ibid. VI), p. 172-174. He al o I k at ju ti e parti ular ju ti in the 
en e that it concern balancing competing demands. 
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master, rich and poor, or man and woman, by di tributing re ources according to 
d sert. In correcti e ju tice, he believes that justice i derived by restoring natural 
equilibrium through equal retribution before the law. 7 
His greatest credit appears to lie in his divisions of justice. By dividing justice into 
distributive and commutative justice Aristotle helped clear the way for further 
discovery of what justice entails. A(so, in his 'logic', he rightly construed the world 
as a totality of nature of which mankind is pan. Hence he set up the necessary 
categorisation of justice into natural and conventional classifications which facilitate 
us with a universal and comprehensive conception of justice. 
However, his major theory is not without faults. By strictly limiting the distribution 
of honours and burdens to the principle of merit Aristotle neglects need based factors 
and questions of morality which are so vital to ju tice. Treating equals equally does 
not alway correspond to the doing of ju tice. Moreover, he overemphasises the idea 
of' treatment' which as a matter of form (only) blurs the real idea (content) of justice. 
For e ample. it can be argued that equal opportunity of representation in a court of 
law amounts to equal treatment before the law. But does that mean that the law itself 
i ju r. What if the judgment it If i unjust'. Thus, by looking at equal treatment a 
the e ential el ment f ju tice. he, in this regard ubj cts ju tic to m re conformity 
to rule f I w. he un� rcunat r ult from hi th ory is that p opl will in ok 
7 Ibi V(iii , p. 176, (iv). 
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dictates o invalid or unjust laws in the name of justice. His conception of justic thu
completely neglects que tions of morality. 
Therefore, ristotle ought to have equally emphasised both formal and ub tantive 
justice a inseparable elements of any rational definition of ju tice. Thi is becau e 
the formal element is the means by which substantive justice is attained. Formal 
justice stands for impartial treatment, while substanti e justice stands as the guiding 
standard that determines what direction this treatment is to follow. The absence of an 
I 
operative marriage of these two will render any definition of ju rice a tagnant 
application. 
On the question of desert. Aristotle held that each is to receive according to their due, 
but he makes no attempt to define how much amounts to de ert. How much is each 
per on's due or how are we to mea ure what quantity amounts to one' due? 
Moreo er. there i no agreement on what constitute merit. To ome. it i a matter of 
contribution. To others, it is a question of talent. Indeed (defining) merit i too 
relative to be used as a yardstick of ju tice and even if it were to be non relative, it i 
till an inadequate way to defin ju tice because it i resrricti e, where a justice
demand comprehensive apprehen ion.
Thu . y empha i in.::, Lhe quation of ju tice t que tions of m rit an conformity with 
the law, Ari t tle failed t reali e th n ed t balan th 'i ' \ ith !.he ' ught' n 
o � t ju ti e. qu ntly he fail d to r ali th t que tio f ju ti e ann t 
5.:, 
an wered by imply emphasising equal treatment based on group categorie Even
mong equals, unequal treatment may be the best way to derive justice. 
MODERN THEORIES 
David Hume <I711 - 76) 
Hume advanced a theory of justice based on an analysis of the nature of virtue. He 
says that justice is that virtue which is contained in the ability to respect conventional 
rights to property. Thus co him justice is no more than respect of the unchangeable, 
but conventionaJly established rules of entitlement to that which one po sses. 
This means that his concept of justice rotates around property and rights co entitlement 
without which no questions of justice would arise, i.e. if there were no property claims 
- no claims of justice would ari e. For Hume. rule of ju rice are. therefore, mere
ascriptions to po session of material wealth. Hence justice i conformity to this 
dictate of ascription. 
Hi quation of ju ti e to rights to prop rty i rooted in the belief that ther i a natural 
r latioo hip f human b in::, to mat rial wealth \: hich dictate that ju ti m an
Hume. D. Tre rise of Hum II awre III -). P. -+ -4 
( d Oxford: Cl rendon r 1960). 
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respect of p ople's rights to the property po sessed by them. However, he also 
believes that we allocate property in the ways we do because of the utility of those 
ways. This adds utilitarian flavour to his theory of justice. Hume ay that a 
person's property is that which "the rules" give hjm or her alone a right to use. In 
determining the rules · we must have recourse to statutes, customs, precedents 
analogies, and a hundred other circumstances. 9 
In section three of The Enquiry Hume argues that public utility is the sole reason why 
justice is a virtue. He reinforces [hjs argument by imagining various circumstances in 
which justice would not be of any use and thus concludes that in such situations justice 
would not exist because there would be no need for it. One st;ch circumstance is 
where there is so much benevolence that people feel no more concern for their own 
interests than they do for others. 10 
As a virrue. justice, in Hume's theory is an artificial virtue contained in principle 
governing human action and its origin is rooted in conventional rule of practic . 11 
Thi makes Hume accept the contention that justice is that which gives ach hi or her 
due. In fact, he does say that justice i to be defined a 'a constant and p rfectual will
of giving everyone hi due'. Thi e entially means: · give each man that which th 
9 
on ention d mand that he be .::,i n.' Thu . in hi ju ti e. there i no u h thing a
10 
Harri n, J., Hume's Theory of Jusri e. 19 1. p. -84. 
Ibid, p. _ 4. 
II Hume. An Enquiry Concernin the principle of morals, 1983, . 204. 
benevolence or the natural inspir tion to be just ince to him, juscic 
tradition I establishments. 
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a matter of 
Therefore, Hume defines justice through the description of an individual in relation ro 
a present right to property ascribed by established possession. In the Enquiry, he 
assembles eight situations which make justice necessary and unnecessary. Two such 
situations will be examined here - viz: that absolute security and unlimited supply of 
goods, and that abundance of human feelings for each other (absolute benevolence) 
make justice unnecessary. So Hume thinks that there is no need for (rules of) justice 
in a society where there is absolute scarcity or absolute abundance because no good 
will come from such rules .. This is a fallacy. Even if people were so necessitous as 
inevitably to perish of scarvation and thirst (for instance, as seen roday in Somalia the 
Sudan and Bangladesh), rules of justice would be necessary in order co ensure that at 
the very lea t, they perished in an orderly way. 12 
Moreover, whether in abundance or scarcity, we till require justice co govern ociety 
0 as to ensure just entitlement and avoid the abu e of rights. Afterall, ju tice is not 
only about property, that i why Hume' rejection of benevolenc i untenable. 
Hume' credit lie in his emphasi on ju tice a a upreme inu without which no 
table o iety an exi t. 
12 ee J o H rri n, op. cit., p .... 66. 
"Without ju tice, ociery must immediately dis olve and everyone must 
go into th t savage and solitary condition. which is worse than the worst 
iruation that can po sibly be supposed in ociety". 13
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Hi strongest weakness i in hi in istence that justice is identifiable with established
possession and in his restriction of the meaning of justice to a respect for entitlement
(rights to propeny. 
Hume thinks that justice is fixed by human conventions. In the Treatise he seems to 
believe that the Jaw mentions only general considerations and that rules too mention 
general consideration. i-t and then insists (in the Enquiry and also in the Treatise) that 
for justice to reign, sociery must follow rules of convention and that it does not matter 
what son of rules they are. So is he assening that justice is following the law without 
questioning whether the law is just? I think o! 
So for Hume then. justice is in on ention and injustice in their breach. 15 In this vein,
he believes that all alue judgments are in some way tied to the rules of conventions. 
So what i right and permi ible resides in what is con entional? But he ironically 
appro e of prudence also and a thus: "Every man may ... provide himself the 
mean which pruden can dictate". 16 Howe er it can be ob erved that it i not 
prudent to follow on ention , not with tan ing anything el e. 
13 Hume D. A Treati e of Human awre. Op. cit.. II, p. _Q2. 
Harri n J, op. it., pp. 288-9. 
1.s id Hurne. n Enquif) Concernin rhe principles of morals, 19 3, p. 11. 
16 Ibid. . 186. 
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Hume's rules of Justice 
Hume arrive at five rules of justice which he says are at the core of the irtue of 
justice, because it is these rules that stabilise property. These are possession 
occupation, prescription, accession and succession. 
Present possession. occupation and prescription 
According co this rule Hume says that in a perfect property system justice is derived 
through the postulate: each has a right over that property which he or she is found to 
be in possession of. The rule of occupation operates through original possession. 17 By 
tracing the original possession through a chain of possessors, we can arrive at the rule 
of prescription which prescribes just entitlement under possession. 
It i by tracing the original po sessor that we can pre cribe who is entitled to the 
presently possessed property. In essence everything revolves around the circle of
possession. In this way, Hume tries to fight critics who charge that his rule of pre ent
pos es ion permits thie e and fraudulent po e ors to own property through 
illegality. 
17 David Miller p. cit., p. 16 . Here Mill r nrgue that thi rule ontradi t
th t of pr ription. 
Access 
Thi rule gives ju t entitlement by auaching property to all its correlative results. That 
is it gives rights in regard to what is directly or ultimately attached ro the property 
presently possessed. For example one in possession of a slave automatically has ju t 
entitlement to the child of this slave! Or one who is found to be in possession of a 
piece of land is entitled to all its products. 
This rule poses thought provoking debate on issues like those involving squatters 
found robe in (established) possession of public land rich in minerals. Who is to own 
the minerals? - the public or the squatter found in pos�ession? I venture ro think that 
Hume in such circumstances would give everything to the possessing squatter, unless
original possession is traceable in someone else, for he would argue that: 
"We acquire the property of objects. by possession, when they are 
connected in an ultimate manner with objects that are already our 
property and at the same time inferior to them. Thus, the fruits of our 
gardens. the offspring to our cattle and the work of our slaves, are all 
of them esteemed our property. e en before po ession. " 1
Succession 
Thi rut tu lat the id a that ju t entitl ment e olve fr m par nt to prog ny. That
i , ea h ha a right t po that pr p rty which ac ru to him or her by virtu f 
Hume, D. 1 Treatise of Human ature. Op. it. ill(2), p. 509.
binh. This would 
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m imolerabl to Plato whose justice maintains status quo based 
on natural capacitie and not accident of birth. 
However chis rule is rational in as far as inheritance laws are concerned but it fails 
to t II u exactly what measures we are to follow in allocation of propeny among 
many children with similar claims to propeny of the same parent. This rule like 
classical theories of justice also has the unfortunate effect of neglecting concepts of 
need in the distribution of propeny and gives no chance to parental or deceased' s will 
in the law of inheritance. 
Application of his theory and rules 
Hume's theory relies on the contention that, the substance of justice is in self love and 
can best be advanced through the furtherance of individual interests. He illuminate 
thi idea when he contends that it harms a per on more to be disposed of that which 
wa for so long under his or her po ession than it would benefit the true owner who 
never had (physical) possession of the property. 19
Thu , po es ion has b en con trued by Hume in uch ab urd term that blur the 
di tin dons b r, een ju tic an inju ti . r all, p , will not rule out 
ch xi tence f illegality en , h re riginal po se ion i trac d. The only trac a le 
19 
riginaJ p r, may , ell b the ry ill gal c upant! 
Ibid ill(2) p. 50 - . 
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foreo er, the concept of original po ses ion gives invalid claims to squatters and 
postulate an unjust escoppel to true owners who may have lo t touch with their
propeny through faults which are nor of their own making. Basically, Hume' theory 
of justice cannot be wholly applied except in the world of imperfections full of 
scarcity but not that of abundance. 
In fact, Hume asserts that in a world of absolute bundance there is no need for 
justice. So. his justice is rooted in the need to deal with problems of scarcity and the 
need to stabilise property. Th.is is achievable by relating justice to a person's habitual 
reliance on social conventions, restricting individuals to fixed rules of distribution of 
entitlements. 
Here, like po itivist and classical theorists such as Aristotle Hume fails to realise that 
restricting a person's behaviour to fixed rules does not per se derive justice. We need 
to ask whether such rules are them el es just. Thus, I agree with the sugge tion that 
Hume ought to have referred to hi rules of justice as principles of justice.20
pen er I k at ju ti e in t rm of happin s and fr dom bet\: een int rp r anal 
demand . But hi maj r ,. ark n ju ti i po tu lated through an examination f the 
n cure of per nal freedom. He equate ab lut fr d m co the la\: of quaJ freedom 
• o av1 iller, p. cit.. p. 163 . 
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for all and believes that justice is derived by granting and protecting people's 
freedom .21
The implications of this formula are far and wide in terms of deriving justice. First 
it mean that to attain justice, there must be enjoyment of maximum equal freedom for 
all and only least interference in the (equal) freedom of others. He infers, from this 
formula that freedom is affordable through avoidance of physical coercion in the way 
people choose to derive pleasure. 
Thus, to Spencer, justice is in the harmonious co-existence. This however, is 
overshadowed by his major theme that justice is to be conceived as a s1:1rviva1 value 
which requires that each is to reap according to his or her natural conduct in society. 12 
In essence this means that each person is to get rewards and harms in correspondence 
to his or her natural deserts passed over from generations to generations. 
In fact, his formula equates to the idea of survival of the fittest as a constituent nature 
of the gregariou ne s of human species and a a basis of the evolution of human justice 
from subhuman justice. 13 His concept of ocial justice therefore. relie on Darwinian 
biological evolution of human pecie and the idea of natural election."� 
21 
23 
24 
p ncer, I11e Principle of Ethi s Indianap Ii : Li rty Cla ic . 1 7 
Ibid, II. pp ... 6, 30- 5 and 76. ee al o Miller Da id, ocia/ Jusri e
Ibid, p. 76. 
Ibid, pp. 33-4. 
p. 1-2.
. 1 6-9. 
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In hi fi rrnul , ea h person i to !iv according to the natural results of his or her 
conduct and external inrerferenc is only justifiable if it is extended to maintain such 
results. Thi mean that only nature and people's abilities will determine his justice. 
This has Platonic and Aristotelian o ertones. His concept dictates that people should 
be treated according to where their conduct carries them. But conduct depends on the 
natural capacity pos es ed. His conception of justice can also be interpreted to mean 
that justice depends on the merit based effort resulting from natural conduct. 
Ba ically his conception of justice, elevates the strong and intelligent and dumps the 
weak feeble and handicapped. Instead of saying that right is might, in Spencerian
justice we are required to hold the opposite view: might is right. 
Under the notion of survival of the fittest, those best fitted to natural conditions will 
urvive and prosper while the misfits will be phased out and a strong and capable 
ociety will be maintained generation after generation. So much for justice in 
Spencer's world! In summary, justice here is looked at from two angles· justice in the 
moral sense and justice in the evolutionary ense. From the evolutionary sense, justice 
is een as the capacity to compete for the limited means of survival. 
rom the m ral ·ense, he equat justi e to a m dium through , hich th gr ate t
happin can e attained. Like Plato. hi ju tice in ba ed on an ideal ociery exc pt
that for the ideal built upon th e, ist n of p a ful ocial 
intercour If rci n, voluntary p ration and perfect pl a ur . In an ideal 
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0c ty. Spen ·er s ormul:l 0t just -: i :Josrulac co be su c ss becaus there will be
no ·mperfections nd hence no limit ro people's narural activities and subsequently
r e om :.ind , appmes will e ttame co the maximum possible --xtem. 
Criticisms 
Perhaps Spencer's theory of justice merits maximum criticism. because of his reliance 
on evolutionary the?ry• By basing his justice on evolution and ideal society, he has 
closed the doors of deriving justic .... base� on rational morality. By subjecting justice 
0 the rule: - everyone is entitled to ace in anyway he pleases as long as be does nae 
infringe upon the equal freedom of others', ::5 Spencer elevates freedom higher and
above the virtue of justice. In this he forgers that freedom can in face be a deterrence
co justice. ·hen he refers co notions of - ike freedoms'. be invariably limits justice
0 particular freedoms. Bue justice is more and indeed greater than freedoms of the
in · · v · ual. 
• Ioreo er. in his onnula. as we have seen. the weak are destined co fail and the strong
co succeed. Thus. his justice amounts to saying that as long as there is no infringement 
on equal freedoms of others. in an ideal society. any other kind of infungemem on
people'. rights is just. By o eremphasising equal reedom. he ·orgers that e is
scroyin;:: is foundation of justic of :m ideal soc·ecy. for his ma. vell mean a right
to v10lence r'or l. 
. IiJler. D. �o Jusr ce. op. ··c .. p. 0 . 
0-+ 
In hi. · dvoc :-, ror pure JUStl c.:. m \ ni h ea ·h 1s co receive rewards :.ice r iing ro 
narural results of his or her conduct. Spencer neglects the artificial inequalities which 
J.re :ne · t1 le -eJli ie. f �a ·hac ··:i l 1m ·e:- · e .1 ti ·:.iun ,f ::is r'o:-rnuJ.!. :--Iis 
emphasis on narural capaciue and hi refusal to acce t regulation of narure' s harshness
leaves the poor. the needy and the desrirure with nothing to lean on. 
\Vhile justice is abour balancing conflicting demands. : is cheory is in effect widening 
gaps of inequality. Proportioning justice ro the dictates of nature and effort. ·a11s short 
or pure and perfecrjUSrice. So. basically Spencer's faults ie ·n his heavy reliance on 
the evolunonarv theorv ana his i
.
aiiure ·o oncede ro rtific a re.alities. For he believed 
., - I .-
hat law is inherited through blood which means that the concept of justice e
volves
differemly in vanous peoples and societies. This is misleading and it is what people like
Hitler used to oppress others!
. .\.nd. he dwells mo much on the resen an .:: \res lir le arrenrion to the needs
of furure gener3tions. He assumes that the pasr is the same as the presem. for his 
justice sees the present in rerms of the pasr. For example. b_ anaching justice ro the 
consequences of people· s abilities. it eems that nder his theory some persons may 
receive rewards and burdens according to \ hat is passed on from generation to 
-=eneranon.: Bu what abouc mos \-:;h ..:ome inta the world with nothing passe on 
to them'? 
His belief m c!V lution would co ::1) put um un e fire!. for the theory of evolu ion is 
· 1_hl: e· a :wle arucUlarl ·rom 1 ·me heolog1Jn 
Sc::::. t" r. .. u .:it. ;:,. !80-' .
reover. JUS e : not · 
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maner of organic biology it is rather an issue of ethic which depends on natural as
well as artificial relativism. 
Thus, his belief in deriving justice from the gregarious nature of human species 
through survival of the finest, runs into debatable justification. Survival is not the 
sole element of justice for sometimes sacrifice can compete with survival. In his 
consideration of pleasure as an element of justice he fails to draw a distinction between 
the quality and the quantity of pleasure. 
This failure is grounded in his conception of an ideal society in which he thinks that 
self sus�ining actions are elements of justice which lead to pleasure. This is wrong.
Sometimes saving a life may be a misery enhancing acc. For example in the Mosaic
law of an eye for an eye or the drug laws prescribing mandatory death for offenders; 
it may be that life sustaining actions of offenders are misery enhancing actions for 
others. 
On this note we can safely conclude that one overwhelming shortcoming of Spencerian 
justice is in his emphasi on urvival of the individual without a balanced argwnem for 
societal or familial feelings. This shortcoming is derived from his thinking that 
ommunal urvival solely depends on individual urvi al without giving standard 
evaluation f various values. His b lief in freedom and tru�gle for the fine t 
overlo ks natural human feeling and obligations uch a parent-child affection and 
care. 
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KeJsenian justice U881 - 1973) 
A an ethical relativi t Kelsen views justice as a relative value and although he does 
not deny the existence of a definition of justice, he refuses to accept that there is an 
absolute conception of justice. This is because he thinks that an absolute standard of 
justice is an irrational ideal which cannot be attained through scientific justification. 27
Therefore, he comes out with a relativistic theory of justice the content of which is to 
be found in the morality of tolerance. To him, justice like beauty, is a matter of value 
judgment. 
So, he asserts that there is no possibility of arriving at an objective standard of justie:e, 
for what is just or unjust refers to an ultimate end and such a value judgment is by 
nature subjective because it depends on emotional appeal of personal feelings; all of 
which are things that cannot be verified scientifically. 
Thus in defining justice. Kelsen outrightly rejects absolutism because he holds that 
justice being a value judgment cannot be objectively tested through verification of 
facts. 28 As such, in attempting to devise an approach to a fonnula of justice, he 
succumb to ociological relativism. 
11 Ke! en. Pure TJ1eory of law. 1970, p. 63-4 and 67. 
2 Ibid, p. 63-7. 
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He tries to define justice by attempting to compare what different people in various 
social orders believe to be just at different times. Thi is what leads him into 
embracing the nonnative claim that there is no absolute criterion of justice applicable 
to all. So, to him, justice as a fact, is merely based on various standards adopted by 
different individuals in various situations. 
But ethical absolutists charge that, justice cannot be defined by equating it to people's 
belief, and that Kelsen ought to distinguish between what is just and what people 
believe to be just. What is just is a maner of standards and what people believe to be 
just is a question of emotional appeal.. So to say that justice is what people believe to 
be just, is like invoking Hume's rules of justice or Aristotle's equation of justice to 
obeying the law without questioning whether such beliefs. rules or laws are just. 
Furthermore, Kelsen emphasizes that, to arrive at a definition of justice, we must give 
justice a subjective meaning. -9 However since he says that justice cannot be defined 
by deriving the ought from the i , it is a contradiction for him to think that justice can 
exist in facts or standards expressed in various polities. 30
I think this contradiction arises because Kelsen attaches strong regard to verification 
of ct and is u . Sin e people' acts an b verifi d through what they expres , 
Z9 
JO 
Ibid, p. 67. 
B Jarup J s "Kel en' Theory of Law an Philosophy of Justice" in Essays
on Kelsen. 1986, p. 300-2. 
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Kelsen then reduces these expressions to what people believe in as the standards of 
justice. 
Thus, basically, Kelsen's justice resides in his belief in (albeit rigid and contradictory) 
relative truths and relative value judgments as the only avenue to a meaningful and 
acceptable definition of justice. Thus, his failure is in his contradictions about the 
approach to defining justice. 
He ends his quest to define justice with a bang on the table asserting that this is my 
justice: 'the justice of peace freedom democracy and tolerance - the justice of all 
ration.al beings' .31 Th.is is absolutism of sorts. Therefore, there are two indispensable 
criticisms of ms theory: inconsistency and contradiction. He assumes to be an ethical 
relativist but in concluding his views he takes his personal conception of justice to be 
the justice of all rational beings. This covers his theory of justice with an absolutist 
mantle! 
In ms condemnation of ethical absolutism, he asserts that the moral principle is to be 
preferred above the latter (ethical absolutism) and yet he alleges that justice exists in 
the elf-evident values of the morality of tolerance freedom and democracy, which are 
to be pr ferred o er and abo e anarchy, la ery autocracy and imolerance.32
JI 
32 
Ibid. p. 02. 
Ibid. p. 302. 
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This does not only expo e Kelsen to contradiction and inconsistency it also puts him 
in the po ition of 'a disguised absolutist'. By claiming that his (seemingly) relativist 
moral principle of justice is the rational principle he elevates his concept of justice to 
a higher plane of universalism and is thus rightly blamed for creating juristic 
imperialism. 33
H.L.A. Hart (1907 - 93).
Professor Hart in his celebrated work: The concept of Law, looks at justice as a 
seoment of morality concerned with inter strata treatment. He asserts that as a virtue 0 ' 
justice is the most popular, � and most legal.� Thus, to him, justice is constituted 
in the moral virtue, 'whose primary concern is examining the way classes of 
individuals are treated'. 
Thi argument i based on the postulate that "the principles of justice do not exhaust 
morality and not all criticisms of law made on moral grounds are made in the name 
of justice" _35 Therefore, it appears that belief in general morality includes the 
derivation of justice as a particular component of morality. 
33 
35 
Ibid, p. 303. 
Hart. H. L. . The Concept of Law, 1961 p. 151-62. 
Ibid, p. 156-9. 
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such, his major theme in the definition of justice is to be found in his views about 
morality. His conception of justice relies much on the distributive aspect of justice vis­
a-vi the anaJysi of ristotelian arguments of treating equal (like) cases alike! He 
thus, defines just distribution as that which gives an impartial (fair) attention co and 
consideration of competing demands. This inevitably marries him to the Rawlsian 
equation of justice with fairness. 
In distribution of wealth, Hart welcomes the notion of differential treatment among 
different classes of people and the subjugation of interests of one class by another if 
such is done under a principle of prior impartial consideration of claims of all people. 36
He therefore, argues that, co favour one sec of claims without a prior impartial 
consideration of all claims of other sections of the society is an injustice. Here, we 
can see Hart equating justice to the principle of the common good. That is to say:
choosing among competing claims hould be done within the realm of the common 
good for all. So. to favour one set of claims against all others after a prior impartial 
consideration of all sections of society, is what entails the doing of justice. 
In examining the idea of justice, he grades it into two: justice as a uniform or constant
stru rure, and ju rice a a hanging criterion. In th former, the rule i to treat like
ca alike. while in the latter. ju rice r fer to tandard which vary in accordance
with the ubj ct up n which they ar appli Therefore, in que tions of justice, 
Ibid, p. 156-9. 
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re ernblance or difference (relativity) do not only apply to th content of the law but
also to the way it is applied. So, it is not enough to look at justice in the law· we must 
also seek justice in the application of the law. This is becau e a law may be applied 
fairly and justly yet its content is unjust or a just law may be applied in an unjust 
manner. 
On distributive justice, he argues that human beings are entitled to equal tre·armenr and 
that no irrelevant differences can whatsoever justify differential or unequal treatment. 
But he does not give regard to the fact that what is relevant or irrelevant is highly
subjective. He ought to give a precise and universal definition of relevant difference 
that justifies unequal treatment. 
In so far as distributive justice is concerned, Hart's postulate resembles Rawls's 
differential principle but under the guise of relevant difference to justify unequal
distribution. His central idea in the analysis of treating like cases alike and unlike 
cases differently, as a core element in his conception of justice, is also based on notions 
of relevant resemblance and relevant difference. So upon this. he asserts that humans
in orne way . commonly resemble and in others, completely differ. 
Therefi re. h argue that any kind of discrimination must be based upon and hown
by r levant differen e. Thi argument i well taken and de erve credit. But as to rhe
p int f rele ant differ n e, I would add that uch relevanc must be rational and
ju tifi bl and n t mer ly rel ant a uch. 
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This is b ause, it is not good enough for everyone to assert that justice demands that 
we treat p ople alike or differently simply because there is a relevant difference or 
resembl nc . What makes uch difference or re emblance relevant need to have 
rational justification, for not every difference or resemblance is justifiable. To do 
otherwise would be a rash conclusion. 
Thus, his examination of the traditional theory of treating like cases alike and unlike 
cases differently ba ed on morality is what makes him arrive at these rash conclusions. 
His desire and primary objective of creating moral and artificial equality so as to offset 
the inequalities of nature, has lead him to embrace a conception of justice based on 
application and distribution, rather than on substance. 
Hence, like Rawls Hart too equates justice to what is fair without giving a concrete 
definition of fairness and merely emphasizes that people prima facie deserve to be 
treated equally. His refusal to clearly distinguish justice as a single supreme virtue and 
his stance on examining justice as a segment of morality are quite disturbing. For 
anything moral cannot escape the inclusion into the supremacy of virtue. However, 
his attack on identifying justice with the law i anti Aristotelian in nature and is a point 
that de rve credit, ince it helps illuminate the distinction between what is just and 
\: hat i la\: ful. 
11 in aJI. Hart's onception of ju ti e i largely imilar to that of Rawls, and is based
n a vi w f ju rice a morality - di coverabl by human reason. Does this mean that
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all immoral laws are unju t? What would be his answer to those who hold that justice 
as an immutable virtue is the principle behind morality? Can morality exist without
ju tice·. Hi answer to the la t question would most surely be easy. But isn't
morality (being a rational concept) rooted in relative rules of conduct? Hart's work on
justice, though small is quite provoking. 
John Rawls n221 - > 
John Rawls postulates an argument of justice rooted in rationality and his basic ideas 
of defining justice are based on rationality of preservation of the overriding values of 
liberty and social equity. His basic concept of justice relies on the assumption that the 
best principles of justice are those that generate equality based on liberty. 
He argues that to arrive at a meaningful definition of justice, we must apply principles
of rationality. In doing so, the rational principles must be derived through positions 
that give us room to achieve rational decisions not based on considerations of self
interest . Rawls a serts that this sort of affair only arises if people deliberate over
questions of ju tice under 'a veil of ignorance'. 
37 These two, 'people in the original
position' and 'th eil f ignorance' :
3 are the model of justification that Rawls
pre ents to illustrate and explain hi theory.
J7 
J 
Rawl , A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 136 & 141. 
Ibid p. 11-12 & 17-'.!l. 
74 
Ihe ori�inal position and the veil of ignorance 
Und r the original po icion. people decide their affairs under a veil of ignorance which
doe not allow them co know let alone consideration of their vested interests, in
arriving at certain decisions. 39 Therefore, people in the original position are well
suited co answer questions of justice because they are unaware of their own interests
and level in society. 'They do not know their position or the level of cultural and
economic development of their social setting'. -lO 
It is under this situation that people in the original position will derive perfect justice
without bias. From this stance, Rawls derives his theory of justice. He thus argues
that - people in the original po ition' is a model that affords a rational approach to
justice. This approach culminates into and entails two basic principles: 
a) Thar · each person is to have an equal opportunity to the most extensive coral
ysrem of ba ic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all'.
This is hi primary principle of justice. 41 
b) That ' ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both·
reasonably e, pect d co be to everyone's advantage and attached to position and
39 Ibid, p. 136-7. 
Ibid. p. 1 7. 
Ibid, p. 60. 
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offices open to all; save where inequality is to benefit the least well-off' _-12 This
i the principle of fair equality and just inequality. In it, is contained his other
major principle; the 'difference principle'. This principle advocates for equal
distribution of wealth and fair exposure to opportunities open to all.
Ihe original position 
The original position is premised on implicit contract between free and equal 
individuals. Its features, as explained by Rawls himself, are the following: 
That all are similarly situated individuals, who deliberate in ignorance 
of: any particulars of individual plans of life, any conception of the 
good and any knowledge of particular alternatives or circumstances, but 
that they evaluate every thing based on general facts of political affairs 
principles of economic theory and the laws of human psychology and 
• · · 43 the basis of social orgarusauon. 
In analysing this model, Pettit has devised four questions under which a thorough
examination of what goes on in the original position can be discussed. They are: Who
chooses? What is chosen? The basis of choice? And under what motivation this 
choice is made?44
He explains that under the first question. what Rawls moots is a finality of inter­
generation representative . That is to say the people in the original po ition are 
-13 
44 
Ibid, p. 60-1. 
Ibid, pp. 136-7. 
Pettit, Judging Justice 1980, p. 150-4.
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picked and drawn from a single generation. but the situation they occupy and the
principle contracted, represent all coming generations. So the big question here is that
since situations change will people still remain under the co·mrol of the original
position, even after the original contractors fade away? How long can the trend of
ignorance be passed over to new generations and can it last? Thus unless the original
position is similar to what theological covenants such as the Israel's and Christianity
represent its participants cannot last long and cannot pass on what they represent. 4s
On the second question of what is chosen, it is explained that what Rawls clearly 
intends to derive is the extraction of general principles of universal application 
particularly across time and generations. 
The third situation of the original position is the basis of its operation. What Rawls
envisages here, is the use of general facts to derive general principles of justice and the 
denial of particular facts (force of ignorance) to rule out arbitrary self inclined 
extractjon of principles of justice. 
The major question here will be \ hether denial of knowledge is not denial of justice?
Can real and true justice flourish in darkness or ignorance?
-15 r example. the idea of the riginal in in hri tianity claims that inc th
fir t man fail d t keep hi promis with God. h was unju t t hims If and
that r fl cts n his pro r ation or pro.::,eny.
Th founn s1ruat1on has morivauonal bearing on the original posmon. Here. :.is Pettit 
exp ams. \\ hat monvaces the pamcipams in the original position to arrive ar principles 
�:· just:(;.:. · �he :1 uon rh::n he'- ·:! !· -d. jc:s1r"- ::ind work �or att:J.inino 
:::, 
general · es ires. These are .:::enerally m erms of the idea of primary goods: 
Pamcularly rights. liberties. ualities ec . But since they operac under the veil of 
ignorance chat is forced upon them. we cannot really call this motivational: for 
morivacion is something that omes voluntarily from within the person and it is hardly 
possible for all people to always have the same motivation. generation after generation.
It mus be emohasised that generally. the original position creates problems for itself 
:nainl.' ec�use it suppresses people· conceptions of the good through forced 
:-escrictions on !�nowledg . , e Jlm !.S • ·osrer unarumiry. but the end result is :in 
individualisuc and presumpuve onception of justice chat substitutes re::ilicy with 
1mplausibiliry. Thus. the original position eems m presuppose nor just a neutral
'.:heory of the good. but a liberal individualisric_conceprion. according to which the best
that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of one's own path. provided
oes not incenere with other rights.-0 
Ho e er. t ·s ar.::ued mac even b.ere. [his theory .:mnot be escribed as fair since
� n °_pc·ons ,. the �oo · ar :· for.__e- oo pt! ot . \\·hile there ·1 rf': ere are man: - _ .... _
·" tu mil\ .ml.1 l 1omc1n. :i,; ;; i.\ 1SilCc.'' '-', su::. 1 an,i \In.I'!"' Rc:�.di f!S. l QOl. 
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po irion. Put in the real world the P.O.P will become frustrated with the choices
imposed by ignorance. Won't this change the whole Rawlsian scenario? Thus. rhe
mistake Rawl makes is that just for the want of unanimity, people must be denied self
knowledge. 
One suggestion to remove this problem is that Rawls should allow P.O.P ro have
knowledge of e eryone's preference and conception of the good without allowing them
knowledge of who they are.47 Howe er. this suggestion may be worse than Rawls'
original conceptions for it may foster the entry of hatred and envy and lead ro bad 
results. Moreover it does not remo e the real restriction: the force of the veil of 
ignorance. 
In Rawls's justice, the original position is a model conception of moral citizens of a 
just society. It does chis by demonstrating that in issues of justice, just individuals are
portrayed by the manners of the people in the original position (p.o.p). These
individuals (p.o.p) deri e principles of justice by working under constant constraints
which make them choo e rightly. The e constraints are in the model of a veil of
ignorance. 
The per ns in the riginal p ition thu p rat und r a powerful sense of justice for
they reprc em and fonn a i ry in which memb r iew each other a equal and free
agreein indi iduaJ : · th y ar all equally rational and qually ignorant' and thus hare
7 Ibid. p. 309-12. 
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a common method of choices to principles of justice. 48 The reason and conclusions
reached by p.o.p are thu rational for they are free of self interests. This portrays their
justice a a rationality of modem society. 49 
The individuals in the original position are ones with family sympathies and do not 
represent instirutfonal individuals. When they choose, people in the original position 
choose similarly, and always choose those principles that comprise justice as fairness.so
Their choice i always in lexical order: with the overriding priority of allowing liberty
to be restricted only for the sake of liberty alone.51 To deal with and resolve
conflicting demands, the principles that are chosen by the p.o.p are thus of general
norm. universal application and are publicly recognised. 
This is because in the original position, each individual makes a rational choice and
asks a rational question leading to a situation where all provide rational principles of
ju rice which are alike and in agreement. This is where Rawls' theory creates 
universal principles. For example we are all supposed to imagine that we are in the 
original position and once there, we must ask one and the same question: Which
principle of justice would I rationally accept? The answers we provide are no le s
49 
Kukatha and Pettit, Rawls, A Theory of Justice and its critics 1990 p. 127.
Miller. Da id, op. cit. p. 341-2. 
50 awl . J. A Theory of Justice, 1971 pp. 129-300. 
51 Ibid. p. 301-3. 
80 
con trained for we are all similarly situated under the same veil of ignorance that 
regulates our conclusions cowards rational consensu . Why is this? 
"The P.O.P brings down a veil of ignorance to ensure that reasonino e, cannot be influenced by inequalities of wealth. status, or talent, and the 
persons are taken to have a preference of the primary goods ... because
these are the goods necessary for the exercise of morality and 
achievement of goals". 52
Thus, in the original position 'parties are behind a veil of ignorance, they do not
know what alternatives will affect their interests and are obliged to take up only
interests of general considerations'. Under the veil of ignorance people in the original
position are only aware of the general truths about humankind or human nature and 
social organisation. 
no one knows his place in society, his class. position or social 
status: nor does he know bis fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities. his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor does 
anyone know his conception of the good. the particulars of his rational 
plan of life .... More than this .... parties do not know the particular 
circumstance of their own society". 53
So under a ei1 of ignorance. people in the original position are left with no choice but
to choo e tho e options which are in line with general truths. And these are (in
Rawl ' view) the m t ensible and just options. This i the creen which the veil of
ign ran e pro ide in order co deri the be t po ible and just ( ocial) arrangement.
To apply hi mod J, Rawls ay that people in the original po ition choose ba ic
2 
SJ 
Kukacha and Pettit. p. cit. p. L8. 
wl . p. cit. pp. 136-7. 
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tru rure principles in a con tirucional convention and apply these principles to elect
a governing law (con tirution . Law makers thus select laws in accordance with this
la\ and prin iple f the ba ic trucrure. Throughout the process, the people in the
original po irion are con trained from A to Z and as they go on, they act rationally
moving from the general to the specific and a this happens, the veil of ignorance
becom thinner and onsrraints to their rea onableness become weaker. This is more
evident at the rage of interpretation of principles at the judicial level. 54 
Well, doesn't chi eem to rum Rawl 's theory upside down or go round about? For
when the eil of ignorance becomes thinner, will the persons in the original position
remain disintere red one , or unaware of their self interests? Moreover it can still be 
pointed out that it does not matter whether the eil of ignorance becomes thinner or
nor. for its aim of er acing just arrangements devoid of self interests is one that is
covered up with blind assumptions. If not, why should Rawls talk of a veil of
ignorance that becomes thinner. He surely seems to be aware that the veil of
ignorance i hazardou to ju t conclu ion and that is why he talks of its need to
become thinner.
In matter of ju tic , we identify people according to their interests and goal , and how
they pur ue the e �oal and incere t . What we have in the original po ition and th
eil f ign ran e i a failure to recogni e chi reality. Rawls' theory neglects the true
w rkin t human n rure. N real per on can ever rand adamant of self inter sts,
ee ukalh an Peuit. P· cit. p. 31 ·
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harm and desire. etc. Therefore. it ·snot. urprising that in general. Rawls's theory has 
been criticised_ as one that is inadequate. untenable and unfeasible. 55 This has come 
For example, it is now a generally widespread criticism of Rawls to assert that the 
original �osition, as a modeL fails ro account for the practical realisations of justice 
because in such .position (0. P) persons are incapable of any reflective deliberati_ons. 
The conclusions persons reach in the O.P are as a result of options forced upon them 
by tbe veil of ignorance. Thus in the original position, Raw ls' s person is raped of the 
ability ro choose freely and from their own point of view. 
Raw is savs. when asked w choose orinciples )f justice. people in the original position . . . 
will choose the right principles bec:mse they are free from self interests. But how can 
their choice represent the right principles when their position is tailored in such a way 
chat they have w or must choose :1s sucn·7 In rJ1e original position. people c::mnot 
choose ri!!htlv for· thev are in no position to deliberate and reflect (realistically) on- - ., 
questions of each· s indi viduai life. 56 . .\11 they look at is the general trend of life. This
is nor the whole of life. Moreover: 
··Logically there can be only one person in the original· position. Any
agreement ·they' reach cannot be agreement with each oth�r to live
ss See Reiman. Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy. 1990. p. 273-5.
·�, JanJei .. I. Liberalisi'n &..2nd The Linur · '<: ° Justice, 98'.2. p. 129.
certain principles. for there are no others. At best. there is only :i. 
metaphorical agreement ... ". 5i
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ln reply. Rawls ,1rgues 1har in '.De ,_,ng1ml posilion there is '."Oom 'Or re:"1ective 
deliberations among the P.O.P. because they are always aware of facts of general 
knowledge. Toe people in the original position have no self desires and in their 
deliberations they ideritify desires and match them with the rational principles of 
justice. Sandel insists that as iong as they remain isolated. people in the original 
position are incapable of properly choosing the right (rational) principles of justice. 58
To put it more simp)y, using the original position is like picking 100 blind persons 
before 100 red oranges. All will pick the same colour and the same orange. not 
withstanding their inhibited preferences. Should the veil (of blindness) be removed. 
some or all of them may nor even choose a single orange! For then they would know
what is in their interest and what is not. 
It is in the ori!Zinal oosition that cracks to Rawls· s theory of justice are more vivid. - . 
Nozick. himself a liberal like Rawls. albeit a principled libertarian, opposed this 
position (0.P), arguing that it restricts the fundamental rights of individual emirlemem 
co property. Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit have attempted to defend Rawls's 
theory here by counter arguing that the rights Nozick is emphasising (Lockean 
57 Ibid. p. 129. 
Kukathas and Pettie, op. cit. p. 100.
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fundamental rights) are not the only serious rights to countenance in questions of 
justice. That is to say, although important, they are not uniquely salient. 59 
However, it must be remembered that what Nozick points out is this: these are 
fundamental rights that express the separateness of persons and yet it is exactly this that 
Rawls's theory disfigures. A further counter argument to Nozick's critique could be 
in the Question: why prefer such rights over others or such separateness over 
interdependence of persons? Do these fundamental rights generate more or better 
justice or do they elevate the individual to higher levels than what Rawls' s theory does? 
Moreover, Rawls does not really disregard rights to entitlement but only subjects them 
to what he calls the 'fairness' test. Rawls' principles of justice have been described 
as mooted to: 
"Ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social 
circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to 
design principles to favour his particular condition, the principles of 
justice are the results of a fair agreement or bargain". 60 
This rationalisation of Rawls' s theory helps us question whether his principles are those 
of social cooperation and not of justice. After all, isn't there a difference between the 
two? But first, let us examine the features that characterise these principles. 
59 Ibid, p. 87. 
60 Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia, 1974, p. 189. 
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Principles of Justice 
The fir r fundamental feature in Rawls's principle of justice is the nature of their 
ordering which is described as being lexical. This means that one of the two principles 
(i.e. the first one) takes precedence over the other. Put in other words, it means that 
if one iruation is preferred in the first principle, it will be the better one even if 
considerations of the second principle are brought in. "Only if two situations are 
equally good when the first principle is applied, will the second principle be brought
into play to break the tie".61 This explanation of Rawls's principles of justice reduces
the second principle to an arbitrating functionary and the first one to a domineering
functionary. But what Rawls intended to explain as the tarting feature of his two 
principles. is that one justifies the other. while at the same time, the one is part of the 
other. That is, both principles are part and parcel of the whole theory of justice. 
The First Principle of Justice 
Brian Barry among all others i the only one who appears to have had a better and
simpler examination of the feature of Rawls' principle of justice and I will follow
hi divi ions of ju tic . The key feature here i the pre upposition of the exi rence of
equal tibertie that all ought to enjoy ,. ithout hinderan e. Thi orre!at and requir
the ob ervance f thr i ue : 
61 rian B rry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, 1973. p. 52. 
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a) The most extensive total system (of equal liberties). What this means i that the
ideal principle of justice in Rawls' theory requires not merely equal liberties but
equal liberties which fit in the most extensive total system of equal liberties.
This, I think is aimed at pointing to the need for comprehensiviry.
b) Total system (of equal liberties). This feature as I understand it, is a demand
for a complete system upon which a standard principle of justice can be based.
The question which we are required to ask is what are the contents of a total
system of equal liberties. 62 The answer which Rawls appears to give here is
"Basic Liberties" and these are fundamentally, political liberty and the rule of
law. The latter presupposes many things incJuding allowing each to do what
he or she feels (believes) is right of equal liberty of conscience, acting within
the law etc. The former emphasises justice as equal right of participation.
Both these features involve a difficulty, since Rawls' principles are built upon
the control of the representational structure of people in the original position.
So how could there be real equal participation when the original position is
merely a model of sample participants? Thus there will be no uch thing as
equal liberty meaning people doing what they believe is right. for ri.::,ht i
predetermined by tbe feature of the original position and personal beliefs are
ut mat bed by this po ition. ft rail it i th original po ition ,. hich deri es 
feature Rawl ' principles.
Ibid, p. 35. 
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c) Equal right and equal basic liberties - the fearur of equality. "Each p rson is
to have an equal right to equal basic liberties ... '  What does equal repre ent
her ? No doubt 'equal' here signifies a feature of the first principle. But how
are we to understand this feature? Brian Barry says that equal in this case
shows the egalitarian nature of Rawls's first principle of justice. That is. it
means that no decrease in one's liberty can be justified simply because it leads
to an increase in others' liberty and henceforth the sum total of liberty. 63 But
as Barry himself admits, we cannot cry egalitarianism because a principle
embodies this implication.� So what is the feature that the word ·equal' carries
with it in Rawls' principles? I think what it means is simply 'liberty' - that no
body i� to be denied what he or she ought to have when others are allowed to
have what they ought to have. It presupposes the maxim: Liberty is the limit
or that liberty limits liberty.
The Second Principle of Justice 
There are about five questions whose answers signify the features of the second
principle of ju rke. Ba ically this principle addresses the nature in which inequalities
can be arranged o as to be part of the meaning of ju rice. Analysed in detail this
requir an int rplay of both equality and in qua1it ; but fir c let us look at the
qu tion chat point t the fi arure of thi principle.
6J Ibid, p. 41. 
Ibid. p. 42. 
. ' 
a I What are social and economic inequalities? 
bJ What i the greatest benefit and who are the least advantaged? 
.:1 \ h:ic.:; vmgs r.n ·pie is _iusri 
J Wha o .ve understand b_ offices and positions open to · 11? 
e) What is fair equality and which are the conditions attached to it?
3 
These same questions an be reduced to smaller- headings such as inequality and 
equality. grearest benefit for the least advantaged. and the just savings principle: Fair 
equality and justifiable inequality . 
al Social and economic inequalities here are in references to the differences in 
wealth incomes and . ower nor starus. 
b) The =reatest benefit of the least advantaged is that which secures for them the
primary goods as requued by the basic structure that 1s derived from the
decisions oft.he P.0.P. We also have to know the least advantaged as those
persons who lack what everyone ought to have under the structure stemming
.: ) 
from the P.O.P.
th usr :a\ m=s pnnc1pk · that \'hi :ners for · m r = nerauon I equity. 
89 
d) 'offices and po icions open to all' requires that there should be a merit 
exposition co talents. But there is a difficulty. Does he mean that there are
c rtain po itions which are not open to all? I think so. 
e) 'Fair equality of opportunity'. This also invokes merit - based applications.
The conditions of fair equality are however difficult to determine. Some have
argued that this is very absurd for it means that everything must be related to
the maintenance of a single family which could practice differential
advantages. 65 I do not think it is satisfactory to explain fair equality only in
such terms.
Two difficulties are wonh noting in the second principle: It is rather impo sible to 
define the boarder line between social and economic inequalities for both are 
inseparably interrelated. Secondly, it is also extremely difficult to define with 
exactitude at what line people become least advantaged. 
Under the second principle which is known as the difference principle, Rawls argues
that unequal treatment i part of equal distribution of wealth as long as uch inequality
j for th advantage of the lea t well-off. So, Rawls allow redi cribution of wealth for
the n fit of th p or and lea t ad ancaged. In thi wa . he po rulac that only by
ad an in the 
rder merge. 
ition of the lea t ,. ell- ff. will a fair and table ad ancemenc of ocial
6S Ibi , p. 1. 
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The difference principle rules that to achieve justice we must redistribute wealth to 
promote equality through unequal treatment in favour of the least advantaged. So. 
what he is purring forward is that to promote equal distribution of wealth. it i a 
principle of justice that we should never tolerate any inequality, except in so far a 
such inequality is to benefit the least well-off and provided that the same is attached to 
offices and po itions equally open to all. Thus, to Rawls, no other reasons whatsoever 
can justify inequality. 
General evaluation 
In putting forward his theory of justice '. Rawls categorises his two basic principles into 
domineering and subjected categories. To him. in matters of justice, liberty is mo t 
paramount and the community is the indicator of what sort of compromise or balance 
will bring justice for the individual: 
"Individual liberty can only be re tricted in the interest of greater liberty 
for all". 66 
So under thi argument it seem that in normal circumstances. Rawls' theory would 
place liberty and equality at th higher plane of virtues. In thi way. questions of need 
are given [ittl room, for equality and liberty cannot b acrificed for material 
pro perity r efficacy. He propo e that to promote equality and ma ·imi e lib rry: 
political, ial and individual fre dom mu t be guaranteed. However. thi can be
Rawl . A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. -�-
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criticised as a narrow view, for there are many other means through which liberty and 
equality can be maintained. 
His greatest credit lies in the fact that he has sparked off a revival of the vital search
for a universal and objective approach ro defining justice. Rawls is not only concerned
about the justice of those in the here and now, but even justice of those in future 
generations. In this way he provides a better alternative to the loopholes of classical
theories of justice. 
His difference principal and his emphasis of equal liberty for all would ne "6Bt±bt help
�lleviate the mess created by utilitarianism and egalitarianism. His assumptive model 
of 'people in the original position' helps us to appreciate the fact that. it is only when 
a person ignores elf interests that an honest and sincere view of justice can be 
derived. Thi is attainable if we discuss principles of justice as if we are unaware of 
our interest and ircumstances. 
General Criticism 
The tronge t criti i m of Ra\ l ' th or m rg from his equation of justice 1, ith
fairn and hi p rulation of an n umpcive mod 1 of 'people in the original po ition'
fi r he belie c that the best principle of ju ti e ar tho contain d in pronounc m nts
f ju ti e a ed n de i ion f 'p ople in the origin I position'. In qua tin� ju rice
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to faime s, Rawls i criticised for failing to define what is fairness and for forgetting
to reali e that fairness i merely a matter of the judgment that justice has been done. 67 
In putting up the a sumptive model of 'people in the original position' as a tool of 
ju tifying and illu crating his theory, Rawls has postulated a great practical 
impossibility. In this way, like medieval theorists, he neglects the inevitable realities 
of a practical world in which we Jive and instead dwells in a world of what could have 
been. Since we live in a world of practical realities the environment and 
circumstances around us will undoubtedly influence our conception of justice 
irrespective of the model of illustration that accompanies the principles followed in this 
conception. 
So it is difficult co see how one can arrive at meaningful principles of justice devoid 
of the circumstances affecting us unless we are in another world - perhaps a conceptual
one! Therefore, 'people in the original position' as a model of application, fails
rationality albeit a a model of justification, is one that is well taken. 
This i be au e it run counter to rules of rationality to argue that people can decide
rationally when their decisions are based on ignorance. To arrive at rationally
meaningful c n Ju ion r uir f uch knowledge as an be
onsider d rucial to th principl to be derived. People' interest and po ition are 
a matt r of vie lity in qu tion n justice. 
67 ie I man. Ju rice Law and Culture, 1985, p. 19 
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Thi mean that a possible counter argument to Rawls's model of people in the original 
position is that those who decide in ignorance may swiftly alter their stand a oon as 
they become aware of their true position. Of course, Rawls' s answer to criticisms of 
his model of people in the original position would perhaps be that he did not 
intend it for practical application but rather as one for illustrating his theory. I submit 
that this is an escapist answer. 
ozick anacks Rawls's difference principle. charging that it treats people a means and 
not as ends. In this, Nozick too turns Kantian. He funher charges that the difference
principle treats natural talents and possessions as collective property for all which must
be redistributed for the benefit of all. In this Nozick again sees in_ Rawls' theory as a
defilement of the inviolability and separateness of the individual. 
He also charges that the difference principle creates two conflicts of interests; between
those at the top and those at the bottom· and between those in the middle and those at 
bottom, for if those at bottom were gone, the difference principle might apply to
improve the po ition of tho e in the middle who would then become the new bottom 
group who e po ition is to be maximi ed. 68 This criticism is perhaps based on
ozick' belief that the role of Rawls' theory or principle of justice is aimed at social 
cooperati n. He explains that Rawl imagine rational, mutually i int r red
indi idual me ting in a c rtain hyp theti al ituation (the original po ition) and choo e 
prin iple f ju tice. 
zi k. op. ic.. p. _09. 
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In Rawls: A Theory of justice and its critics. Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit put 
ic more ubtly: ozick charges Rawls's theory of treating all natural endowments as 
'manna from hea en'; meaning that we alI come into the world with nothing and find 
things already there arbitrarily possessed waiting to be distributed. 69 
Generally, what Nozick objects to is a theory of justice (such as that of Rawls) which 
intervenes in people's natural rights or economic lives particularly in so far as 
property entitlements are concerned. He therefore dismisses Rawls' s theory as one 
that cannot be (permanently) applied particularly because it lives by constant 
intervention in people's (rights and) lives. Nevertheless, we must be reminded that 
Nozick in his criticism forgets to remember that Rawls's theory is only meant for 
occa ional readjustment to fairness when and if circumstances warrant. 70 
H. L. Hart inter alia charges Rawls of inadequacy and ambiguity in his theory. He
points out that Rawls calls for a principle of greatest liberty for all, while at the same 
time, he insi ts on defending certain- pecific liberties. Hart reminds us that a close 
examination of Rawls's theory shows that his real interest is in basic liberties.
In the Turner lecture we are told that Rawls agree co this insi ting that hi theory
70 
a tradition f dern ratic notions. which empha i s not liberty a a priority but
Kukatha . C. and Peuit. P. op. it. p. 9. 
I id. p. 
95 
certain b ic libertie .71 So no R wl very clear] eem to b revising (from th 
out ide) hi Theory of Justice. Furthermore. other critic have charged that by
empha izing a priority for th lea t II-off, Rawl provide incentives to the poor
ection. of ociet and denie the am to the rich ection . Thi low down the
morale of development and advancement in the rich sector of ociety. 
On thi note I would defend Rawls; since hi differential treatment is not aimed at 
permanent operation for particular sections of ociety. Once the aims of this principle 
are attained. the le t well-off will no longer be least advantaged. Another criticism 
of Rawl theory i on hi argument for principle of justice based on rationalit:,. 
In thi , he forget that not everything derived through ratior:ialiry is right and just. In 
fact, rationality can be u ed to defeat claim to equality and liberty. Also in hi 
theory Rawl ha o er emphasized the concept of liberty to make it appear even 
abo e ju tice itself. 
In toda ' world of strife for economic development. thi concept of liberty would 
deter one' need to achie e national industriali ation. This i because industrialisation 
invol e acrifice of certain libertie . For example. in man countrie vital
nationali ation cheme greatly but inevitably disturb individual liberty. Rawl would 
only ugge t tampering with people' liberty if it would enhance the enjoyment of
equal Ii rtie for al I, r if it promote the b nefit of the least well-off. 
"71 I id. . I 0. 
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So, in chi regard, Rawls would appear to allow industrialisation and sacrifice liberty 
until desired pro perity is attained. Perhaps what prompts Rawls to give this
cone sion i the reali ation that economic development may generally enhance equal
liberty for all and uplift the position of the least well-off. 
But even in his concession, there is still a danger: he does not state what will indicate 
attainment of desired pro pericy. So, where does prosperity end and liberty (or justice) 
begin? Thus. it has been argued that, this sort of concession gives room to politicians 
for abuse of individual liberty in the name of striving for desired prosperity that will 
enhance equal liberty for all. 
Further. under bis 'just saving' principle. Rawls advocates distribution and 
management of resources (wealth) in light of what will benefit the least well-off here
and now and those of the day after tomorrow (between generations). This is a poim
\ ell taken. but it is blurred when he refuses to tolerate any conservation of wealth or 
reservation of re ources, becau e he thinks this exploits the least well-off in the here 
and now. On chi note. I think that in his theory of justice Rawls is too harsh on the 
rich and yet over empha izes the priority of those in the least advantaged position in
ciety (the poor). 
blamed for putting up uni r al qu tions through a univer al model 
t an wer and pr vide univer al luti n v ith ut intending co do
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This i because he in i ts that his theory is not meant for universal conception.but is
built on foundations of rea on so as to provide rational answers to the demand of
justice. But rational answers need to dwell in the clear sunlight of knowledge and
reality, not in the dim light shadows of imaginations and presumptions. 
Thus, although his work is a formidable attempt to deal with the difficult task of 
providing a well meaning conception of justice, Rawls's theory of justice is built on 
hard to believe models and presumptions: The original position, its people, and the 
veil of ignorance under which they operate are some of the major 'hard to crack' 
dilemmas that surround 'A theory of Justice'. The two major principles of this theory 
are ideas that deserve insurmountable credit if and only if the models that postulate 
these principles were not attached to them. 
Rawls' Principles of justice: A Comparison 
Rawls approaches justice from a contractarian theory of social cooperation in which
he as erts that ju tice is fairness. Thi results in the doctrine of ocia1 contract which
envi ages fair t rms of ocial cooperation between free and equal individuals born and
living in a ciety they find them el e in. •
1 Su h po ition i what mo t a
hyp theti al ri)nal 
M n utt�l h 
and eg I Th 
it ion chat p rtra a a ic tmcture of Kantian con tmcti i m.
ed) Ju ti ·e. he International Library f E a in Law 
12. England: Dartmouth Co. Ltd., 1991. p. 15.
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which aims at securing an acceptable constitution structure of basic principles, that
command unanimity based on rational and reasonable distinctions. 
These principles are basically two applicational means that aim to provide an 
alternative to the obstacles of utilitarian approaches to justice. They are: the principles 
of basic liberty, which is the priority principle and the difference principle, which is 
the principle governing social distributions of interactions. Both of these principles 
concern: Liberties. basic rights. opportunities and equality. They are aimed at 
providing a more acceptable and secure basic structure of society and are therefore 
intended to argue for a basic structure that governs assignments of rights, liberties and 
duties. which regulate social-economic distributions of advantages. 73
The two principles hold his conception of justice and both represent and depict justice 
as fairness. From the standpoint of the original position. justice here and in this case 
emails that all primary goods are to be distributed equally. This is the primary 
principle which a1 o means and entails that there is establishment of equal liberty and
equal opportunity for all. But people in the original position may encounter situations 
which demand that they consider the outcomes of the primary criterion of ju rice. 
This only happen when and if equality leads to a dampening of the iruation of the 
lea t well-off memb rs f the general ommunity. This is what introduces adoption 
of the econd principle of ju tice which then commands that "inequalities are 
7) Ibid, pp. 6 48.
74 
1S 
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pennis ible when they maximise, or at least all contribute to the long-term expectations
of the lea t fortunate group in society". 
This has two basic meanings: one is that Rawls' theory of justice is ba ically 
equalitarian, or at least emphasizes equality first and fore most and the other is that 
in analysing justice we have a finality of two principles only namely: one that allows 
people to view justice from a fixed standpoint and the other that varies this view. One 
accords equal advantages and the other special advantages, while both stand for 
equality albeit in different ways. 
Thus it appears true to assert that in the original position, parties start and handle 
questions of justice with a principle of equality for all, but advance by establishing 
greater equality for some, so as to foster real equalities and that this operates when 
there is necessary - inequality in the basic structure which works to improve everyone, s 
ituation. 74 This is premised under the principal argument that: 
" ince there is no way for anyone to win special advantage for himself 
each might consider it reasonable to acknowledge equality as an initial 
principle. There is. however, no reason why they should regard thi 
po ition final; for if there are inequalities which satisfy the econd 
principle, the immediate gain which equality would allow can be 
considered as intelligently invested in view of its future return". 7s
Murphy and olomon, What is Jus1ice? Classic and Comemporary Readings,
1991. p. 310.
Ibid. p. 309-10. 
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Thi futuri t and result ended argument could be one reason why Rawls' principles 
of justice are seen a a qu t to improve upon and provide for modified utilitarian 
alternatives. What it al o means i that his primary principle only applies when there
i equality, otherwi e it is the second principle which will be in operation. 
This prompts the argument that his first principle will always be redundant because 
there is no day (in the real world) when such equality ·will happen. In return then this
also prompts the argument that the real Rawlsian principle that can be in operation is 
the second one. Thi brings us into accepting of the assertion that the difference 
principle i the governing principle of social justice and really not that of basic liberties 
or equality. 
The basic feature of this governing principle is that there has to be redistribution of
goods and that uch redistribution runs from the better offs to the worst offs. This is
continuou until redi tri ution fail to raise the long term absolute hares of the worst
off. Put in other words: it is a principle premi ed on the basis that sacrifices which
lessen inequality are just, but tho e which increase inequality are not. 76 Thus the
difference principle i not only a governing principle of justice it is also a principle
rooted in and aimed at promoting egalitarianism. This is because through inequality
its aim i to attain equality, or if not that. th n at lea t a unanimous feeling of equality.
76 Ibid p. 273. 
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However, the difference principle like the original position from which it stems has
been bitterly opposed as implausible complex and unrealistic. 77 It is a principle that
treat people in a way that neglect their real differences, forgetting as Sandel arQUes0 ' 
that as a matter of want, even where fair opportunity is the rule, these differences
naturally persist. 78 
Thus, the practical argument is that artificial differences can be remedied through
certain principles but not the natural differences. The difference principle neglects this
for in its treatment of natural talents as common assets, it allows people to reside in
each others' genetic and cultural advantages and thereby sidetracks the idea of merit 
and desert, which are vital as far as justice is concerned in this regard. 79 But it would
be wrong for Sandel to think that cultural differences are as forceful and unchangeable
as genetic ones! 
The better argument made by Sandel against Rawl 's difference principles, is that
ba ed on the force and nature of genetics. 
"The more inequality turns out to be genetic but not culturally included, 
the le ciety can do about it. Given a fair system. some will advance 
77 ee Reiman. Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy. 1990. p. 273-5. 
; Philip Pettit al o blame Rawls for �i . arguing _
th�t t�e difference principle
like utilitariani m, doe not take enou ly the d1srmcuons betwe n per on .
I thi why it treat people a means. (See Pertit, Judging Justice 1980, p.
131). 
9 ee Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 1982. p. 72-5.
more successfully than others and there comes a point when even the 
mo t enlightened society can do nothing to alter this fact". 0 
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Thus, Sandel i right in so far as he argues that justice i not in the reduction of 
natural differences (genetic ones) but in the way we deal with these differences. If
these differences are talked of as merely natural then the argument must be different 
because then the difference principle may be applicable to non genetic, but natural 
differences such as tho e brought about by cultural inclinations. Take for example the 
Malaysian social system. Colonial cultural heritage and Malay kingship created 
disadvantaged and advantaged classes of people. This can be, and is actually 
changeable, and not natural. 
Rawls' reply to these problems appears to be in the assertion that the difference 
principle is a principle of mutual benefit through which people do not gain at the 
expense of each other. since only reciprocal advantages are allowed. Therefore, the 
difference principle will be accepted to both groups: the advantaged as well as the
disadvantaged because it operates under the view that no one deserves his or her place 
in the distribution of native endowments. 81 However, as Reiman argues this is an
unconvincing and unsatisfactory a reply. for even if people are not entitled to what they
naturally have, it does not follow that acquisition of benefits has to be in a way that
maximises the welfar of others - thu prima facie, Rawls' difference principle
Ibid, p. 75. 
Reim n, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy 1990, p. 274.
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depicts a confusion of justice with benevolence. 2 Moreover, as Reiman again shows, 
the difference principle operates in uch a way that allow the least well-off to acquire
advantages in a manner that doe not improve the welfare of others. 
This, in itself, doe not only make the difference principle lopsided towards the poor 
and less fommate and thus becoming biased against the rich and well to do, but it also 
makes this principle a self defeating theory which runs counter ro its very stand point: 
that no one hould benefit in way that do not benefit others, or which worsen the 
conditions of others. 
Reiman uggests that this problem can be removed if the difference principle takes the 
labour theory of moral value as its justifying stand point. This labour theory argues 
that benefits of the well co do are - a result of labours (efforts) of the worst off. On 
this basis the di tribucive theory of the difference principle is acceptable without 
question becau e it balances the two by reasoning that the rich are what they are
because of the poor and therefore removing wealth from them to the poor is no fault
at all. Under this argument the least well off are thus justified to receive additions
from the better off because the latter also received the farmer's labours (so as to be in
that po ition . SJ Thi labour theory eems convincing but it also does not deal
cxhau tively \ ith the troubles that the diffi rence prin iple is faced with. For example
J 
Ibid. p. 274. 
Ibid, p ... 74-5. 
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it cannot quash Sandel' s critique that the principle is a fallacy in so far as it treats 
talents as common a sets. 
Generally, Rawls argues for his difference principle on the premise that its practising 
inequality works to the advantage of all directly or indirectly and that the aim is not to 
eradicate the different variations of office, status, positions etc, but the attachments 
corresponding to thern. 84 So won't Rawls's theory under chis argument allow slaves 
and master to stay as uch, so long as the corresponding attachments are varied to work 
to the advantage of the worse off (i.e. the slaves)? I think it can do so. And in this
way his theory does not question the status or position one holds, but the attachments 
and advantag_es corresponding to it. However, we have to know that justice is not 
distributions alone. but the basis upon which these distributions are based. 
Brian Barry's Concept of Justice 
In A Treatise on Social Justice. Brian Barry embraces. discusses and counters the 
variou theories of ju rice co extract his own theory of justice which is justice as 
impartiality and ju lice as mutual advantage. This he does no better anywhere else 
than in ch analy is of th theories of Da id hume and John Rawls. The model he 
in that of Rawl ' ri�inal po ition. 
Ra,.: Js A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 307.
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His work i in three volumes but for the purpose of this thesis it is volume one that
is analy ed in detail, for the other two volumes are meant to build upon the conclusion
of the first one. In this treatise Barry adopt Rawls' original position with a thin theory 
of the veil of ignorance under which rational individuals can derive principles of 
justice. Under this model Barry modifies and limits Rawls model of people in the
original position through an increase in the knowledge people need to derive principles
of justice. 85 Therefore, although the model upon which he builds his principles of
justice is Rawl ' it is also one where people are allowed to have self interests but are
denied knowledge of self identity. All knowledge is availed to them while at the same
time their identity is concealed from them also. This puts them in an egoistic
bargaining position as well as an impartial one at the same time. The result is a two­
tiered theory of justice. based on both constructionists and contractualist base lines.
This seems to suizoest two things, that in deriving justice there are co- operative and.. A:, 
non cooperative starting points from which parties bargain their way towards
agreement to just principles. But it also suggests that there is no agreement point in
which principles are discussed from an already set situation that only guides towards
just conclusion . This is where a marriage of Rawls' theory to that of Brian Barry
come into harp focu for both embrace thinly varied original positions with fixed
characteristic feature intended to deri e principles of ju rice.
8.5 Barry, Treatise of Social Justice Volume I pp. 304, 327 and 331.
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Both argue that to d rive ju tice, panies have to be put in similarly set situations with 
th only difference being that Barry, unlike Rawls, builds his theory on a round about 
analy is of many theorie who e models he reforms and reformulates into direct and 
indirect approaches to justice. These, he terms the intuitionist and constructivist 
approaches respectively. 
Barry's three approaches 
In his A Treatise On Social Justice, Brian Barry provides three approaches to justice. 
These are modelled under the triple theory of games, fights and debates,86 but generally 
portray a variant of Rawls' model in A Theory of Justice. 
The fu t approach is that which realises justice as a matter of mutual advantage and is 
in terms of a game cons!ruction. What it does is basically to create a game in which
the major question is: What would rational self interested individuals (players) agree
to and conclude. Barry explains that this approach involves a theory of co-operation 
in which members interact by each doing their best and presenting to one another their
be t challenge . The principles that emerge are tho e that are based on a rational and
acceptable analy i . 
6 Ibid, Chapter , pp. 112 and 371.
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The second and third approaches are those which realise justice as a matter of acting 
impartially. Thus there are basically two approaches albeit two in three. s7 
The econd approach is one that involves a kind of Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The
unique position here is that parties are not similarly situated as such for they are
allowed to pursue self interests as effectively as possible. 88 The word 'possible, here
is crucial to Barry's approach. For this is where the veil of ignorance is operational.
In this approach although parties are allowed to pursue self interests, chis is controlled
by a veil which covers their capability to know who they are. Thus although they
know what interests that are pre-existing and the conflicts involved they do not know
who they are and are therefore incapable of relating these_ interests for the advancement
of particularly distinctive self interests or choices. This then places them in an
impartial position for all are placed in a situation of uncertainty. The real problem
which exists is (as Barry himself hints) that of decision. How are parries ro decide
principles of justice in an uncertain situation while at the ame time there is pursuit
of elf intere t ? 
The third approach is what Barry calls the Rapoport Debates situation. Here, Barry
explains that this is an approach which involves the requirement to aim at convincing
each cher. making each other e thing a other 
9 
Ibid, pp. 369-72. 
Ibi , p. 304-7 and p. 69-72· 
Ibid p. 371. 
e them, or in a word: the
91 
108 
readiness (acceptance) to convince and be convinced,: This too puts the parties in an
impartial situation which leads to impartial inclinations, provided that the debate is
done in good faith. This necessitates that members (parties) accept 'good' argument
even where it turns against their interests. However if this is to be connected to the
veil of ignorance of the second approach it becomes difficult to see how panies can see 
what is good if they cannot know who they are. For goodness need be connected to 
the individual's identity. Moreover, how are they to know it runs against them if they
do not know their own identities? Barry's answer seems to be in the device he adopts
towards the third approach which he breaks into two situations:90
a) First situation here is chat the approach requires parties to reach agreement on
principles that nobody could reasonably reject.
b) Second situation is the provision chat parties 'do not operate under a veil of
ignorance', albeit they can (in a ubordinate structure) invoke it. 91 This is
confusing and contradictory. For once parties invoke it. ignorance will
automatically become operational. What we must observe here is that the first
part of the third approach i the real approach which realises justice as
impartiality. For as Barry himself explains, the approach that brings about
imp rti l on lu ion i chat \ hich operate under the requirements that
eryb dy mu t b .::-i en (due) on ideration and chat everyone has authority
I id. p. 71. 
Ibid.p. 71. 
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over principles of justice proposed, unless it would be 'reasonable' for that
person to accept such principles. The hard to crack questions here are
(however): what is reasonable and who determines it? The test that Barry
provides in answer to these questions is the requirement: We have to see
whether the principle itself is impartial - that is to say, whether it could not be
'reasonably' rejected by anyone covered by it. 92 But there is still a problem.
The approaches that Barry constructs are a double edged sword, for they are
not only confusing and contradictory but may also be self defeating. In fact,
Barry himself seems to admit there is a problem and argues that the reasoning
surrounding these approaches can if carried too far, bec.ome misleading:
. .
"On one side, we want to insist that the parties have 
interests and values that they are concerned, up to a 
point, to defend. But we do not want this to reduce the 
third construction to the first, where parties utilize 
whatever strategic advantages they have in order to 
advance their interests. On the other side we want to 
say that the parries are prepared to accept that it would
be unreasonable to hold out against some proposal 
merely because it is relatively disadvantageous. But we 
do not want to ay that their sense of what is reasonable 
is O strong that it leads them directly to identical 
h • ' II 93conclusions about w at 1s Just . 
Justice as impartialic, 
Barry argues that justice (a a virtue) is derived by sticking to the requirements of
being just. In justice a imparciality it means adopting an impartial stand point in
92 
9) 
Ibid. p. 72. 
Ibid, p. 372. 
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vn1 en 1meresr ,r J J are t K n care:: or n enc: ·no1ce or pnn ipies or' Jusnce. This
is similar co the other concept of justice as devoting a mutually advamageous stand in
·n :Jr '.l .. ·1dm1 s rc J!!reemem. Ho\lv·eve rhe ·ame similari . · i . .-lvenhro\\ n by the
requirement mac m Jusr1 a· impamality. bargaining seems co have no place \i any
at all and chat H is nm so much the outcome that matters. 
To understand justice as impanialiry. Barry provides a number of desiderata which 
must be satisfied. But first. we muse note thar rhe whole concepr of justice as 
impartiality !S grounded in rwo views.· One is a world in which it is accepted, 
that JUSt1ce is molivared by sel imeresrs; and the other is a world in which it is
accepted rbar ir is rational ro do things in pursuit of jusrice contrary ro one's self 
:n e:-esr- .i.: c .::omprehend justice :i_ .m ar·iJliry. Barry argues. these rwo worlds 
mus be :omrasred. 
There is .:iiso the argument rhar unparriaiiry !S )ven fulfilment through having a sense
of being JUSt and the regard that in Justice lies me reason for avoiding unjust acrs. 95 
This argument. vhen ombined \vitb the above rwo views. makes justice as impanialiry
an abstract and constructivist oncepr. Barr_ ' - basic idea or justice as imparrialiry is
·ome Ort of a Kantian approach: purring one's self in another's shoes and asking the
quesrwn: HO\\. would you like ro be u-e:He in the way : ou :ire proposing co crem
V() \'J S: 
Ibid. p �6 
!bi'·.., .: �o.
,, 
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• I nc t� 10 , SK· 'hat some: neool wouJ support tr rhey did nor know their
posmons. w, Here the aim is w rule our self inreresredness and bias so as to
ue an im a :al eelin!:! ·und omt Howeve;- his is :i highly R:iwlsian
posru1are, purely anributed to Barr:,,� 
The other. is ro ask panies (in the hypothetical siruarionJ ro propose principles
of disrriburion of benefits and burdens 1hat·mighc be acceptable to everyone
-nor merely as preferable ro outcomes arising our of lack of agreement. but
under conditions in which that kind of bargaining pressure is removed. Q7 
Thus. what Barry means by justice as impaniality. is that kind of siruation in which an 
:m_ arr'al ocserve rwhar Barry ::ills person ,vjth no srake in the case) would approve
o . Such siruarion muse manifest the following features:
There muse e :ibsence of the assumpnon hat peooie will be unmoved by self 
interests. 
) Re ·ection of comemion char efficien principles of justice reflect power 
relations 
.._) . on existence of a non-agreement position as a sorting prim except in non 
.:onrrolling I subordinate) position. 
::-:in la 100 · su er'or · argaining 0wer 1nro ;id,·amageou outcomes.
112 
These feature , in order to realise justice as. impartiality, operate under a three-in-one
approach which, in the Barry world view, is the general theory of justice: 
"It is an approach in which the motivation of being just is in the desire 
to act in ways that can be defended to oneself and others without 
appealing to personal advantage". 98 
This reduces 'justice as impartiality' to acting in ways capable of being defended
impartially. Barry also argues that 'justice as impaniality' has a core of morality, for
the quality of being impanial involves a moral sentiment of acting with objectivity and
without·fear or favour. Thus, in puning forward a principle that could not reasonably
be rejected by impanial spectators, Barry moots a theory of justice based on a moral
sentim_ent which then makes justice as impartiality the core of morality or moral
principles of justice. This is perhaps because Barry argues that: "Morality includes
an impanialJy defensible core, and that justice is wholly contained within that impartial
core". 99
Hence. the conception of justice as impartiality also rotates around the postulate that
there i an intimat linkage between justice as a moral feeling and justice as the desire 
to do what w ul r a onabJy not be rejected. Thus. principles of justice, from an 
impartial rand point are not only impartial principles of justice, they are also
prin iple f momlicy. Ho\ ever. Barry counters this analysis with what appears to be
a elf conrradi ti n f hi p ition. He ay that:
9 
99 
Ibid, p. 61. 
I i , p. _91, 
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"If the principles are agreed upon by normal human beings from normal 
human conditions we would surely expect them to prescribe 
impartiality in som contexts and allow (or even mandate) partiality in 
other . 1 
Justice as Mutual Advantage 
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The central issue here is justice as co-operation within a hypothetical situation which
requires a move from non-agreement, to what Barry calls the 'pareto frontier' (how
gains of cooperation are to be shared).- So, Barry argues that the just terms are those
term of co-operation and agreement between self interested individuals. 3 This in turn
means that justice is that which channels the motive of self interests towards actual
agreement to signal mutual advantage. In this case it means that justice is that which
underwrites mutually advantageous cooperative arrangements, whether they arise from
explicit agreements or not. 4 In other words, justice here infers co-operation and it does
not matter from where co-operation is derived! 
However. Barry simultaneou ly asserts that once justice as mutual advantage is
operationaJised, a variety of a contractarian theory of justice is derived, but this is only
in O far a he thinks of ju tice as a matter of institutionalised compliance. 5 This then
Ibid, p. 291. 
Ibid, pp . .,69-70. 
Ibid pp. 369-70. 
I id, p. 67. 
Ibid, p. 369. 
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makes justice as mutual advantage a comractivist theory which arises from agreement 
of individuals to maximise their self interests within the annpit of mutual
advamageou ness. 
Thi works with a model of contractivism which requires as Barry explains, a setting 
up of interactions between hypothetical people in hypothetical positions and thus 
be ome a model of the theory of justice. This model represents people bargaining 
advantages and disadvantages so as to generate consensus. In justice as mutual
advantage the demands of justice are thus answered by constructing models of human
interaction in a certain context also. And the emphasis here too is in. the nature of
outcomes. 
Thus like in justice as impartiality here too, the aim is to identify what would people
agree to as principles of just institutions, and, the question they ask is: does the
con truction derive acceptable principles? 
The major point of distinction is the non-co-operative starting point which justice as
mutual advantage largely embraces. Here the idea is that everyone should deal as well
for them Ive a they can with "a resultant non-co-operative payoff" but provided that
ir um lance hold partie by moving away from the non agreement point so as to
deri e what Barry call a co- perative urplu 
. 6 Thi ultimately calls into action the
pro p rive ad amag u ne which i al o th ba i of justice a mutual advantage.
" Ibid. p. 369. 
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Neverthele , in so far as they stress agreement, both of Barry's approaches to and 
forms of justice can be characterised under contractivist and constructivist theory. In
terms of motive, they again share the same goal: to extract principles of justice based
on the test of reasonable terms which emphasize fair dealing or fair play.
On another front, it can be seen that both approaches share in common the theories of
modern and classical philosophies of justice. Justice as impaniality is basically a
combination of views of Rawls, Hume and the Stoics, while justice as mutual
advantage brings together the views of Hobbes and the Sophists.
One major critique that can be brought forward against the theory of Barry in this 
regard is the implausibility and inconsistency his arguments exhibit. He says that
justice as mutual advantage is in adopting a rational course in which each carries out
undertakings because of their advantages. And he also insists that justice is in 
everyone doing their part in mutually advantageous-co-operative arrangements. So he
seems to refute his earlier notion by arguing that advantages are only motivations to
justice and that it i not merely doing whatever one views as advantageous that wilJ 
derive ju tice. 
More r. e en if we ac epc chi udden change of argument. it can till be seen that
ju tice a mutual advanrage ha a problem because it entails bargaining, tho e with
uperior p wer ar de tined co flourish and the ma im 'might is right' can through
per ua ion translm d into ju tic und r the gui of what i mutually advanta:.eou
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to all. Furthermore, as it has been noted, both justice as impartiality and justice as 
mutual advantage operate under the derivation of justice in real tenns. 
Finally, it can also be recalled that the ground work of justice in the Barry world view
is that based on institutionalised compliance. That is he asserts that the basis of justice
is in (just) inscirutjons because they offer compliance. However, institutions are •
artificial creations of humans and cannot, I think, be taken to be superior to the
narural (innate) sense of justice which ought to be the starting point on all issues on·
justice. 
Barry's approaches compared 
In justice as impartiality we have noticed that there are fundamentally two approaches 
to justice. The first one is where people are allowed to pursue their own interests or
advantages. but are denied certain knowledge. so as to prevent abuse of superior
bargairung power. Here we realise that the first general approach used in justice as
mutual advantage i still in active operation, albeit under a thin veil of ignorance.
The econd approach is where partie are put under a hypothetical situation in which 
the ole aim i the earch to reach agr ement on principles of justice that nobody could
r a ona ly rej ct. Her ne fundamental fearure to ob erve is that, unlike the approach
in ju ti e mutual ad antag , this approach totally, or almost totally drops the
itu tion of If inter t. 
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Moreover, as Barry explains, what we see in both justice as impartiality and justice as
mutual ad antage, is the use of self interests under utterly different roles. In justice
a mutual advantage, self interest plays the role of representing people as they really
are (self interested individuals). While in justice as impartiality, rhe role of self
interest is reduced to only aiding in bringing about an impartial stand point.
It is also rightly elaborated (by Barry) that the two approaches are largely similar,
panicularly in so far as they emphasize achieving agreement from the pursuit of self 
imerest (to constitute justice). The only puzzle of this remark is, that how can pursuit 
of self interests derive � justice? I think what is practically possible, is the
contention that justice can be derived only hypothetically _if we are to connect it to and
extract it from real pursuit of self interests. Nevertheless, it is true to point out that
the real difference between these two approaches, whether of impartiality or of murual
advantage. i in the way they single out certain conditions which characterise self
interests. That i , eiled self interests and unveiled or free self interests. Put in other
words: the impartial approach puts resrrictions on people's knowledge of self interests
vi -a- i their identitie and a ks the question: bow would you like it if you did not
know how y u v uld be affected. The mutually advantageous po ition or approach.
leave p n th ca e for knowledge, o a to maximi e gain. 
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Justice as a Subiect .. 
In conclusion to volume one of his Treatise on Social Justice, Brian Barry provides 
three important questions that are indispensable to any theory of justice. They are: 
a) What is justice?
b) Why be just? and
c) How do we go about determining what justice demands?
These are crucial questions on justice, whether Barry answers them rightly is another 
question. The first one has been asked since Plato and is still being asked. We shall
examine it first. 
a) What is justice?
Brian Barry suggests that there are a variety of contexts in which this question 
can be answered. However, he inclines towards that which describes justice 
in social terms as an institutional distribution of benefits and burdens. He also
ay that justice can be described as an attribute of individual legal decisions, 
but insists that as a subject, social justice incites distribution which invariably 
requires and means that justice is an attribute of institutions. !his is because 
institutions are considered to be the creator of benefits and burdens. 
7 
119 
So what Barry seems to propose is that when we talk of justice we think of the 
way an instirution distributes benefits and burdens and that "when we ask about
the justice of an instirution, we are inquiring about the way it distributes
benefits and burdens. 7 The benefits and burdens in Barry's view are thinos0 
like: rights and disabilities, privileges and disadvantages equal and unequal
opporrunities, power and dependence, wealth (control of resources) and
poverty etc. 
Well, there are two key faults with this conception. One is that Barry's ideas 
in this regard restrict. the subject of justice to the social-distributive enclave. 
But justice is more than this. Secondly, even in social terms, justice cannot be 
limited to institutional conceptions. There is the innate feature of justice that 
can be related to distributions. 
b) \-Vhy be just?
This question presupposes a conception of justice based on what motivates 
people to be ju t or put in other words, the variou inclinations towards being
just. Thu Barry suggests that there is always an inseparable affinity between
ju ti e and the motivation of being ju t. Thi inti r that the meaning of ju tice
i attach d to why people are ju r. It al o mean chat a theory of justice can be
an wered or explained in a theory of motivation.
Ibid, p. 355.
9 
10 
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The argument is in the assertion that "because of the practical nature of justice,
a theory of the motivation for being just must at the same time be a theory of
what ju rice is". For the content of justice is such that people will have a 
reason for being just. 8 For example, this explains why Barry postulates justice
as mutual advantage and as impartiality. In the latter there is justice because 
of the desire to act in ways capable of being defensible by an impartial stand 
point. In the former justice is brought about by its advantageousness. This 
makes justice as Barry says,9 that which every one finds to be advantageous or, 
that which appeals to impartiality. 
Altogether we then see that justice cannot be derived in a situation where the 
why is not connected to the what. But the paradox is that normally the what
comes before the why! 
What I can see in the motivational explanation of justice is in the postulate that 
why be just does, as a question, explain what is justice only in so far as it leads 
to the requirements of justice. Barry also somehow puts forward this 
argument. But the problem with him is that he overemphasizes the
requirements of justice as being the requirements to comply with the dictates 
of the (ju t) institutions of distribution of benefits and burdens. 10 This leads 
Ibid, p. 359. 
Ibid, pp. 361-366 
Ibid p. 359. 
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to requirements of justice. But indeed as Barry himself hints justice is both an
individual virtue and an institutional virtue! It would therefore be wrong to say
that justice is merely a disposition or desire or motive to conform to the
requirements of a just institution. 
c) How do we go about determining what justice demands?
In answering this question Barry suggests that we adopt a method in which we
contrast approaches to justice. So the approaches he puts forward for 
contrasting are those which are based on the hypothesis of what parties or 
people would eventually agree to. 
This, as we have already seen, is in the result of principles of mutual advantage
and impartiality. 
CHAPTER III 
UTILITARIANISM, JUSTICE AND MARXISM 
In Bentham's tenns, the single object of justice is to seek pleasure and shun pain,
therefore an act of justice is to be judged in terms of its contributions to pleasure. I 
In this regard anything pleasurable is good and just. But as we shall see later in
this chapter, there is no standard evaluation of what constitutes pleasure.
Moreover, Bentham's two principles - desire for pleasure (as the goal behind every
action) and universal benevolence as a master scale of just acts in a community,
come in eminent contradiction. 
This is because pleasure stems in self interests and yet his theory looks at the 
justice in pleasure under a general overall measure which actually diametrically
contradict the natural self interestedness of individuals, at least in the psychological
en e. Thi can be vividly een in Bentham's failure to recognise the relative nature
of pain and pleasure as the standard measure of right and wrong. This failure is
clear in his tatement that: 
"Nature ha placed mankind under the governance of two overeign
ma cers; pain and plea ure. It i for them alone to point out what we
ought co do, a well a to determine what we hall do. On one hand 
the candard f right and wr ng, on the other hand the chain of cause
and effects, are fastened to their throne"2
B ntham, An Jnrroducrion ro the Principles of Morals, p. I. 
Ibid, p. 1. 
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Generally, there are basically two utilitarian views. One is char an ace is righc or
wrong according to the con equences it brings forth. The second one is that acts are
judged or weighed through the nature of consequences of the rule that actors follow 3 
These are what can be called act and rule utilitarianism respectively. Whatever the
view in any case the utilitarian principle is clearly the same: justice is a matter of
pleasure derived in the consequences of an act. Thus, fundamentally the utilitarian
stand point is this: An ace is just if the consequences resulting from it derive the
maximum possible satisfaction, or happiness for the greatest possible majority.
I have come to feel that this is rather absurd, in the first place, it neglects the content
of the act itself let alone the state of mind of the actors themselves. Moreover, such
a proposition is highly subjective for what may be pleasurable to the greatest majority
of people may in itself be inherently immoral and unjust as well as harmful to others
(minority). Both the act itself and the individual are either given negligible attention 
or are utterally left out by the utilitarian dogma. 
In theorising justice, utilitarianism therefore seeks to emphasise communal-majoritarian
upremacy over individual rights. Its roots are in the belief that justice and the value
of human life are contained in the dictates of pain and pleasure. Therefore, classical
utilitariani m po rulates a concept of justi e based on the belief that an act is good,
right or ju t becau e it produc s 'the greatest possible ration of good to evil over all.
mart an WiJliams Utilitarianism, For and Against, 1973, p. 9.
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In the light of ju tice, utilitarian concepts look at a definition of justice in terms of the
general go d for the general public resulting from an act. It does not matter if the
general good i contained in an evil motive or action as long as the subsequent
results give the 'greatest pleasure (happiness) for the greatest majority'. 
This means that, things like war, cheating, fraud, murder, assault and slavery can be
considered just not withstanding the suffering inflicted on a few victims, as Jong as
maximum satisfaction (good) can be achieved for the greatest majority. This is the
classical theory of utilitarian justice. John Stuart Mill as a disciple of Jeremy Bentham
advanced upon the classical theory by advocating that in utilitarianism, justice is
derived by considering the immediate and ultimate consequences arising from an act
vis-a-vis the maximisation of pleasure for the greatest number of people. 
The difference between Bentham and Mill is that, while the former does not distinguish 
between panicular acts vis-a-vis utility· the latter lays emphasis on evaluating the utility
of various ace and their general effects. However, both Stuart Mill and Jeremy
Bentham are committed utilitarians who e theories are derived from consequentialistic
conceptions. 
To cla i al utilitarian , a socially just allocation of goods is that which brings the
r at ati faction for the greatest number of people. Modem utilitarians would 
agree co thi though with little analytical alteration. The problem with utilitarianism 
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is that, there i no preci e measure of pleasure, happiness or satisfaction and one
cannot simply equate justice with that which satisfies the greatest number of people!
It is an illu ion to think that justice is only attainable through maximisation of pleasure
for the greatest number of people. This is because happiness, pain, pleasure and
satisfaction are dependable on personal (immeasu;able) feelings. So what is
satisfaction to one group of people or a single individual, may be painful to the other.
The Utilitarian conception of justice considers consequences and not the process of the 
idea of what is just. Thus the just measure in utilitarian terms is that which weighs
up things in regard to the results. The standard with the largest overall (net)
balance of happiness is the just standard, the collateral harm not withstanding. It
means that in considering competing claims or rights, that which leads to the largest
total sum of general welfare will be the one that shall be considered most.
Therefore it eems that utilitarianism may not give strong regard to those claims which' 
do not generate maximum general happiness - no matter how vital they may be to some
people. The rate can also take away any individual entitlement or rights if the same
i required in the maximi ation of general (net) happiness. This is the good side of
utilitarianism. for it cares for general welfare. The bad side is that it does not care
wh th r the methodology i harmful to others or immoral.
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good xample here is slavery. For the utilitarian, slavery can be good and just if its
use i crucial to the maximisation of happiness. Thus, if (as it was) the whole world 
1 m need of human labour for its industries, so as to increase social economic 
development and thus happiness overall, utilitarianism will accept the talcing of a few 
million laves to generate this aim for the many other millions or billion people. 
Therefore, utilitarianism would be totally unacceptable to all those moralists and 
believers in a rights thesis, like Ronald Dworkin, who argue that justice equals 
morality and taking rights seriously. 4 
Put in other words utilitarians seek to explain justice in terms of that which maximises 
human welfare. This is derivable in weighing up pleasure against pain seen in the 
consequences of an act. The action which produces the maximum possible amount of 
welfare (happiness) overall is thus the just and right act. This postulate, just or unjust, 
is the basic premise of utilitarianism. 
If we consider it in terms of its possible effect on the overall welfare, justice in
utilitarian terms refers to and concerns that which promotes the overall maximisation 
of welfare and is futuristic in nature. This is because utilitarianism evaluates actions 
and behaviour in terms of the foreseeable results that generate maximi ation of welfare.
That i , it does not give trong regard to whether the act itself is good or not, what it
i concerned with is whether an act will derive maximum overall plea ure. 
e Ronald Dworkin: Taking. Rights Seriously, Chapter VII and for
Dworkinian argument on utilirariani m in this regard, see Chaprer IX of thi
book particularly pp. 232-7 ·
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So to the utilitarian, such acts as murder, theft burglary, etc, do not worry them, 
what matters is their expected result on the maximisation of overall happiness. On
this note Simmonds gives an illuminating example: in utilitarianism a promise is not
binding because of its having been made per se, but rather, because of any anticipatable 
consequences that can be foreseen for the results of its being broken. 5 If breaking the 
promise will derive maximum overall welfare then it's alright; but if the same will
result in injurious consequences on the maximum welfare, tlien it becomes binding to 
follow the promise taking the injury into no account. 
Utilitarianism is basically contained in the maximisation of welfare, no matter what the 
distribution is. To µie utilitarian, the rightness and wrongness of something is
traceable in the anticipated consequences or present consequences of the thing itself and 
not its nature. Moreover, the consequences must be such that they are interpreted in 
terms of their effect on overall welfare. Thus, prostitution and slavery for example, 
may be generally seen as immoral and unjust acts in the way they exploit the human 
body but to the utilitarian. such acts are just and good if they derive maximum
pleasure and welfare for the general majority not withstanding the individual harm
involved. 
Along thi premise classical utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham have stood to explain the
utilitarian po tulate: it i because of pleasure. they argue. that acts are assembled into
s Simmonds, N. E., Central issues in Jurisprudence (1986), p. 18. 
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motion. 6 Therefore pleasure being the end, the purpose and product of all human aces '
it i the sole criterion of right and wrong. To arrive at this criterion emails and
requires ascertainment of the maximum total balance of pleasure over pain involved in
the consequence of an act. This means justifying maximum pleasure and trading off
the corresponding pain. 
To capture this so as to identify and manifest justice classical utilitarians explain that
we have to assess the likely consequences of an act to all individuals in terms of
pleasurable experiences of such consequences vis-a-vis the present or likely pain
involved. If the pleasure involved maximises overall welfare and outweighs the pain
(overall) traded off, then the ace is a just act if put in motion. This clearly shows that
utilitarianism gives no attention to justice as a content of the act per se but rather co
justice as a matter of the results of an action. 
Questions like whether doing or not doing the act will be an injustice are left
unattended. Moreover how can we precisely know overall pleasurable and gainful
experiences. This renders justice in utilitarianism a matter of questionable
ubjectivism contained in component experiences of the individuals overall.
furlherrnore, it appear ab urd and quite disturbing co view justic in terms of the
ubjectiv g a can be een from Bentham's "pleasures of Malevolence". 
7 That is.
6 Ibid. p. 0. 
Ibid, p ..... 1. 7 
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how can we ee justice in acts of cruelty and sadism simply because the actor(s)
derive(s) pleasurable (maximum) experience from them? Therefore. it is quite fitting 
to criticize utilitarianism for failing to see that justice is beyond mere individual 
conceptions of the good. Though goodness is a wider concept than justice, what is just 
and right cannot be viewed in terms of what is good alone. For justice is a function 
of many things; it is a function goodness it is a function of pleasure, happiness, s�cial 
order etc. 
In its classical form, utilitarianism stands for the good overall and marginalises the
individual appeal. In this, the utilitarian postulate remains emphatic: maximisation of
welfare and not equality of welfare is -what derives justice. This means that unlike
popular theories of justice, utilitarianism is not concerned with welfare in the
distributive sense but rather in terms of maximisation. What utilitarianism stands to
offer and advocates for, is a society in which the total welfare is higher, and not
nece sarily the equitable distribution of social welfare. That is to say, the question
utilitarians tend to always ask is: bow much welfare there is and not how equitable is
the welfare spread? 
evertheless utilitarian justice in this sense may entail the equal distribution of
resource \ hich in ol ves maximisation of welfare. This means that under
utilitarianism too we can redistribute wealth so long as the same leads to a
maxi mi at ion of welfare being the sole goal of redistribution. In this way, equal
di tributi n i merely the means and maximisation of welfare the goal of the utilitarian
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notion of justice. For example, utilitarians would accept the idea of redistributing
resource from the rich to the poor simply because by doing so the harm traded off 
is outweighed by the pleasure (welfare) maximised or felt by the poor recipients. 
Therefore in utilitarianism it is the end chat is looked at and not so much the means.
In it, justice is seen as a matter of pleasure expressed in maximum overall welfare.
This makes the demand for general happiness (maximised) as the demand for justice.
But, it can be argued chat this does not mean an equation of utilitarianism to "universal 
egoism". After ail, utilitarianism urges the consideration of the effect on each and all
by the consequences of an act before the same can be judged as right or wrong. 
But utilitarianism can be criticised for not providing a stable standard measurement
upon which precise evaluations can be held. For example, it has been argued that a 
society of utilitarians is bound to collapse, for each may trample upon the general 
principle when he or she tries to speculate what can lead to maximum welfare. There 
is no precise way in which to weigh what and how the maximum welfare will be
attained from the consequences of an act! 
To thi problem, utilitarians may perhaps provide the answer in the postulate of what
i termed a ideal and actual rule utilitariani m. Ba ically, the argument here i that
\ e ught to b erve th rule which refer to utility. Under actual rule utilitarianism
the argum nt i that each hould regulate himself or herself in accordance to the
gen rally ace ptable rule f compliance which fo ters perfect utility. The question to
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be asked here is, what if such rules do not exist? What is to be done? Under ideal
rule utilitarianism the argument is that the society should conduct itself according to
those rules which appear to be such that if they were to be generally observed, a
maximisation of welfare would subsist. The problem here, like in the other rule­
utilitarianism is that there is too much reliance on assumption conception.
Furthermore, classical utilitarianism has been blamed for being non-liberal. This
however can be tack.led by new dimensions of utilitarianism which emphasize the
honour and satisfaction of people's preferences. Nevertheless, the critique persists: by
building a society based on individual preferences, utilitarianism displays a lack of
independent guiding standard measure of values, even in so far as assertino what.0 
entails maximum welfare is concerned. 
Thus it can be rightly observed that by perceiving justice in terms of that which
maximises (the greatest) welfare realisable in maximum pleasure, utilitarianism fails
to see an important fact: pleasure as happiness is not all that justice seeks to find but
is merely part of the few goods that constitute the aims of justice. 
Moreover it is difficult to measure how much good equals to maximum general
welfare. It is also a notei orthy ritique of utilitarianism to argue that, under utilitarian
notions of justice there is lirtle respect for individuality, for the individual may most
usually be used for the ake of the general welfare, anything to the contrary not
with randing! 
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Ir an also folio\ thar ther 1s little moral ·oncern in utilitarian theory of justice. And,
when broadly examined. e can see there is a clear absence of a superior concepcio . n 
)( rh .!Ond I d r _h n '! Jitarianism. fer 11. there is no etter ·udge of vhat
makes ea h appy x pt the individuals themselves and everyone's effort co maximise
self happiness ought to be upheld. Th.is is because in tracing overall maximum welfare
or happiness we have co sran with the individual. 
In Yfarx's writings. justice is irnplicity discussed in terms of the relationship between
distribution of conditions of production and the mode of production itself. From this
ngle .• farxisr concept of distributive justice is argued in these cenns: 
"The scrucrure of distribution is completely determined by the srrucrure
of production. Disaiburion is itself a product, not only in its object. in 
that only :he results of production can be distributed, bur also in its 
orm. in char the specific kind or' participation in production dererrnines
the specific forms or distribution". :3
Thus. though it may be right to argue that fundamentally, Marxism is noc based on a
passion or ·ustice. it is !early evident that Marx was concerned with the grave
inequality between the mer.hods of acquisition of emitlemem and their ownership. That
is why he did nor ondemn apic.aiism per excellence but because of the inequality (in
the mode of produc ion) it was Jssociated with. Therefore the .\1arxist analysis of a
r.heory oi iscributive justice in regard to desert is in terms of erforr and reward vis-a­
vis the mode vf production. In C piral chapter twenty one . .\.farx thus argues:
Karl �farx. Grundrisse. 95 (Nicolaus. Trans. 1973) c ·ted in Baxi. U. Marx.
L wand Jusrice (1993), p. 55.
T . •r. .C. TlzeJl r.risr 1?.i:i-olurion r y Idea. pp. 34. 35. _6 nd .; . 
"It is a self evident principle of narural justice that a man who borrows 
money with a view of making a profit by it should give some portion of 
his profit to the lender. " 10 
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Thus, under the Marxist theory, the concept of (distributive) justice, is not just about
conditions of production but also the existence of fair dealing in which no one is
exploited of his or her due. 
"The owners of goods must [therefore] behave in such a way that each 
does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and part with his own, 
except by means of an act done with consent". 11 
Hence, the idea in Marxist theory is· that in transactions between peoples, it is
impossible to discuss the concept of justice or how it is derived or what it entails 
with�ut considering the mode of production. What is a just distribution must therefore 
be based on the present mode of production. 12
This means that in Marxist philosophy, social justice entails examination of the mode
of production and it does not matter what system we are faced with. It could be a
capitalist ystem, or an I Jamie system or a communist one, - whatever it is, "if
distribution corresponds with the mode of production" [in tha� system], it is just, if it
d · · · t 13oe not - It IS unJUS . 
10 Marx Capital. 7. Chapter 21. Vol. 3. See also Capital. 2. at 339-40.
Ibid. I: p. 88. 11 
12 
13 
Critique of the Gotha Programme 18 and 19 and Capital I. at 188. See also
Tucker R.C. The Marxian Revolutionary Idea.
Baxi Marx, Law and Justice, (Bombay: Tripathi Private Ltd. 1993) 57.
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For example, if we consider justice from or within the capitalist mode of production,
we see that people can be used as merely means for the interests of the industrialists:
their labour can be hired for very poor prices and under very bad health conditions so
as to produce massive profits for a single employer. The relation between this mode
of production and the corresponding distribution has results that are oppressive,
exploitative and with no regard for human rights. 1� This is unjust.
Therefore the marxist theory requires that justice be conceived relatively and in view
of the prevailing mode of production. 15 It would henceforth appear wrong to argue that
under Marxism we can wholly universalise or idealise the concept of justice. Like 
utilitarians, marxists are opposed to views of justice based on meritocracy or desert.
For their conception of justice is need-based and social equity oriented. They
advocate distribution based on need but production based on ability. So, to marxists
and communist theories of justice, there is an assumption that sufficient resources can 
be created to meet individual needs. 
Thus while utilitarians would support private property, marxists and communists are' 
for the justice of collectivism. This is because, utilitarians see private property as
one major way in which efficient maximisation of general satisfaction can be derived,
Whil marxists view collectivism as the best avenue for ensuring social justice and
I� Ibid, p. 57-8. 
15 Lloyd Post Modern Jurisprudence, 1994, p. 858.
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equity. Therefore, in some way both marxists and utilitarianists share a majoritarian
touch. 
However both utilitarianism and marxism can be criticised for trampling upon
fundamental individual rights and freedoms: utilitarians neglect individual needs by
emphasising majoritarian priority. Marxists over emphasize social equity and they too
trample upon the needs and freedoms of the individual. 
Basically, the marxists talk of a justice of a classless society in which equality and
liberty of opporrunity for all is sustained. This is because, capacity is only to be
con idered in terms of production but need is important in considering distribution.
So in Marxi m it appears that burdens are shared according to ability, but rewards are
according to need. 16 
To Marxists, any classification or stratification of people into various categories is a
catalogue for exploitation and goes against the true nature of humankind. In this way,
Marxism emphasizes the natural inequality of people rather than the opposite, and
urges a shar d consumption of any surplus value otherwise the existence of surplus is
considered exploitative. This, looked at from Rawls's just savings principle comes 
to term with Rawl ian ju rice, at lea t methodologically or in approach.
16 It ha n rightly contended that Marx' concept of justice is in the slogansti rom each according co ability, co each according to needs ti! See William
Lean McBrid , "The concept of Justice in Marx Engels and others ti. Ethics.
1974, Vol. 85, p. _03-18-
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Moreover, in a far as Marxism advocates the liberty of the proletariate, as opposed
to the well to do industrialist, it can be said that it too seems to fight for a welfare
social order in which those at the periphery of the social ladder are the main focus
of attention in equalisation principles of justice. Thus, Marxist justice is a social
bargain between the proletariat and the bourgeois. 
Marxism i a failure principally because it erred in its conception of humankind. This
is becau e, in the examination of society and production, the whole marxist philosophy
seems to have assumed that persons are responsible for their situation since they have
the power co produce. Therefore, marxists argued that when society is organised to
the extent that there is a collective ownership of the means of production, then justice
will prevail for people will be able co avail themselves with what they need and there
will be a classless social order. However, it is not always true that whenever society
is in control of the primary means of production (resources) the needs of the individual
will automatically flow therefrom. 
Moreover, justice transcends mere physical needs of people's social engineering
through the industrial process. Furthermore. there is no such thing as a classless social
order. It i unattainable and beyond the true natural creation of peoples. For, there
ar alway situations when people need to be put in certain categories in order to
deliver ju rice. For example. in the case of affirmative action. there has to be a 
category or cla s of p ople that will be distributed certain things that others may not
receive. What may be true is that a good social order can exist if people are not
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graded in unfair discriminatory classes. Classes can exist between people if such 
will help redress the prevailing injustice and put back the real stamp of justice in
ociecy. 
Marxism has a narrow view of life and therefore cannot give us a complete theory of
justice. It looks at life as a maner of material needs and as a constant struggle between
classes for the control of the means of production. It therefore appears interesting and
absurd to note that, co the marxists justice is attained when at the end of the struggle
one class is triumphant: "the worker". This is not justice but politics! 
I , 
r. .. 
CHAPTERIV 
ISLAJVIIC JUSTICE 
Islam approaches the concept of justice from both a universalistic -mecaph · 1 ys1ca and
rational conception which is based on wilful submission co div1ne !aw evp-o d . A '"sse m
the inward and ourward human behavior. It is both absolute and relau·ve 1· n narure
but walks along the veins of a single, and unadulterable universal Jaw that 0 .:,overns
human affairs. 
. In genera Islamic langu�ge, justice is couched in terms
derived from the revelation such as; Al Mizaan (the correct
measure), Al sirat al mustaqiim (the straight path),
Istiqama /(steadyfastness or straight forwardness),AJ Wasat
(the middle course) or Al Furqan (the criterion between
right and wrong) . 1 Literally, thes,e terms show that justice
is to be conceived as the best measure between two
extremes. Basically, Islamic justice can be divided into 
three categories: j stice as righteous behaviour, as living
according to the shariah and justice as leading a life
based on a totally free, equitable and responsible sense of
distribution of burdens and rewards.
For example 1c is indicate� that the ur' an is the Crice�10n of right and wrong
( 1 Furq:in) Jnd hJt God 1s he one vho creJted :ill rhmgs :ind ordJined them
in due ro ortion. . 1 Qur' n. _5: l ).
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Ju tice as righteousness 
Justice as righteou ness can mean many things. It is leading a peaceful life within and
between individuals, and it also refers to being upright in conduct or following a
rightly guided sense of direction or dispelling discord and establishing social order, etc.
Fundamentally, for all these meanings to hold, one must live "a complete" way of life
free from discord and evil. From the textual language of the Qur'an, justice is thus
identified through the implications of the word Zulm (wrong doing). 2 Therefore '
Qur'anically speaking, justice in this regard is perceivable from both the correlatives
of right and wrong as seen from the implications of the terms zulm and 'adil; which
equate justice to equity and fairnes� and injustice to inequity and imbalance. Such
equation ties justice to expressions of equality3 and uprightness as principles of
righteousness and the moral good. 
From this angle we can also say that justice in the revelational sense generally refers
to the furtherance of good morals and righteousness. Anekbis is what we may IiteraHy-
.. . 
eqwty-;-righteousne s, moderation, temperance etc. Tu this -affec; the Qur'an is not
only replete with condemnations of wrongdoing but it has in no uncertain terms
in oked moral values as the umbra of justice. -1
2 J Qur'an, 5: 45 and 4: 49. 
J Kbadduri Majid. Islamic Conception of Justice 1984, pp. 7-8.
4 See Al Qur'an, _:42-4, 4:127-9 5:8 6:151-2, 17:23-38, etc.
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Ir muse be mpha i ed therefor , that in Qur'anic ethics, justice as righteousness is best
con eived in the expre ion of the consequences of wrong doing (zulm) which is the
other word for inju rice Jawr). Both these term are synonymous in meaning and it
is difficult to draw a di tinction between the two. For example through both terms, the
Qur'an expres e inju rice as anything that inflicts harm (in the religious sense) on
one's self (soul) as well as on interpersonal relations. 
But it is in the Qur'anic concept of zulm (wrongdoing or evil) that a bener and simpler 
view of justice can be perceived. This is perhaps because from the implications of 
'wlm' (wrongdoing) justice is explained as doing the right thing and injustice as 
anything that trays from the right path of the divine scheme of things. So anything
that departs from the divinely prescribed behavior is wrong and henceforth unjust.
And anything that onforms to the divine prescriptions is righteous and thus just. s
Thu . in I lam, ju tice a righteou ness is a morality based disposition to do good. 
Thi not only make it an ethical matter of following religious duties and obligations,
but require th exi tence of an immutable code of ethics to determine the right or the
ju t. In thi ode. is where lie the perfect mean (Al Wasat) which is the Islamic
equi al m of the ri rotelian "golden mean". But in Islam, following the mean
i nor enough. Thi i b cau , while the law lays down what
i right. _ 
•-
A 
and ju r. it i the pr per u e of the law that affords the comprehension
i • lly. "zu/m" an be d fined as �urting things in the �proper (wrong)
phtc . Ir con em intra- elf wr ngd mg (':.ulm al nafs) and interpersonal or
i I vii ('•ulm I 110 ). ee J Qur'an 3:135 and 2:57. 
6 
7 
141 
and di tin tion of ju cice.6 In Muslim philosophy, like in Plato and Aristotle, it is
therefore belie ed that ju rice exists only when there is an ideal order in which perfect
interpretation of the law ub isr . For example: while Ibn Khaldun7 argued that for
justice to prevail there has to be 'a great society' based on solidarity not self interests ,
both 1 Farabi and Ibn Rushid9 saw justice as that which prevails in a virtuous
(political) order and following the guidance of (its) virtuous leader who is the best
person endowed with the best qualities of knowing the right and the wrong. In Plato's
tenns thi i what i called a philosopher king or in Dworkinian reasoning; the super-
judge-Hercule who possesses the right answers. 10 
It then follow that since justice means righteousness or doing the right thing, it can
not be realised until there is a righteous (ideal) social order in which every one is
accorded their rightful roles and dues. This means that in Islam too, like in
Thi i why some scholar have argued th�t justice _ 
in I�lam is not merely the
e cabli hment of an ideal order but followmg the direcuon of a rightly guided
leader po ses ed with the best knowledge of rationalising the meaning of the
law. ( ee note 8 9 & 10). 
ee Khaduri Majid, The Islamic Conception of Justice 1984 p. 81-2. 
ee 1 Farabi' Political Regime (Al-siyaasa al Madani a) PP. 69-70 also 
cited in Khadduri Majid. Ibid. p. 85.
Q ee Khadduri Majid p. cir.. pp. 99-101. citing Ibn Ru bid' Comrnentary on
Plato's Laws, p. 157.
10 c mpare with Jbn ina who contend _rh�t j�stice_ i� �or 0 �ollowing the
dir ccion of a irtuou leader, but that m a Just city , Justice 1s derived by
e tab Ii hing that order which i agreed upon by the citizens (under a social
contra c b cween them and the leader). See Khadduri Majid op. cir.. pp. 88-92.
1 ee Lapidu , . M A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ rsity Pre , 1991) 186-91.
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, nscocehamsm an Placo1sm. jusnce entails the excellence of virrues and the treatment 
of people according to deserts. 
But in Islam, it is not enough to equate justice to the 
exce ence f virtues alone or placing people in a middle 
position. n Islam, if and when justice is equated to the 
idea of the mean, or deserts, it means the existence of the 
Promotion of fairness, self control, ·self preservation and 
social balance in accordance with divine prescriptions. 
Therefore on this note it can be seen that in Islam, 
defining justice revolves around one thing: following the 
divine order of things. Afterall, the divine order is the
only one that is accepted as the perfect order, because God
who is its author is perfectly placed. For He alone
places, and Has placed everything in a state.of perfection
(proper order) . 11 Going against this order is wrongdoing
(and thus unjust) since it creates a distorted order based
on human whims and fancies . 
evil leading to injustice. 
This creates suffering and
In ocher words jusr:ice as righteousness is in obeying divine 1aw
12 because, by so doing
one . ·eeps .!Vil and �ood o e in peace \Vich each other and allows every thing to
remain in its properly placed order. u Bue it is also extra lega
l because it is not only
!I 
' ·-
Geor2'e falek. ''Islamic Justice vs. Christianjustific:ition" (199_) 8 Journal of
the f;stiwte of .1uslim Minon"ry Affairs. _3 . 
This makes it possible for Islamjc Justice to meet wi�h Ariscot_elian omemion
h t JUSti i chat vbich c?ntorms to he law or the social order. The
· ndJID ncal diffi rence here rs that Isl:im ares co
 :inswer he questions: what
law nd whose order?
Tlus coo allows muslims co accept Placo
's_argwnenc cha�j�sti�e i� in the placing
of thm ... s in their orders. 
The difference 1s mat Pl:ito 1Im1cs Justice ro people's
..:=ipa. t}' ind cac on in lifi . 
This s ems o e n:iccepcable o Islam 
14" 
in the os · nd o noes or' legal· rules since 1c m olves he excellence of moral
�haraccer and habits. This is where a distinction can be made between justice as 
sue..: ,b .:onformn•: m 'he w. 
Justice as conformity of the law 
In Islam, legally speaking justice is that which is in line
with the Shariah and whose application is in conformity to
the dictates of Shariah ( Islamic Law) This is because
justice (in Islam) is not only the goal of the law but the
law itself is the pathway of justice. 14 Therefore in Islam
too like in Aristotelianism, obeying and observi·ng the law
is comprehending justice. 15 
Bue in Islam confonnicy with the. law wtiich equals co justice is not blind conformity.
This is because me Shariah which provides guidance upon which justice is co be
achieved is qwce comprehensive and irs content includes divine revelation and human
reason ... xpress1ble tn the Qur' n, Sunna. Ijma (consensus). Qiyq,s (analogical
for ics juscic ... cranscends people's apaciry 
and social establishments.
u 
fn face Shariah .::enerall_ means 'p
athwa( to be followed or in a more literary
·ense. the road ro J ·.v:1t c·ng . la .... Bas1c
:11ly. for the purposes of this thesis,
�hart h ·houl<l e undersrood .is char I w 
which is he totality of God's law
tucb re;:,ul res people s lire so JS 
co progr:im � perfect so ial ord r.
r the Qur':in we re:i : 'T
hose who o not JU ge by chat whi h llah has
r
n
ve:il d (Sizar' h) the_ :ire me (dis
obedient) unbelievers. they are wrong doers
z 1, un . rhe, .ire he trJns=ressors (Fi squn) sura. 1 Maeda 5: verses: ../4. -1-5.
7.
1.44 
educ ionJ nd ·uruf cuscoms acceptable co divine revelation). All those help us to
indicate rhe principles of justice both through the revelation and by way of the 
_i:rin::,Ub,irn_ ·a It_',,, isdom1 ·.•,hich dis s che right rom the .vrong Jnd the just 
fOffi the UDJUSC. 
But specifically, it is under Qur'anic phrases like al- ' 
Mizan (the just measure) and al-Furqan (the criterion),
that justice is conceived as a matter of following divine 
law in interpersonal human conduct. This law is contained 
in the injunctions of the Qur'an and Sunnah as the unbiased 
standards that inspire us to deal with each other under the 
principles of equality, tolerance, freedom and togetherness 
which are the cardinal pillars of justice. 
This is further illuscraced in che Qur'anic maxims of: 'Klzayr umma' (the besc
ommunicy). 'ummawn wasar' (moderate community) and 'Ummaron Wahid' (the
sinoJe be onaina) all of which onceive juscice in terms of solidarity and social equr·ty ::, ::, ::, . 
guided upon a single law of God. 
nder these three maxims. justice is chus expressed in terms of chat conduce in which
every one cares for ochers as parr of the obligacion ro promote a familial social order.
This m ans chat co r a is ju ci che in · vidual has ro onducc himself or herself wich
a vie chac ·he or he is part and pare .. ! of single emicy of brothers nd sisrers tied by
ivme injunccions. 
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Therefore, the guiding principle which derives justice in Islam is the existence of
onenes 16 of purpo e and commitment by adhering to the Laws of God and
distinguishing between people in accordance with divine regulations. This requires that
member of a ocial order do observe and enjoin upon each other the doing of good
acts and avoidance of evil by fulfilling divine obligations. This operates through the
use of reason and revelation which afford a moderation of human direction. 
Thus, it would appear right to argue that the proper enforcement of God's Law in 
society will also derive justice for it is His Law and religion that prescribe the "just"_ 11
This is because the narure of the Divine Lawgiver is not unjust and justice is His
attribute. 1 
And, since His laws are for just ends, whatever He commands is just and that which
He prohibits is unju t. In thi way Islam postulates justice as conform.icy with the law 
and meets with Aristoteliani m bur only partially for while Aristotle does not question
the justne of the law to be followed, Islam presents before its believers the
16 The onene s which reali e justice is that where people have a mutual _ feeling
for each other - behaving like parts of the human body would do; "if one pan
i afflicted with ickne . the whole body feels the pain" and if another one
achie e joy or succe . the rest of the body hares in the happiness.
11 Ibn Khalidun and Ibn al zraq on Social Justice· ee Khadduri Majid The
Islamic Conception of Justice. 1984, pp. 185-7. 
It can al O be rightly argued th�t justice i� not merely a matter of human
appr val and di appr va_l �or be_mg an attribute of God' very nature it is
implanted in pe pl by d1vme guidance and knowledge. See George Malek
op. cit., p. 237. 
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postulate that divine law is the just law and that this 1s the very reason why its
observance equates with a sense of being just. 19 
This being the case, it thus follows that the substance of justice in Islam, is a resident 
of the ultimate principles of Shari'ah which express the ultimate aim of the law as the 
province of justice. These principles have been identified as three fold in nature viz: 
the general good (public interest), happiness and good character. 20
Under the principle of the general good, justice is derived in the avoidance of any 
wrongdoing that may harm the public welfare and prevent the promotion of public 
interest (maslahah). This can only be done if people obey God's Laws since only He 
knows what is in the best interest of all. It is only through this guidance that things like 
corruption, exploitation and oppression can be avoided and public welfare attained. 
Imam Ghazzali21 explains that the reason why the general good (maslahah) is an 
element of justice in Islam is because as a principle of Islamic Law it averts evil 
which causes suffering and encourages the doing of good which promotes common 
welfare. In this way. the general good becomes an ultimate end of the law which is
the content of justice itself.
19 Al Quran 6: 153 "Verily this is my way leading straight: follow it, Follow not
other (paths) They will scatter you about".
20 Khadduri Majid op. it., pp. 1
35-7.
21 I � 
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Other jurists have considered the public good (maslahah) as an overriding element in
any conception of justice since it is the public good itself which is the ultimate end of
the law. 22 Such an argument appears to be quite absurd for it is difficult to see how 
considerations of the general good can outweigh all other considerations. To submit
to such a contention is tantamount to equating justice with anything that serves the
general good per se. 
How would this reconcile the Islamic principle of deserts? Perhaps the answer lies in 
the contention that in Islam everything belongs to the Lawgiver and Creator. 
Therefore under the Law of God who is rhe absolute Owner and Creator, it is a 
prescription that each shall own only in trust to God_ and that this is best manifested in
those actions which further the general good of all "creation". 
Therefore, for the furtherance of common welfare, God has presented divine Laws as
guidance for disposing and enjoying private possessions. This guidance lays down the
method of redistribution of wealth which postulates that private ownership exists side
by side with the rights of the general public. Under this divine law of redistribution
of wealth. the rule is that justice resides in observing the maxim: in the wealth of the
rich and the well to do is a right of the poor and less fonunate. This rests on the
-2 For example ajm al-Din al-Tawfi lean to\ ards thi argument. See Khadduri.
The Islamic Conception of Justice, op. cir., p. 181-2.
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injunction that "[a person i not a Muslim if he or she] goes to bed with a full stomach
while [his or her J neighbour is hungry". 23 
Islam also like utilitarianism conceives justice in terms of the element of pleasure or
happiness. The argument here is that justice is a matter of deriving permanent pleasure
through the intentions of divine Jaw. But unlike utilitarianism, this has to operate
under the requirement that the pleasure that derives justice is only in such things which
are good and pure. 24
Thus, again, unlike utilitarianism, in equating justice to the attainment of pleasure,
Islam considers not just the trade off between pain and pleasure, but also the treatment
of people according to deserts. This is because in Islam unlike in utilitarianism, justice
as a matter of pleasure involves both the respect for common shares (the general good)
as well as the pre ervation of private rights. 
Al Farabiis in examining this postulate, explained that happiness as the ultimate end of
human life i the content of justice itself. Like greek philosophers26 he therefore
23 See Heine. p "Europe and the orient. Islam's confrontation with European
Modernism". (1993) 2 Universitas. 121.
2� Al Qur'an. 2:168 and 23:51.
25 ee Al Farabi's Al siyasa al Wadaniyya (The Political Regime) in Khadduri
Majid, n1e Islamic conception of Justice, pp. 81-86.
-6 Aristotle also believed that ju tice as the highest virtue leads to happiness for
it i not part of virtue but che whole of virtue just like injustice i the whole of
vice. 
149 
argued that since justice is a supreme virtue, any happiness can only be realised
through cultivation of virtues. These virtues are attainable through the observance of
God's Law . This require the ob ervance of good characters. 
Under the principle of good characters, justice is contained in legal rules which
prescribe good conduce of human relations such as kindness, benevolence, mercy,
generosity tolerance and sympathy. Through these rules, Islam conceives justice as
a matter of maintaining moral order based on the observance and love of divine
guidance. Tho e who conduct themselves in obedience to God's Laws are the jusr ones
and the Qur'an described them as the best.27 
On the whole we can say that Islamic justice, panicularly as righteousness and as
confonnity the law or legal order, resembles chat of classical Greece. But this is only
in form and it does nor extend to the ground on which it is based. For example. it is
true that in the application of Islamic justice , it is a requirement (like in Plato and
Aristotle) that there be existence of a political order28 under the direction of a virtuous
Ieader29 _ philosopher king. But there i a distinction also: in Islam, both the politics
.7 In 1 Qur'an -t.9: 13 God admoni hes that: "The best Among you is that onewh i God fi aring". 
2 
9 
1 ara i Political Regime (Al-Siyaasa Al-Madaniya) op. cit.. pp. 69-70. cit d in Khadduri Majid. The Islamic conceprion of justice, op. cit., p. 85). 
Ibid, pp. 69-70. 
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upon which ociety is ordered and the virtues of the leader must be m constant
hannony with revealed prescriptions. 30
Thus in Islam unlike in classical theory, justice requires answering the question: whose
Jaw what order? This is vital for all the conceptualisations of justice in Islam whether
it is justice as "the golden mean" (Al Wasat), or as an amalgamation of virtues, or as
putting people in their rightful places, it all must be within the dictates of revealed Jaw.
Distributive (Social) Justice in Islam 
In analysing social values, Islam gives a strong position to the rights of the individual
as well as those of the society. And under this analysis, the argument is in this: 
"Justice i the greatest of all the foundations of Islam; but justice is not 
always concerned to serve the interests of the individual. Justice is for 
the individual, but it is for the society also, if we are willing to tread the 
middle way; and so we must have in our life justice in all its shapes and 
form . "31 (empha i added). 
Jo 1 Qur'an: 4:59. Urg�s that in �e ordinary government of human affairs,
there hould be a co- rdmated obedience to the laws of the Qur'an, the tradition 
and practice of the prophet, and the rules and regulations of those in charge of
authority in society. But. where this co-ordination meets a conflict, the "best
and mo t suitable" arbiter is to be found in devine law (Qur'an and sunna).
Thi is the righteou order because it is based on righteous prescriptions. It
wa al the way followed by the four onhodox caliphs after the prophet. For
example bu Bakar the fir t caliph is reported to have admonished his
foll " er thu : "If I govern well you hould help me. If I govern badly, you
hould correct me . . . It is your duty to obey me only so long as I obey God
and Hi prophet. Were I to di obey them, you owe me no obedience".
J1 Sayyid Qucb, Social Justice in Islam, 1970 pp. 103-4.
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This type of justice is f_ound by living in peace with one's
self and with others and is b d ase on righteousness which
entails the doing of right and avoidance of evil_
righteousness has co be objective and subjective also. It 
is objective because all Muslim societies; have to guide
But 
their conduct by the dictates and within the realm 
Qur'an and Sunnah as the undoubtable signals that 
of the 
direct 
independent human reason 
between persons. 
to determine social behavior
It is subjective if doing rig.ht includes the direction of human conduct in accordance co
the public good (mas/ah.ah) of a given sociecy of in accordance_ with unique. situations
one may be found in. This alls for an interplay of rules of conventio� (' urf),
independent legal reasoning (ijtihati), analogical deduction (Qiyas) and consensus
(Ijma) in deciding social issues of a given sociecy. 
32 
Basically, social justice in Islam is realisable in the com
prehensive and all embracing
oarure of Islam which avails no room for distorted orders. In this case, social 
justice
coo is an all encompassing virtue which seeks co redress the artificia
l inequalities and
redeploy che universal order (of God
). This brings into light, che call for redistribution
of ve:i.lth and income as che cenrral piece upon whic
h Islam bases social justice. Under
this onception of social justice. Islam presen
ts eradication of poverty, need fulfillment
and coral alienation or any kind at status 
uo JS the goals of any me1Ilingful and perfect
soc ·:11 order. 
.J� For detailed analysis of che use of: 
rules. of interpretation in Islamic Llw, see
K:imali. yt_H. Principles of lslamzc Ju
nsprudence. 1989. pp. _11. _.rn. 309,
359 and -+63. 
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Examining the idea of social justice, Sayyid Qutb in his book Social Justice in Islam
argues that justice in Islam is an all embracing concept that emphasises a unity of the
soul with the body, the spiritual with the material; and the communal with the
individual.33 This can be realised best in a theory of justice such as that of Islam which
is comprehensive and coherent, and in which the integrity and universality of values 
subsists. 
The best way to understand justice and social issues in Islam is therefore to start from 
the universal theory which Islam presents as the answer to all human questions. This
theory is to be found in the Qur'an and traditions of the prophet (sunna) which are the 
basic sources of Islamic law and the immutable guide of �uman conduct.
Through these sources, Qutb explains, Islam has laid down the perfect nature of
relations whether of deserts, entitlement, need or merit, etc. It. is from these sources
that all things must be ordered so as to establish a society in which there is no
crookedness. It is in such an order that social justice thrives since in it all are one and
the same and are mutually interconnected. 
34 
33 For a detailed examination of this view see Adnan Mu allam "Sayyid Qutb
and social Justice (1945 -1948)" (1992), 4, Journal of Islamic Studies p. 52-
70. 
34 lso see Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, o
p. cit., p. 19.
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Such makes it possible for people to establish justice because in that order there is
harmony between mankind and nature, and individuals are allowed to live in purity and
perfection. 
Under this view, Islamic justice therefore argues that the true conception of justice is 
that which realises this: 'that [people have to J lead a complete life and this resides in 
a single world of individuals in which the natural and artificial distinctions between 
mankind do not give way to discrimination but rather perfect the unity of purpose that 
exists amongst [their global] environment'. 35
Thus, the differences in people and their locations should not be used to promote
inequality and discrimination. but rather to emphasise the unity (of purpose) and
interdependence that exists between them. This is because the Qur'an clearly
prescribes that all people, men and women were nor created or made into variations of
races and nations to despise or exploit each other, but rather to know [and recognise
the consideration for] one another. 36 
It i thi ort of unity which ought to explain the true nature of justice for in it resides
the perfect order of God. It is a unity which sets a lasting harmony between competing
desir 5 and strike a perfect balance between opposing ends.
Js dnan Mus 11am, "Sayyid Qutb and Social Justice", op. cit. pp. 20-21.
36 I Qur'an, 49: 13. 
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i.'.ly In it lie the perfect rights and responsibilities as well as duties which explain the• u-<. 
varied nature of persons and balances their natural distinctions through a sinolet, ' 
immutable and complete law. 37 It is in such a community that social justice thrives for
·-r it i based on perfect guidance. This means that, social justice in Islam is to be sought
in absolute unity of existence and general humanity. 38 It also means that Islam
recognise that there is a basic equality of people and that all are to be regulated under
'""-l one table basic law of conduct. It is in this vein that the spirit of social security,
...J peace and togetherness is enjoyed by all in society. Justice therefore is to be found in..... 
the fundamental equality of individuals. 
. However, although Islam "acknowledges the fundamental equality of all [peoples], and
:,<-
a fundamental ju rice among all, it leaves the door open for achievement of prominence
J through hard work just as it lays in the balance values other than the economic 11• 39
· 
Fundamentally, what Islam postulates is that in matters of social justice there should
be equal opporrunicy to all and that natural abilities and talents must be �sect for the
benefit of the individual as well as the community. On this point, the Islamic theory
of ju tice. like that of Rawls would probably meet fierce criticism (from libertarians
uch as ozick) that it tramples on the invisible rights and liberty of persons by 
treating their entitlements as collective property. 
37 
J 
39 
Ibid. :_13. 
a yid Qurb, P· cit., P· 25·
1 id. p. 27 (Empha i added).
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However, compared to Rawls's theory, it can be argued that though both Rawls and
Islam agree to the use of people's talents and possessions for the (common) welfare of
others, Islam goe further than this, for it recognises the sacred right of individual
entitlement more than Rawls 's theory does._ Individuals are free to utilise and enjoy
the fruits of their own labour and talents. 
What Islam forbids however, is the misuse of natural endowments and efforts to create
false standards that promote injustice. This is because Islam recognises that people in
their natures are prone to avarice and therefore need constant divine guidance so as to
realise complete justice between each other. In maners of justice therefore, Islam
_envisages a single life, a single community, a single nation and a single universe in
which there is a comprehensive and interrelated unity of all. 4° Neither race nor
geographical orientation or accident of birth, etc, can be an acceptable part of the
social justice Islam stands to promote. 
Foundation of Social Justice 
In illustrating the comprehensive nature of justice, Islam urges for the operation of 
three pillars of social justice: fr edom of conscience, absolute equality and mutual
responsibility. 41 
40 
41 
Ibid, p. 28. 
Ibid pp. 47-55. 
Fr dom of Con cience 
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According co Qutb, freedom of conscience is that which liberates the individual from
all tho e entanglements of human nature. ?Y attaining this freedom the individual• 
becomes able to free himself or herself from all kinds of fears and can therefore be in
position to appreciate and obey the perfect laws from which iustice can be derived. In 
this way there will be a harmony between peoples and their environment. This means
that with a freed conscience, the individual (and indeed natiollf) gains complete respect
of all the rights duties responsibilities and entitlement that guarantee social justice.
With this in operation, justice is set to be in motion for a nation or people who fully
are conscious of their place and role in this world are always free from all sorts of false
controls, elf desires and despair. So in the truly Muslim situation, justice has to 
prevail ince when people are under the law of� they are free from the dangers of
elf de ire . 
Therefore with a freed conscience, peoples and nations are higher and above the
power of their instinct. This is because they are always confident, hopeful and able 
to hake off all fears and desire that are destructive to the emblem of justice in
ociety. With this in mind the Muslim, (whether a a nation or individual) is then
aware of the need to put hi or her rights and duties in practice. In thi lies a strong
foundation ton of ju tice in society since the individual is completely free from
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feelings of fear and desire whether of livelihood, power, poverty, life , or station in
life, etc. 
Thus, with freedom of conscience the individual is well armed to establish justice.
He or' he can and will take that which is his or her due, and will attain or fight for
· their-right. either will they be proud of or misuse their station in life nor forget their
duty to themsel es to the community and to the world. Hence, no matter what, the
people with a freed conscience will always do the right thing. This is because their
will to be just is unshakebale and it is based on the belief that "nothing will come upon
] "b d 
tt42 us save what's [already been prescn e .... 
So, what is required is w.-at we control our instinct so as to gain hope and confidence
and stand firm in justice whether it be for or against the kin and kith, 43 or our nation
or their nation or the world in general. Under freedom of conscience, justice demands
us to ubdue our ego or greed and realise the worthless nature of artificial controls
uch a rank, wealth and power. In essence, it requires the readiness to comprehend
and practice ab olute equality and oneness with others .
This is affordable because in Islam when the conscience is freed then �ndividual is
abl to practically reali e the steel bars of social justice : firm belief in the absolute
will of God and con ciou and wilful righteous conduct in ociety. This need to
l Qur'an: 64: 11.
43 also I Qur'an: 4: 135.
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subdue elf interest or control is what relates Islamic justice to Rawls' s model of the
veil of ignorance which also require that self interests be kept at bay in rationalisations
of justice. 
But freedom of conscience is an equipment for that vital knowledge which is
necessary to realise the single equality of all. Therefore, persons with a freed
conscience are always ready to establish justice because they :Stand on a firm ground
governed by the laws of the universe and those of their nature. They can share with
others for example, not because they expect a reciprocity of some kind, but for the
sake of necessity of justice in society. In the same vein, they can kill and be killed
not because they hate and dislike this or that, but because that is what is required of
them and is in hannony with the divine will and perfection.
b olute equality 
In justice as absolute equality, Islam stands for the demolition of all artificial
distinctions and e cabli hment of a single equality. In this lies the second pillar of
social justice in I Jam. It i an equality that springs from and is manifested in the
nature of human creation and origin. In it, all are equal in nature, decent and purpose­
and every ne i addres ed a one and the same a well as in one and the same manner.
4 
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This is because ocial justice in Islam means: one people one God, one law, one end 
(goal) and one origin.44 And it revolves in the command; "O you people reverence 
your Lord who made you from a single soul". 45 This reverence and worship is realised 
through righteous conduct in which is contained the manifestation of this human
equality. Under this equality all are of the same blood and all share common feelings,
desires and fears. Only the styles differ. 
In it, all possess a single belonging whose compass of equality transcends false
discriminations such as patriotism, nationalism, tribalism or even geographical and
physical distinctions. However, meaningful and sensible distinctions are well taken. 46 
But generally the physical variations of persons are only meant for general appreciation
and understanding of each other.·H It is upon this standard that Islam stands to explain
the justice of the absolute equality of persons. This explanation is in the fact that Islam
envisages that justice entails absolute equality of treatment since each and every
individual i as sacred as the other. 4 
45 
See Sayyid Qutb op. cit., p. 45.
Al Qur'an, 4:1. See also Qutb, op. cit., p. 45.
In Islam like in Aristotelianism, the law of equality also recognises the
doctrine of treating like cases alike and unlike cases differently: For example
in the Jaw of murder and retaliation. there is the prescription of "[an injury
for an injury equal and similar in narure], the free for the free the slave for
the slave, the woman for the woman", etc. See AI Qur'an: 2:178.
Ibid, 49: 13. 
Ibid, _:178-9 & 17:33. 
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The equality that manifests justice is therefore resident in the unique oneness of human
value. Any differences in human treatment must hence realise this: that no one's life
is entitled to a higher value than that of others. That is why Islam has put up stringent
laws that preserve the absolute equality of human sanctity. Thus, there is a life for a
life, an injury for an injury equal and similar in nature, a slave for a slave, etc, no
matter who is involved. 49 
This is because, the Islamic standard of justice is built on an un-amendable and firm 
human equality which admits no false or worldly discriminations whether between
man and woman or Muslim and non Muslim, etc. But there are those who could argue
that Islam fails its own equality wh�n in its laws it accords superior and inferior
status between genders. In fact, it can be noted that the most common criticism of
Islamic jusciceso is in the way it treats women particularly in the allocation of shares
of inheritance and the giving of evidence. In reply, Ismail Al-Faruqi argues that
Islam's answer to this is two fold:51
a) In Islam. a woman is always entitled to the support of a male relative as a
guardian regardless of her wealth. 52
49 Ibid, 42:42. 
50 
SI 
52 
I mail a1-Faruqi, "I lam and Human Rights" (1983) 27 The Islamic Quarterly
28. 
Ibid, p. 28. 
Thi would be opposed by femini�t conceptions of justice between gender.
emini t argue that co see women m terms of male support and protection is
t ubject them to male domination, dependence and subordination which is
unjust because what all this points at is the requirement that women's needs
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b) And the Shariah regards a woman's evidence as full and equal to that of a man
in ca es regarding legitimacy descendence and family relations which are
the areas most women are familiar with. The area in which the woman gets 112
a share, is that in which she is less familiar compared to the male: civil '
adm inistrative and crim inal.
I find this qu ite flawed. If we base issues of justice on who is more familiar
with this field or that, we will always be in a state of imbalance - for, now the
women are as knowledgeable as and sometimes more familiar than men in these
fields. 
According to Qurb, 53 the answer to such criticisms appears to be in the wisdom of the
Islamic system of Jaws that manifests the standard of justice it preaches. The Islamic
laws of justice are nor for false or artificial discriminations but are intended to establish
relevant equality based on duties and responsib ilities rooted in the different div ine
endowments. Those who have more than others whether in physical strength, intellect
or wealth have co perform different obligations compared to their counter pans. So
the woman for example, explains Qutb, shares weak physique and higher emotional
ability than the man.5-1 That is one rea on why Islam gives her different rights, duties
and r spon ibilicies as compared co those of the man. 
----�- -----
SJ 
hall b determined by and in accordance to male standards.
ayyid Qutb, op. c it.. p. 45-50.
Ibid, p. 45-50. 
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And m the Islamic !aw of inheriranc·e the daughrer of the deceased gets half the share
of her brother because. in perfect Islamic sociery, the girl upon marriage will be taken
� r or :>:, ·n 1usbana vh Jc the oy upon reaching maruricy wi have w shoul er :he
sole responsibiliry of looking after his wife and the whole family. 55 Bue what if the ofrJ� 
does nor gee married? To this we could argue chat in an Islamic society marriage is
higlily valued that no woman or man will wam to remain unmarried for the prophet has
admonished that "marriage is half of faich".
The Islamic law of evidence also provides that two womeni
witnesses are required where one male stands to give
evidence. The reason here is that while men are stronger
I 
and firm, women are of a high "emotional" tide. 56 But it is
on y essent'al and not a matter of male superiority that
Islam requires that there should be two females in the
giving of evi ence ·d "so if one of them goes astray
• d h II 5 other can rernin er . 
55 Ibid. p. -+5-50. 
56 Ibid. p. -+5-50. 
But this is not in all cases.
the. 
;; • 1 Qur'.1n. _;_82. Imerprering this erse . .-:\mina Wadu� .'.ikes ifferem and
perhaps rhe better view: She :.trgues chat _;n the recor�mg of_ vidence here.
the Qur' n does or intend o mean that one male w1mess s equal ro cwo
temale vicnesses or that ne male [is -=e�erallyJ equivalent to. or as good as.
rwo females". Basically there are two wHnesses: one the man and the other,. · che cwo omen Thus, though there are rwo women in ivina of1s one or · . . -= ::, 
'd "borh function differendv": one 1s the w1mess and the other "acesev1 ence. · . 
bor..,ror" to remind the witness. See , mrna Wadud. Our'an ands .1 �orro ... -
Woman. 1992. P· 85. 
I 
Theretore. m =ender isuncnon. Islam only emphasises the physical and naruraJ
differences as well as the duties and responsibilities that culminate from these
Ir oe not i O\ :his iscmcuon co degenerate into sociai corruocion .1nu
mJusnce [n an_ ase. che Islamic stand is m the argument that although different in
the physical and emotional make up. and although they share different duties and
responsibilities, men and women are equal and the same. They both stand on the same
standard measure of justice: if anyone does good works. man or woman they shall gee
the best reward due to them and no one will suffer any injustice. 58 
Justice as social responsibility 
under murual responsibility Islam grants individual freedom in the most 
perfecr fonn. and human equaliry in the most exacting sense, bur it does
no leave these rwo things uncomrolled. society has irs interests. human 
narure has its claims but a value attaches also to the lofty aims of 
:-el· _ion. So Islam secs the principle or' ·ndi idua1 responsibility over 
ma -of individual freedom. and besides them both ir secs the principle
of social responsibilir
y which demands alike on the individual �d 
• -qsociety.-
Throu=b murual responsibility. Islam thus tops up the pillars. of justice in society.
This is because in murual responsibility there arise a moderately controlled discipline
of 11 human es1re and belongings. Thi mean that ·oc1al _1uscice involves the
ss1grum:::nc n un en:ikmg J :ano ha e 0f roles. respons1bilir_ and
Ib1 . J:L-+ 
utb. vp . .;1c.. p -o. 1 Empnas1!> a etl). 
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accountability. It includes the responsibility of the individual and the soul, the 
individual and their family, as well as that between communities and nations.
However, mutual re ponsibility stems from individual responsibility for if one is
irresponsible to one's own self there can be no complete social responsibility and
ultimately no social justice. 
From this, it can be argued that in Islam, each individual has to carry two
per onalitie · keeping watch on one's self and keeping watch on one another.60 In this
way we see that in order to realise complete justice, all the essentials of social justice
have to be brought together. That is, people have to be mindful of tneir
interdependence and their variations: neither forgetting our dues as individuals, nor
neglecting them as a community. 
Each individual is responsible for his [or her] welfare and his [or her] predicaments
and - 0 soul shall bear a burden beyond that which it can hold. Each soul is held in
pledge of what it bas earned. What it has gained stands to its credit and what it has
piled up rands against it,' [in essence]; no burden bearer can bear the burden of
another and people get no more than that which they strive for. 61
So, people are responsible for their fate or burdens and rewards. This is the justice
of the individual. But the ame is attached to the rights of the community and there can
Ibid, p. 57. 
61 1 Qur'an, .... :286, 17:15, _3:62 and 7:42. See also Qutb op. cit., p. 58.
( mphasis added).
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be no justice co the individual unless persons strike a balance between their needs and
desires and the interests of their family, their neighbourhood, and the interests of
society at large. This means that like in Barry's "justice as mutual advantage" and
"justice as impartiality" in Islam too, justice can be conceived with the recognition of
the absence and presence self interests. 
Thus in order to realise social justice in Islam, individuals have to be mutually
re ponsible to each other and not only for their self interests. To achieve this, Islam
provides a system of laws that governs and enforces social responsibility. For
instance, the Qur'an is replete with exhortati9ns of the duty to social welfare through
acts of benevolence kindness, liberality, consid�ration, charity, etc, in otherwords ' 
through acts of responsibility to the world around us. 
This makes it a maner of binding social responsibility that in an Islamic community,
justice will not exist in its entirety unless people care for general welfare whether
between parents and children, 62 or citizens and foreigners etc. This responsibility
0 erthrow any injustice that may exist in the possibility of having a society with
abandoned children, the old aged, the homeless, or displaced destitutes. In Islam.
refu ing to be respon ible for the general welfare of society is not only an act of
disob dien to divine Jaw. but it is aJ o an injustice that leads to social corruption and
ufferin d ince divine Jaw is perfect law, justice as social responsibility can only
be r ali d by living according to divine law.
z Ibid, 31: 14 and _4:-2. 
IM 
For example there 1s rhe ramily law or mheritance which Islam pur forw d . . ar to rnamram
the bond of relationship between blood relatives. H_ere. Islam also exhons that in
m kmg :iequesrs .. arr o · rh eeceasc · · _roperry hould e left :1side fo �he . i • 
" .'.l!U LO 
sociery. This reates social responsibility m the famil_ unir as well as the comm . umrv
at large. 
ow, regarding general responsibility. Islam demands char each and every individual"
is responsible for the safety. peace. and welfare of all in the community. This is
rramable by each doing cheir dury as decreed by [divine] law modelled under the
posrulare: 'Every one is a watch man [or warchwoman] and every one is responsible
or his [ or her J ward". 63 The justice Islam preac�es here. is char based on murual help
-oored m ri=nreousness .rna -equires c.nar: there be a communiry of people exboning
o �ood. r =mg co virrue, and restraining from evil conduce. 
64
Therefore. n Islam. murual responsib .
. 
iry t.bar realises justice is conrained in this: char
just as persons are required ro be in mutual help of one a another. so they are also
required co be muruall_ responsible in resrraining each other from evil so as ro promote
fair dealin=-- This can best be realised by practicing the prophet's injunction:
Whoever among you sees any evil doing, should change it with their 
hand. Jnd if the JD o o ma . lee mem hange it with cheir tongue. 
l)J • 1 Hadirh tPropher's cradirionJ. ee Q
urb. �P- cir.. p. 62. Another· version
• •k. Ha ith is cranslaced JS . "Each of you 1s shepherd and e.:ich one of youOt uuS
I answerable for h1s [or her] rlo k
nu, . n . .: : 104. 
and if they can not do that, lee them change it with their heart, (detest 
it within themselves) and that is the weakest of faith. 65 
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On thi note, Qutb elaborates chat each and every social evil is an injustice of and
belong co that society. If the society does not take mutual responsibility over its evils
then ach and all are well on the course to their own destruction. 66 This, and other
imilar illustrations demonstrate that, justice as mutual responsibility, is more than
merely helping each other and extends to restraining each other from the forces of
ocial evil and corruption. For each and every one's evil is the whole
community's e il and each and every one's good is the whole community's good. In
such good is contained social justice and in such evil is contained social injustice.
Thi sort of justice and injustice includes all things. even if it be the sympathising with
the good or the evil. This is because, the just community is mutually together and 
mutually responsible; sharing all in one. Such community is one in which individuals
always manifest a single identity and feel all things common: whatever happens to one
of its member the remainder of the members are also affected. 
To create uch an establishment and realise justice, Islam therefore argues that those
who hav more than the ba ic necessities are duty bound to give part of what they
fi r th benefit f ciecy a a whole. 
67 In a just ociety therefore, no body is
6S Haditb. ee al o ayyid Qutb, op. cit. p. 63.
I id. p. 
67 ur'an, 3:92. 
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supposed to be enjoying luxuriantly while others are in suffering and misery for Islamic
justice is built on a single, interrelated and interdependent arothcrhood and�-
The application of social justice in Islam 
To achieve complete social justice, Islam puts forward a system of Jaws that is 
extensively comprehensive and all encompassing. Through these laws all are protected 
and secure. This is because the Islamic legal system as a moral fabric, is not just a 
religion but a complete way of life. And it is also because, Islam, through the .use of 
its laws, envisages a complete human justice in which "human conscience" allows the
individual to rise beyond legal requirements and economic needs. 68 
It is also because, justice in Islam is a comprehensive concept whose attainment arises
out of the honour of human.kind both as an individual and as a community. As shown
by the Qur'an, the laws that attain justice must therefore also be comprehensively
immutable. In this way, human sanctity which is at the core of justice will be 
protected in all its entirety. This requires absolute moral excellence of both the 
individual and society through self-respect honour, and regard for one another_ which
is what Islam preaches in its laws. 
vayyid Qutb opt. cit., P· 69·
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The Qur'an therefore, ha always as a matter of emphasis exhorted upon the Muslims
and mankind in general to respect the sanctity of persons if justice is to be realised.
Therefore aII such behaviours that defile the honour, self-esteem and will of the
individual in particular and society as a whole are acts of injustice and hence abhorred
in Islam. 
Thjs means that, from the Qur'anic point of view, good character is of profound
importance in the application of justice. So, it is a requirement in Islam that people
have to excel in character in order to achieve justice in society. And the model ro be
foIIowed here is in the tradition and practice of the prophet69 and the historical
community he established. This is because the prophet had and instituted the best
pattern of conduct70 society. This pattern represents in practice, the perfect laws of
social justice. Therefore, to practically comprehend justice in the Islamic sense of the
word the followers must have belief in God, His laws and all His representations.
This prepares their hearts and bodies to stand for and live in justice.
All this is put in real practice by doing that which the prophet did or enjoined to do and
avoiding that which he didn't do or prohibited or discouraged from being done. To
realise and apply ju tice in the Islamic sense, we must therefore learn to accept divine
law "makin our will consonant to the Universal Will. "
71 This means that in order:::, 
69 
70 
71 
1 Qur'an 33:21 and 33:45-6.
Ibid, 33:21. 
ee Yusuf. Ji. The Ho(
v Qur'an, Translation and Commentary (New
J r ey: Amanah Publication, 1983) Commentary No. 3721 at p. 1117.
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to institute the character which will realise justice in society,, nobody is to fail one, s
self or society in anyway. 
Society or the individual, both deserve the honour and respect that is due to them; and 
this is a cardinal requisite in the application of social justice in Islam. After all, in
Islam respect for the individual is respect for the society and vice-versa. And respect
for both i respect for the perfect laws (of justice). This is achieved by following an
immutable and balanced system of laws in which human honour and sanctity is
protected, preserved and promoted. 
Prominent among these, is the poor tax (zakat) which is a due to the least well off. As
a due to the least well off, zakat is not just charity72 but operates as a way of mutual
responsibility. For it is a binding method of redistribution of wealth from the well to
do to the least well off. The community instituted in the paying of Zakat is therefore
not one that i merely charitable. It is jn those who consciously construe and
appreciate the interdependence and spirit of togetherness.intended in these rtues.
To apply thi ju tice, the Mu lim therefore is not supposed to allow any poverty or
material constraint to come in his or her way of ensuring mutual help and
either i he or he to wait until he or she possesses in excess of 
d ire an n ed . "What i pent in alms will be paid back to you in full measure". 13 
72 
73 
e 1 Qur'an, 
Ibid, .. : 74. 
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This shoi,; that the idea of reciprocity is a treasured part of the methods of social
ju tice in Islam. 
It is this repayment and hope that keeps justice alive in all the acts of charity of which
Zakat is the prominent. It is a repayment that resides in the gifts material and extra
material and only accrues to those who involve in good dealing and lenience with one
another. 4 (emphasis mine). Those who fail to practice good dealing and lenience with
each other, lack the just hand of Islamic law. In this, they are unjust to themselves and
the society they live in and are a handwork to their destruction. 
This destruction is what a c�arirable society stands to prevent. It is a destruction that
expresses itself through disobedience to perfect (divine) laws, and a destruction that is
manifested in the products of a selfish world that breeds a cruel, careless and
unsympathetic society full of decay and suffering. 
I lam and Entitlement 
Like in the (majority of) secular theorie of justice, (particularly classical theories)
I lam al O r cognises that people ha e de err and are therefore entitled to certain
claim xclu i e co them. Thi means that in Islam. there is a ratification of the right
to in i iduaJ p s s ion for all but this manifest it elf in the right to teceive and the__,,,..
7 yyid Qucb, op. cit., P· s7.
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obligation to give out of what we possess. This is because, in Islam there is no 
"ab oluce" owner hip of anything by any one. Islam conceives entitlement only in 
term of the r span ible possession of whatever one possesses be it from their own 
effort or through the endowments of nature. This means that in questions of justice, 
entitlement means the right to possess and obligation to dispossess for the common 
good of all. The absolute owner of all propeny is God. 75 
This is the true meaning of entitlement for it realises the needs of both the individual
and those of the society and thereby enforces the perfect justice Islam preaches. And
it spreads to a wide spectrum of things which rotates around the fundamental principles
of acqui ition and pending. 
Under acquisition Islam entitles all individuals to acquire the use of those things
needed in deriving the basic necessities of life. This is rooted in the l!adition of the
prophet: "[People] hare in three things; water, herbage and frre. "76 Stretched to
modern condition however, necessities in Islam may vary (in form) depending on
time and pla e. But one thing muse remain clear, in Islam, necessities are outside the
exclu ive right of individual possession .
e rth 1 , Islam pennies and indeed encourages 
the earning of these things and
tho e ,. hich are non ba ic through the effo
rts of individual labour and intellect.
75 l Qur'an. 4: }_6 and 1.,1.
6 yid utb. p. it., P· 109.
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Those who ar unable to acquire these necessities are then ent1'tled to a right of
deriving them from the pockets (possessions) of others who have in excess. This is
binding.n 
But individuals can and are encouraged to redistribute to the needy even if there are
no exces possessions. Thus, acquisition as a method of applying justice in Islam 
operates in rwo ways: we acquire through our own work and labour, and from what 
we are entitled to in alms (charity). However alms are not for every body
"Alms are for (those who are ) poor, destitute the tax collector, those 
whose hearts have been reconciled to the truth (righteousness), for the
ransom of those in bondage (sla\'es), the relief of debts, for spending in
' th " 1178 the way of Allah and 1or e way 1arer.
But it is through work that Islam prefers its believers to attain justice in so far as
acquisition i concerned. This is particuJarly because the reward from own labour
protects human honour and dignity. However, on the general level, the concept of
desert in Islam operate under the premise that both the individual and society in
general ha e interlocking rights which must be balanced.
The principle behind uch entitlement is that of need fulfillment for all. After all, the
proph t ha aJwa emphasi ed thac. "no (person] has a right to possess more than
n J Qur'an, :_67. 
1 Qur'an, 9:60. 7 
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three things; the house in which he [or she] lives, the garment which covers his [or
her] nak dness and the crust of bread and water". 79 
This does not mean that in questions of justice, people must live by the basics alo ne.
What it means is that in possessions people are duty bound to spend all that which is
over and above their basic needs for the benefit of all. This is why Islam dictates that
since we hold in stewardship to God in what we possess is a right for society at large.
What we po sess is not only for ourselves and our families, it also belongs to others
who are not related to us in blood or friendship.
E en upon death the demands of justice in Islam require th�t we are indebted to society
in what we leave behind. This may be in the real debts we owe to others, or it may
be in the inheritance rights Islam entitles to prescribed beneficiaries. The deceased like
the living, have rights and obligations in their property. These, transfer to the
immediate members of their family who must then use such property in such ways
that reali e murual responsibility and henceforth, complete social justice. It is in
these " ay that other members of the society will continue to benefit from what the
de a ed l ft behind.
Therefore entitlement to property in I lam i a acr d a the human life itself, for
each and ery entitlement mu t be protected in it entirety. Just as no body hould
7 1 Hadith, al cited in Qutb, Social Jusrice in Islam, p. 109.
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violate the human life that God has made sacred, so is the case for the sacred shares
of one another in the earthly possessions. 
Enjoyment of property must thus be moderately spread to meet the needs of all for if
this i not done, each and every one feels the effect. To prevent this and apply
complete social justice, Islam demands that both the individual and society muse
conduct the enjoyment of their property responsibly. 
"The individual must realise that he [ or she] is no more than the steward 
of th.is property which is fundamentally the possession of society; this
mu t make him [or her] accept the restrictions which the (Islamic) 
system lays upon his [or her] liberty and the bounds which limit his [or 
her] rights of disposal. On the other hand, society must realise its 
fundamental rights to uch property, and must thus become bolder in
prescribing the regulations and laying down laws which concern it. 
This is the only way we arrive at principles which will ensure complete 
ocial ju rice in the profitable use of property, which cannot be the end 
in itself, nor an object of any [individual's] purely personal 
po ses ions". 80 
The fundamental principle is therefore that in Islam. property generally belongs to
ociety at large, and the individuals can enjoy their rights in what they possess
although in so doing they cannot go to uch limits as will defile the perfect interests of
a p rfect order , hich the Islamic society constitutes.
To a hi e true entitl menr, Islam th r fore requires that both the individual and
j ty mu t di c rn all exce e . This is why Islam has put limits on what and how
we a quire and e pend property. "Some property is held in common and this no
ayyid Qutb, op. cit., P· 106. 
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md1v1 ua an possess" From all property is a due to the social needs of socierv
which make the socie� to sra_ cogether rhereb preserving its health and pe......-l ,ect10n.
in!! Jnd 11 ypes of righrs have been put under
str1c regulations in Islam so as ro endorse r.he scamp of jusrice which realises the true
entitlement. 
The individual is free to acquire and expend rhat which he or she righrly possesses
but the; musr nor exceed rhe limits of rhe law. Society roo musr operate within rhese
limits. In all-this, tbe principle is char of social responsibility and social accounrabilitv- .
Thus. justice as enticlemenr also means the arrainmem of equal claim (or right) ro the
ideal necessities which are cwo fold in narure: rhe physical well being_ and capacity to
fulfi mora obligations. 
These necessities are: food, clothing. education , shelter and healthcare bur may
vary ·n cordance ro cbe standard of 1i ing of a given society. for while a television
sec ma_ be a basic necessity for education or a refrigerator for food in one community,
the same may be a luxury in another community. 
31 This is one way in which the
onsid rauon of usrom (ud) as a rule of justice has to b� considered in order to
achieve true emirlemenr in various societies .
. /s 111 •• orerrr and Income disrriburion. 1991. op. 
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In sum, we can thus say that, in Islam, the goal of justice in the entitlement to wealth
is in the proper distribution of those things that will refine and moderate the quality of
life for all in the public (social) order. 82 But these are secondary correlatives of justice
and will only be required after the bear necessities are availed to all and when there is
abundant wealth to warrant doing so.
Basically, the Islamic restrictions on the conduct of wealth in society operate upon the
premise that, in Islam all property belongs to the Ummah (general community) and
each is merely a possessor whom God has treasured with wealth just as a test and trust.
The test is to see who is good in conduct83 and the trust is in the fact that the individual
is no absolute owner but possesses as a vicegerent for the general good. 84 Thus, in
Islam the concept of property upon which social justice greatly dwells is limited to the
divine will and the idea of absolute monopoly does not exist. 
Under the requirements of social justice in Islam, people must therefore be moderate
in the conduct of their possessions for they dq not belong to them alone. They must
82 In Arabic terminology, these can be categorised as Zaruriyat (necessities),Hajiyyat (conveniences) and Tahsiniyat (refinements). See Ziauddin Ahmad,op. cit.. p. 108. 
J In I lam redistribution of wealth is a divine command and since the best in
conduct i that Muslim who is most obedie_nt to God - distribution of income
according to divine Jaw elevates people to high conduct. See, Al Qur'an 3:92
and 49:13. 
1 Qur'an 2:30, 33:72-73. 
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n ith r sp nd their wealth in wanton prodiga1ness85 nor hold it back niggardly under
elfi h intentions. Their income and wealth ought to be spent under a measure that
putS indi idual and society in hannony with each other, for the two are a unity within
a diversity and have interlocking rights upon each other. 
For uch conduct ro thrive Islam advocates for a social order under the guidance of
righteou leadership who enforce the shari 'ah. 86 Under this leadership justice will
prevail by the leader ensuring that divine law is fo11owed87 by all, and by the ruled
consulting with the ruler to ensure that it is upon divine guidance that their order is
run. 
een from thi perspective Islamic justice can thus be viewed as a matter of human
rights 9 contained in the Shari 'ah which rules that each be righteous unto himself or
herself and to others. This calls for the existence of an ideal political-social order in
\ hich righteousne i enforced both by and upon the ruler and the ruled in accordance
co th dicrate of the Shari'ah.
1 Qur, an l 7: _6 God urges people to distributes wealth to the less fortunate but
warns that w hould not be extravagant so as to erode our own welfare and
that o ciety. 
Qur, an 21: 105 "My Righteous Servants will inherit the earth".
1 Qur'an. 4:59, 42:42-
l Qur'an 42:3 , "[The just people are those who] conduct their affairs by
mutual c n ultati n "· 
H . hts h re ar embraced in the concept of equality and entitlementuman ng . h 1 . 1 d th to the-indi idual and ociety - wh1c a so me u es the principle of public
int r t (ma lahah). 
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The ju tice that Islam preaches therefore is that which reco"gnises the equalities and
inequalitie of people. But, no kind of inequality will be accepted in Islam unless it
expres es itself in the designs of a perfect order (based on divine law) which dictates
that there should not be a trade off of one person by the other or one community by the
other. Such order is realisable when and where everyone is vigilant in the enforcement
of each other's rights and entitlement and when their natural interdependence is in
practical operation. 
Thi order i what in Muslim-Qur'anic terminology is called the Islamic ummah
(righteous community) which is the perfect order because it is based on doing right and
avoiding evil. In this community, the stamp of justice is endorsed by each treadino. 
b 
the middle course based on Shari'ah. In this way a moderate community is established
and justice is promoted through right conduct mooted in tolerance, temperance and
mutual care. 
Finally, it mu t be remembered that in Islam, social justice can also be conceived in
terms of political law (si asa shar'iya) which expresses the service of maslahah (the
common good or public interest). Through the promotion of maslahah (common good)
as the ultimat goal of ocial order political law helps to realise the meaning of social
ju tic by empha i ing that obedience to divine law improves social order and closes
, '" to chi rder in the e term : "You' re the best communityh ur an re,er . . . . 
u. ) that ha e er been raised up: you enJom the dorng of ooodKha •r mm .::, . d'" b"d e ii" e 1 Qur'an, 3:110. Ju u e an ,or 1 
91 
180 the gap between any artificial inequalities such as those between 1 ru er and ruled, rich
and poor ere. 91 
This concept of social justice is some�ow sir�ilar t� wha� Ibn Taymiya (132S)
and ajm al Din Tawfi (1316) considered m t!1elf deliberations on justice.
Th y both empha j ed ju tice as a content o� r�e Just order which is that order
who e end i reali ation of Maslahah (pubhc rnreresc). In fact al Tawfi went
ro e rr me and emphasi ed fv!as_Iahah (public interest} as the overriding
principle of a just order. Trus m effect reduces social justice to social
welfar . or a brief examination of Justice according ro Ibn Taymiya and al
Tawfi e Khadduri fajid: The Islamic Conception of Justice, op. cit., pp.
177-179.
CHAPTER V 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
One of the major concerns of justice particularly in modem jurisprudence is the
relation between the developed-industrialised world and the less or underdeveloped
nation . It i a major concern because in questions of justice there is the assumption
that people hare a rough equality in the quality of life they need for basic surv· 1 1va.
Thi i what prompts the idea that justice requires us to look at people from how they
fare in a global per pective vis-a-vis the principles of desert, merit and entitlement or
the way ocial welfare ought to be shared around the globe. For this to happen, there
are certain conditions to consider in the application of international justice. They are:
the a umption that people are equal, that there must be an international co-operation 
under reciprocal advantage and that every nation operates under the presumption of
moderate carcity of re ource . 1 
Under the condition of equality, international justice is argued from the premise that 
there i a natural equality between persons which demands that the basic needs of 
people around the .:,lobe ought to be imilarly atisfied. This condition, like that of
k Well l.f viewed under the Kantian concept of cate0o-ori·cal co-operation, wor 
imperati e a we . hall ee later in chi chapter. 
K . .
 1 'Global ju ·tice. capitali m a
nd the Third World', in Attfield and
W�;ki� (:;· lntemational Justice and 
the Third World (Newyork: Routledge,
I _) p. _5-6. 
3 
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The condition of co-operative-reciprocal advantage applies under the argument that in
international relations, people are generally interdependent and that, since they gain
from each other, nation have to work for the enhancement of the welfare of all
persons in the globe. Thus, to talk of internationalism and justice, we need a pre­
existing situation where people and nations are similarly placed under conditions of
mutual co-operation. 2 
Under the condition of moderate scarcity, international justice operates through the 
presumption that each nation moderately suffers from or lacks certain goods and
resources which others may have. Thus, it becomes necessary that those who have
what others need and Jack, should fairly deal with other nations in the share and
distribution of scarce resources or needs. This inevitably merges the condition of
moderate scarcity with that of mutual co-operative reciprocity. Therefore, the
fundamental argument is this: 
"For principles of justice to function, there must be enough reciprocity
d i'. eople to find some balance of reciprocal advantage. If they�� imp 
1 .  th' t fi d that they have no basis for regu atmg eir conductcanno m , . . . . " 3 in accordance with the prmciples of JUSnce 
But there i a problem in this, because if these really are the circumstances of justice,
·t I ks 1 ·r we can have no global justice, for the richest nations do not1 oo at east as 1 
I id, p. 26. 
Ibi , p. 26. 
.s 
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eem to be related to the poorest ones in such a way that the rich nati·on s secure
reciprocal advantage if justice is done. 4 
Co-operative reciprocity is not therefore always the realistic circumstance of
mternarional justice because if it is, the rich nations of fhe advanced world will then
be allowed to exploit the other nations which are less developed. This is because under
such circumstances the developed North, will succeed in the claim that we cannot
redistribute global resources to benefit the South, since the latter is in no position to
adequately reciprocate. After all, the real world 'is not a co-operative scheme,. s
Moreover the international organisations we have today are not really for schemes of
mutual support since there is no real co-operative support from the North to the South '
and vice versa. For example, in international trade, there is a complex network in
Which poor countries are only allowed to be in very tied up relations of
interdependence with the richer developed world. The rich nations of the North, trade
reciprocally and are interdependent between each other but not with the South.
A ca in point i the way tenns conditions and market prices are fixed for the flow
of go and rvice b cween the developed world and the so called third world. The
third \! orld ha the prices of its commodities determined by the developed nations of
the Orth. And, through , orth' based multinationals like the international monetary
Ibid, p. 26 . 
Ibid, p. 26. 
() 
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fund an the world Bank, countries of the South are given terms that never lift them
our of the begging po ition. Therefore, the loans from such multinationals and
counrrie of the orth are liabilities to peoples of the South. For. they come with
Stringent trings attached to them and very rigid requirements as to how and in which
areas they are ro benefit the recipient countries. Yet this may not be how the basic
needs of peoples may be satisfied in the recipient countries.
Thus, what is required in international justice and what all nations have to realise is
that the needs of the poor peoples of the world cannot be pre-determined by other
nations who are nor lacking chose needs. And rightly, it can be argued that moral
reciprocity and not co-oper�tive mutual advantage is what can deliver justice between
nation . 6 Otherwise, if we argue for strict reciprocity, then there has to be a
perpendicular compensation for the exploitation countries of the North inflicted on
tho e in the South _ all the way from the loss of human resources through slave trade
to that of mineral resources through colonialisation and imperialism.
Bur I think what i fitting in global issues and justice, is to adopt a Kantian approach
to mutual · e In order ro conceive the existence of international justice ac --ex1 r n . , 
broad conception of Kant's categorical imperative is thus necessary. For, it requires
that \ h tber (\vhether between nations or individuals) as we wouldt: ar to tr at ea o 
r a nably \ i h t e tr at d ourselve . 7 This means that in global issues whenever
Ibid. . _7_ 
Ibid, p. _ 7_ 
10 
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we t lk of ju tice for our nations we inevitably must think of the situation of other
nation al o, and how the furtherance of our designs may affect justice for other
nations. 
Thus, in international relations before we take advantage of the situation in other
nations, before we fix world prices and market forces and before we establish terms
and conditions of international assistance to other nations we have to ask: how would
we feel if the iruarion wa reversed and our feet are now in their shoes? For example
those in the orth could ask: would we wish to see our children or ourselves suffer
from war, hunger. famfae and disease aggravated by unfair terms of trade and
de elopment in the globe? And those in the South could also ask: How would we feel
if we were the one gi ing aid co countries whose leaders misallocate and misuse
. . b 1 ?9 international aid through corrupnon and em ezz ement. This is how Kant, s
care orical imperative become extremely important to issues of international justice.
It m ans that, inst ad of considering what advantages can be gained from international
co-operation. ea h nation should put her self in the position of other nations and thus
onsid r that if in uch circumstances, 'we would not will it for ourselves, we cannot
\ ill it for th m ith r'. 10 
I id, p ... 7-9. 
lbi . p. - . 
id. p. 
186 
Theories of international justice 
Theories of international justice postulate that there has got to be a world community
of states in which universal co-operation and mutual respect are the norm. Some
require that, for practical existence of international" justice, the principle of
redistribution of income, social welfare and resources has to apply. Others argue that
to apply such principles is to interfere with the rights and liberties of sovereign states.
To support the principle of redistribution here, we have to argue that unless this
happens the gap in incomes and social welfare between peoples of the world will
remain wider. And, for the non interference argument to· apply, it has to be
emphasised that the basic entitlements and moral equality of peoples of the world must
remain in equilibrium. There are three situations to consider here: Rawls 's theory of
redistribution vis-a-vis Nozick's theory of entitlement, cosmopolitan theory vis-a-vis
communitarianism and the just interaction theory vis-a-vis the just war theory.
Rawls' s Theory vs Nozick 
Under Rawl , theory of redistribution international justice will be served by
advocating that people's and national wealth and abilities be shared within the dictates
of the 'differ nee principle'. This means that global wealth has to be redistributed in
uch a way that will be to the advantage of the least well off peoples or nations.
187 
But there are problems with chis kind of argument especially when 'people in a
national society are assumed to have an identity with each ocher, a common bond,
which people in international society lack'. 11 
Yer Rawls, under his difference principle and the veil of ignorance, presupposes that
individuals - national and international, are commonly placed, unaware of who they
are and do not know their particular interests. Therefore, when they approach issues
of justice between nations, they do so without regard to their national interests or
identity. But, as Sandel points out, in the international world, people belong to
particular nations and have national interests which precede international desires. 12 This
is because, in reality people and nations are seriously �elf inclined. This makes it
difficult to see how international justice can be achieved under the Rawlsian principle
of redistribution which emphasises justice as the blindness to self interests.
'For if individuals and groups are primarily concerned with the pursuit 
of their own projects, then they are not likely to favour a policy which 
threatens their property, pursuits or idea of the good for the sake of a
universal redistribution of resources. Such a prescription is an unjust
• l'b I 13 limitation on their 1 erty · 
This is where the Islamic theory of justice and Nozick's theory of entitlement
come in. For, while Rawls's theory denies people a wide particular identity, under the
Islamic theory of justice people exist as a collective entity with common beliefs and
11 Ibid, p. 104. 
1- Ibid. p. 104. 
13 Kai Nielsen, 'Global Justice', op. cit., p. 31.
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aims but they can also operate as separate identities responsible for their failures and
success. 14 
Nozick's entitlement theory comes in by way of opposition to Rawls's theory of
redistributive justice. For, unlike Rawls, Nozick believes that where people's liberties
and entitlements are concerned, the principle of non interference is paramount. This
is similar to the position of those cosmopolitarians and communitarians who oppose
international justice based on the argument that its interference with particular welfare ,
rights and liberties of nations is unacceptable. Basically, bo_th communitarians and
cosmopo1itans 1_5 differ from Rawls because they (both) do not believe that it is
unacceptable to have: a concept of global justice in which people 'have' no interests of
. f h . 16 their own or alffis o t e1r own. 
Cosmopolitan theory and communitarianism 
Cosmopolitan theory urges international justice under the concept of a federation of
world states. This is evolutionary. It evolves from economic and political
developments around the world which inevitably make national governments realise the
importance of governing their affairs under a commonwealth. This in tum leads to the
14 See Yusuf Ali. The Holy Qur'an. Translation and Commentary (Maryland:
Amana Corp. 1983), 49: 10, 17: 15, 2: 143.
1.s For a concise discussion of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, see J.
Thompson (ed) Justice and World Order. A Philosophical Inquiry.
(Newyork: Routledge, 1992) 104-7.
16 Ibid p. 104-7. 
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creation of non-governmental organisations (N.G.O) as world regulatory fu t· nc 1onanes
run by representatives from all states. 
Gradually, under these organisations and their regulations, a lot of global affairs
become integrated, and as this happens and begins to bear fruits, people will then
realise that they belong to a larger world - which is the world of these regulations and
not merely their particular states or nations. 
The people belonging to these organisations will form a universal conception of justice,
for, they will be able to realise how indispensable or interdependent each nation is.
"As individuals become more and more aware of their dependence on others_ they will
come to regard themselves as first and foremost world citizens". This, and the
integration of various world affairs in various states, will lead to the demand for global
governance of people's affairs thereby leading to a federation of world states in which
rights, dutie and responsibilities of states will be seriously revised and redistributed
to reflect a more balanced and universal co-existence.
Inevitably a universal conception of justice will emerge and become the basis by which
world affairs are run. This will make it practically possible for the application of
univer al redistributive principles of justice in the enjoyment of world resources,
opportunitie and ervices etc. In this way, universal justice will be attained, since
everyon , welfare, rights and entitlements will be equally respected and fulfiiled.
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This is the concept of universal justice according cosmopolitarians. But, their concept
is not without problems or inadequacies. 
Like Rawls 's model in A Theory of Justice, the cosmopolitan formulation of universal
justice can be criticised for being implausible and very assumptive. It assumes that
people and indeed governments can easily abandon national pride and national identity
or interests for the sake of universalism. 
And though it argues that under a world justice, states will continue to exist and
pursue policies or laws for their people, it is impractical to think that in a global
federation of states, countries will not pursue those particular interests harmful to the
concept of universal justice. And, while cosmopolitan theory urges us to conceive
global belonging first before national identity, the reality of modern federations says
otherwise. For example in Canada, the problem of cultural diversity and the struggle
for power and control among states (pai:-ticularly Quebec) makes it difficult to see why
on global level, universal justice will not be injured by the concept of federation of
tates. 
Therefore, it is unrealistic to argue that a global government of affairs is practical
merely because we already live in pluralist society with cultural and ideological
variations_ 11 Furthermore, the idea of a federation of world states is mainly based on
the concept of interdependence. But, we need to realise that "people must not only
17 
\ 'i 
JanRa Thompso Justice Werld--OFder-, 
eutled·0a.-.-r-nndon, 19.g2.) p, 94.
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have relations of mutual dependence, they must be aware of them, value them and
value the institutions which make them possible". 18 And I might add, they have to be
ready, able and willing to defend them. 
And, under the communitarian critique, the idea of international justice in terms of a
world state is definitely unacceptable. This is because communitarians see justice in
terms of the absolute preservation of rights and identities of particular nations or
societies. To say that a global government or regulatory body be instituted to
redistribute general welfare among states would destroy these rights and identities.
Thus though the cosmopolitan theory of international justice under the idea of a world
state helps us to see how and why a theory of global justice is necessary, it is not
adequate enough to be a workable concept of justice. 
The just inceraccion cheor:y and rhe just war theory 
Both the just interaction and the just war theories base their argument for international
justice on the idea of sovereignty. Under the just interaction theory the argument is
that international justice will prevail when the integrity of each state is preserved.
Therefore the only way redistribution can occur between states is in those cases where
a tare owe omething to another - no state is duty bound to help those it has not
Ibid p. 102. 
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injured. In this way, the just interaction theory helps to further justice between states
by outlawing war intervention and exploitation of nations. For example history shows
that some of those countries that were disturbed by external war, heavy terms of trade
or colonialism have had to cope with resultant poverty and impoverished economies.
Thus, the just interaction theory further urges and argues that for there to be just
world order, nations have to pay back for the injuries they have caused to other peoples
and states. 
This again is the other way in which an extensive theory of global redistribution of
welfare can be effected under the just interaction theory. For, almost all nations owe
one another in some way or the other particularly, countries of the North. Countries
of the North have through colonialism and economic imperialism imposed massive
exploitation of the South. And, through collateral industrial effects, and the damping
of indu trial waste into the high seas, countries of the South and the whole globe have
suffered erious environmental damage.
All thi , goes a long way to dampen the chances of poor countries ever becoming well
. off. Thi i unju t. So. the idea of reparations for damages caused is in the right
direction of alleviating this injustice. Bue, the problem with it is that it inflicts
unnece ary burden co future generations who did not in any way contribute to the
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And moreover, people are not always the ones who cause iniuries to other n t· . :.1 a ions -It 
is the political systems that govern them. This means that at certain instances the
concept of reparations may backfire when people refuse to pay for the injuries caused
by their leaders. And when this happens, the just interaction theory may fail, for, war
will emerge thereby destroying national integrity between states. This is exactly what
happened between Germany and the league of nations after the Versailles peace treaty
(1919) which imposed heavy reparations that Germans later rejected.
And even if it was possible to get countries to receive their dues in reparations from
those who injured them, how would we measure the amount or value of these
reparations or how would we insure that these reparations would be used appropriately
for the furtherance of international justice? For example, look at the reparations for
the injury caused by slavery or colonialism, how would we measure it and how would
we ensure that those to pay are really the ones who enslaved our nations? So, this is
a erious inadequacy in the just interaction theory and the furtherance of justice
between nations. 
Furthermore, the conditions under which the just interaction theory operates make it
implausible also. For, it is required that under this theory: all states act as responsible
agents in global affairs. that they be able to act freely, have just institutions and that
all tare have enough resources so as to satisfy the basic needs of all peoples and
prev nc tho e acts of desperate people who may do whatever it takes to disrupt other
nations in order to get what they need.
194 
These conditions are good, but. (like the theory they are intended for) are implausible.
Fir tly it i general knowledge that not all states have sufficient resources needed to
satisfy the ba ic need of peoples. That's� reason why we see so much suffering
in countrie such as the Sudan, Somalia or Bangladesh (just for example).
Secondly, it is general knowledge also that not every country can act as it would wish.
Today many countries cannot do what they would wam for their people or what their
people wane them to do because the whole globe is at the mercy and under the policy
of the economjc and military super powers. Otherwise, the whole of Panama (for
. . 
example) would nor standby and watch as America captured and judged its leader
(Noriega) when there are courts in Panama itself!
Finally, it is impossible co ensure that all states will act responsibly in global affairs
urue perhaps we adopt ome kind of a cosmopolitan federation of states with
institutions to monitor and O ersee this. Thus on the whole, the just interaction theory
implausible and inadequate: it pays little attention to the requirements of justice such
a the considerations based on need capacity, merit, etc. This is because it relies too
much on the concept of justice as paying back people's debts only or tit for tat
principle . But rit for tar creates more conflicrs and less reconciliation. The just war
th ory p rhap h lp to ol e some of the problems of the just interaction theory, but,
it i nor without conflicts either.
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The ju t war theory considers that it is necessary to intervene in global affairs in order
to defend the right , entitlements and sovereignty of nations. So, the respect for
overeignry of rate and the rights to determine their political social and eco ' nom1c 
system is what promotes ju tice among nations under a just war theory. Intervention
1s to be avoided unle s it i based on very good reasons.
Thus, under this theory the jusr acts in a world society are those acts that promot e,
defend or preserve people' rights to self determination and the respect for national
so ereigmy. 19 Therefore unless there are clear indications for the need to defend these
rights, nation are co remain impartial agents for peace in global affairs.
One of th erious difficulties this theory poses is that, like the just interaction theory,
the just war theory is very inconsiderate to the issue of global inequality. By looking
at justice in term of rights ro national sovereignty, it rules out the need to interfere in
Other nations, affair in order co consider the requirement of global redistribution of
Welfare. 
Thu . in thi \ ay a ju t war theory leaves everyone in his or her position -letting
e rythin \ her it lie : the p r remaining poorer and the rich richer. This in turn
al o pr rn 
imbalan ed. 
th idea f re p cting global racus quo of nations which is unjustly
nd r thi • \ can ee that countries which have achieved sovereign
Rawl Theon' of Justice. Op. cit. p. 378-9. See also Janna Thompson,
Ju flee and World ·order. op. cit.' p. 12· 
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t tu over other ' land may end up maintaining their colonial schemes without
hind ran e. For example Briri h Bermuda or Chinese controlled Mongolia will remain
a uch. Thu unlike the just interaction theory which at least considers the 'debt'
owed by on ouncry to another the just war theory "takes the entitlements of
sovereignty for granted". 0 
Funhermore, though both of these theories need to strongly reassess the reality of
mOdem interdependence of states vis-a-vis their account of justice, it is the just war
theory which muse strongly consider the role interdependence plays in global welfare.
The just interaction theory does (though in a limited way) conside_r the importance of
international interdependence in issues of justice by urging that nation� pay for their
Pase injuries to others. 
Bue as Thomp on ays, the just war theory does not adequately address the balancing
of relation between rates, for ir pays no regard to past global injustices or injuries
between cares. 21 And the just war theory pays little attention to other non anned
interference in the national welfare of peoples
22 such as injustices that accompany
economic embargoe . undue urveillance which can go a long way to harm the
w Ubeing of itiz ns as i the ca e now with the United Nations imposed embargo on
Iraq. 
• o 
J nn Thomp 
lbid. p. 77. 
J.ustice and World Order op. cic., p. 17 .n, 
21 
I id. p. 77-
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AJJ in all, th just interaction approach clearly makes more demands on states than the
JU t war theory does. "Bur they are both motivated by the same reasoning, [for] they
take the same basic idea that cosmopolitans share: that it is unjust to cause harm to
individuals or co violate their individual and political rights". 23
In conclusion the concept of justice whether in issues between gender or nations
requires the respect for peoples' dues and entitlements. It is not a tit for tat theory or
reciprocity like some would argue. And we do not have to wait until there is a global
viJJage to \ hich every one belongs before we can attain full inrernarional justice as
co mopolitans would argue nor do we have to stick to particularised worlds in order
to concrerise ir. Justice, for men or for women, for nations or the globe is one and the
same thing _ mutual co-existence, and involves the acceptance of the fact that each and
everyone of us has to be given his or her entitlements, burdens and rewards before we
can attain full international justice. 
Other cholar ha e argued that international justice is not workable because it
presuppo es exi tence of a mutually interested international order. 24 This can be solved
by religiou beli f: which actually create such order through common faith and
a pirarions a e n under the I lamic theory of justice (above). 25
1 1d, p. 7 . 
1 id. . 105.
e - Ch pt r 4.
27 
"To move toward corrective imbalances between North and South 
·11 wew1 have to move to a collective ownership and control of the meansof production for otherwise, economic power becomesconcentrated in the hands of few and they will dominate and exploitothers". 6 
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This means char we require ro introduce a limjted concept of Marxist conception of
JUStice. I say 'limited' because, an exjstence of full scale Marxist justice would in tum
lead to an overwhelming suppression of the individuals rights, 27 which in a way are
very crucial to the preservation of international justice. Interference (in matters of
global concerns) hould not disrurb the essential or basic interests of nations and
peoples. It should only occur to reinstate these matters which are the crucial needs of
P_eoples and nation _ against disease, poverty, ignorance and homelessness, etc.
Again, this further means that there can't be international justice without extensive
international redi tribution between North and South.
"To O ercome the great disparities between North and South, even to 
put an end ro conditions of iinJniseration in the South -starvation, 
malnutrition Jack of work. extreme poverty - there would have to be 
ignificanr a�d varied redistribution from !'f Orth to Sou�. In do�g this .
we wo Id have ro !live rather more weight to the nghts of faff co-
u - . fi 11 28 operation than co rights of non inter erence 
o ingl theory f ju rice will therefore suffice in helping us attain a just world of
redi tributi n in th international arena. We would have to select principles of
homp on. Justice and World Order op. cit. p. 105.
kai 
p. 30.
iel n. , Global Ju rice, Capitalism and the Third World', op. cit.,
�·) 
r isrr bur on from
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·vrde spec rum Jr rheon s vf justice. Islamic jusric .. would for
example e p us in balancing a lash between non-$ubordination and non inte .f.'. r1erence.
R wl ian �neory of 1usr1c-.. pamcuJariy rhe irference princiole and rhe J·usr _ · �avings
Principle would be immeasurably essential in answering the needs of imergenerarional
unbalances and chose of che lease welloff in the mternarional world . . \fozick's theory
of em1t1emem , ould nor be of much help ro ·mernational justice. except. in so far as
It ccepts redisrribuuon co resrore lost entitlements of nations. 
Otherwise. his theory seriously protects -apiralisric behaviour which has caused so
much injustice in imernarional social order. ;g This is because. :-lozick argues that
people re ... nm e w �;ghcs Jgainsr :-ion ·merrerence. But he forgers rn reaiise char in
che same . ay. eopie. Jnd ,ndeed ;-,arions. 1 ave rights co fair distribution a(
1.mernatioo welfare nor only for resources in zones of renimriai neucraiity (like in the
'.J.w or" che sea>. · ut m iJ J.re:is where :he �J.Sic needs of nations :ire oncerned.
T1 e ;Jro km ·v ch . ·oz: K :s �,ac ,:c: ;;:1ie•:;;:s :W ::mch m people s or JJtional libem·
ac e •v n compromi e any oss r" it. The errer ·iew. particularly for international
JUSri s w t.hmk .. ,e Rawls Joes. ·hat ;iucions or peoples interact airly benveen one
noth r �: 15 _tnke.s �JJ n .. �c:[ \·een :m
c:mnrion.1 · imerrerence � nd preservarion or'
acionat -: =ms ro c ... rr.1m cnmlc:mems. .n 
orner •vords. ir me:ms [he c:d.srenc ... or" rights
ind . .1r r. J\\"I • ,et · 1/Je
viare his rob/em by :idvocaring
� w.str buc10n. 
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to fair co-op ration between nation . This is where both Rawls and Kant meet m
IS ue of intern tional justice. For both believe that people's or nations• liberty to
pur ue own intere r . mu t be adjusted in view of the rights to fair co-operation and
co-exi ten e. 
Other liberal egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin would also be in favour of an
international redi triburion of welfare in order to establish a just"international orde r.
However, for them, and especially Dworkin, the vital requirement is not the
equivalence in people's liberties, or the superiority of people's emitlemems, but the
equal icy of resource .. 30
Thu , in con epruali ing the theory of international justice we need to take only those
theories or principles which help us to think that the world is my country and not the
reverse. For thi not only helps us in overcoming those conflicting demands of
co mopolitanism and communitarianism. but it also makes it possible to identify
oursel e with a global belonging which makes international justice realistically
attafoable. 
Equality' (19 1) 10 Philosophy and Public Affair, pp. 
THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE 
It i r uir m m of ju ri chac all p oples and nations be entitled to cenain basic 
n d n ry for d m enjoyment of life and preferences imponanr ro them as
ln 
righc or d
J -a-vi ch
farin
... nd
n or m rn for them a they are: men, women children or nations
lobal iru uon - pa t and pre enc. 
chi hapc r i to e amine how justice between the sexes has fared, is
rhap h \ ir could be impro ed upon. Basically, the issue is that in
lllau r of end r an ju ci , tb re ha been and there is a serious imbalance in the
Way micJ m m ar di tribuced and enjoyed between the two sexes. It is the
Worn n ho h ve urn r d from di criminarion and Jack of adequate entitlements
11 d the ,.,.:eak r 
on Ptu Ji rion of ju r1
the problem ha been with the traditional method of
ordin:, to Moller Okin, 1 this is because it has 
lw ju rice in terms of idealised and relativised 
on d n pc . ju ci e i perceived through comexr, tradition
ilnd hi r ry hi h d n 1 nd r chan= ; under idealised concepts, justice is
ab tr t d tr m th parciculancy f r ons \ hich is blind to difference. 2 
m. . r. "Ju ri e an
Ii ,p. 11-. 
nd r" in orwatez T. Justice, p. 172.
' 
( rti UI rl
ju ri 
om in. 
202 
ti r ti king co tradition or history or context
n h nn lled it fails to eradicate the evils of
is where the problem of sexism
nr ,u or hi wry of the tradition of conceptions of
n e ap doing an injustice to gender. And even if we
rgum nr that leads us to consider each in relative
1 
\ •• or p r( ul ril . '"e , •ill rill b gender bia d. After all, we live in gendered
I Cy, 
ch 
ju ti 1hr u 
J th ory. fi mini cs argue, does nor care to consider the
m chod and formulations of justice for it hardly
ri d norm and tandards.
11d th u h m rn Lh C)' u mpl co ha e ome kind of a more fair approach to
also gender biased. This is particularly
"in virabiliry of ex differentiations" in issues of
JU CJ b tween the sexes have remained in the rn 
print fl it i
C 
h 
Ji m by inr rpr ting law in term of differences between the
r ju ti i una
If ·t 
ta I to fi mini t legal theory because it
n th exe without questioning
- anl r 1 ant.
3 
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Resrricring women to one single sphere and men to a different sphere creates an
abstract universality that is nor cognizant of the shared sameness or similarity which
exi ts between human species. According to feminise theory, requirements for justice
between genders are in the argument that albeit there are numerous ("infinite")
similarities and difference between the sexes, not all of them need be considered.'
there are those we must discern and those we have to discard.
For example, to ay that the women's place is in the home (private sphere) to mother
and tend to the children and carry out wifely duties3 is an arbitrary deference that is
nor relevant to the furtherance of justice between the sexes. 4 This is because to make
such an assercion is co say that the woman is just biology but �or the man. Yet we
know that both the woman as a wife and the man as a husband are similarly situated:
they both have a place in and belong to the home (private) sphere.
Therefore from a feminist viewpoint, we can argue that there is nothing so different
about a woman to make her place of occupation mainly a matter of home affairs and
nothing so special about a man to make his place of occupation a matter of things
outside the home: bread winner and wife protector. Traditionally, perhaps such kind
of differentiation would be tenable if we adopt some sort of a Spencerian argument for
For a odern perspective on this issue see Neave, M "From Difference to 
m L and Women's Work" (1992) 18 Melbourne University lawamene - aw 
R A "R · R · 769_70 789 and Wasserstorm , . . ac1sm, Sexism and 
P
e
vfii
e
w. _P-1 A Ap
,
proach to the Topics", (1977) 24 UCLA Law Review p re renc1a . n , · 
588-9.
l·n "Racism Sexism and Preferential treatment· An ee R. . Was erscorm ' 588 9 · th T · s" (1977) ?4 UCLA L.R., P· - · pproach to e op1c -
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JUSric a a matter of survival of the fittest. That is, since traditionally men were
co nsidered to be rronger in physique. and since family support and protection was
based on and required physical fitness, it would seem right to argue that for the sake
Off. ·1 am1 Y survival, the man's place would be to support and defend the family whilethat of the woman would be different.
Bur under modem circumstances, it is no longer tenable to argue in this way. s In the
industrial world of today with modem weaponry and technology, both the woman and
the man are intilarly situated to adequately defend and support the family without
recourse ro differentfations based on physical fitness. Moreover, even in traditional
times, the argument for differentfated occupations based on s_ex would nor hold since
there could have been (as there are today) women who are stronger and better in
Ph Y ique than men.
Bur becau e there are ituations (such as pregnancy) that make the woman so distinctly
Unique as to require " pecial rights" and entitlements, there is a need to consider the
differences between the sexes before justice and gender can be balanced. And, we
canner generali e, otherwise we will create stereotypes that can endanger the true
ll'leaning of ju tic between the sexes.
Th. . hy some feminists argue for absolute equality of sexes 1 1 on reason w ,, . .C "Femini t Jurisprudence (1981) 56 Indiana Law Journale • ale , Ann. · . 1 · d d · · · . , 8 . . d that the indusrnaJ revo unon ren ere 1t impossible to �- \: h r 1r 1 argu d. . . h 1 in t nn of physical strength. 1 tmgu1 x r 
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This means that every single difference and every single similarity bet h ween t e sexes 
· , e case ofmust be considered according to the facts of the case For example th 
pregnancy demands that some (not all) women shall be tr_eated differently from all
other humans. 
Thus, in arguments for justice betwee? 
genders, it must be emphasised that feminists
do not deny the existence of differences 
between the sexes nor do they oppose the need
to discuss justice and gender based o
n differences between the sexes. This i� because
feminism recognises the fact tha
t "somewhere in the nature of things there must be a
list of sex differences that matte
r and those that do not matter". 
6 What they do not
accept however, is the use 
of "abstract universality" to arrive at a list of such
differences. Feminist critique 
therefore demands that to foster real and meaningful
conceptions of justice between
 the sexes, we must distinguish the relevant differences
[and similarities] among peopl
e (but particularly between gender) from the non relevant
ones. 7
To identify what differences 
[and invariably what similaritie
s] are relevant, Ann Scales
. . 8 
h t We need to consi
der the followmg questions:
proposes t a 
6 
7 
A C "The Em
eroence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay"
Scales, nn. · 
0 
(1986) 95 Yale Law Jou
rnal, p. 1377. 
Ibid, PP· 1386, 
1387, 1395 and 13
96.
8 Ibid, p. 1375.
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i) which differences between the sexes are or should be relevant for legal
purposes?
ii) How does one tell what the differences are?
iii) Does it matter whether the differences are_ relevant or the result of upbringing?
iv) Is it ·enough to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate stereotyped
differences? Or are there situations where differences· are sufficiently 'real,
and permanent to demand social accommodation?
By answering these questions we can show that women have certain rights which
indicate the existence of real differences as compared to the other sex. And it would
be fair and proper to add that where there is a demonstrable_ existe�ce of such rights
for men, then the same indication applies. These rights can be called special rights
or equality rights. 
By answering these questions we can also achieve modified application of Aristotelian
classification of justice under the maxim: treat equals equally and unequals differently.
1 say "modified application" because under the feminist critique we question the
relevance under which peoples are considered
 equal or unequal before being entitled
to the application. This modification or 
relevance is adopted from Hart's relevance
approach to equality. 
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The three· views of feminist theory 
There are three views that have been advanced _in the conc�ption of approaches to 
feminist justice. They are: the Millian - Liberal _view, the assimilationist - absolute
equality view ·and the "unique physical difference" doctrine or what Scales calls the 
"Bivalent" view of equality. 
The Liberal View 
The Liberal view is championed by John Stuart Mill9 and is based on the rejection of
classification of burdens and rewards between men and women ac�ording to their
gender - physical or biological differences. Therefore liberal feminists argue that all
formal constraints that divided the chances of equal competition between the sexes have
to be removed in order to give justice a chance - particularly for the woman who has
been denied (through such classification) the role to determine her own course of
things. "The liberal feminist believes that uustice between gender means that the
woman as an individual], should be able to determine her social role with as great a
freedom as does a man"
10 and that achievement of equal opportunity for individuals
whether men or women, is what matters in issues of justice between the sexes.11
9 See Mill, J.S. The Subjection of women 7. (2nd ed. 1869) cited in Scales,
'Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence' (1981) 56 Indiana Law Journal, p. 426.
10 Scales, Ann. C. 'Feminist Jurisprudence' (1981) 56 Indiana Law Journal, p.
426-7. 
11 Ibid, p. 427. 
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Generally, the liberal feminist view of justice based on the concept of (absolute) 
equality is shaped by their reliance on the argument that between the sexes, things have
been always determined according to the male as the norm. 
However, liberal feminism has been criticised for using the male norm to 'analogise' 
justice and gender; a thing which stagnates the struggle to remove barriers of achi�_ving 
true equality between genders.12 And, reliance on arguments based on the call for 
equal opportunities does not also fully embrace the problems of justice and gender. 
For, as Scales demonstrates, true equality does not only require that women be like 
men in some way, or operate men's institutions per se, true equality demands the 
existence of proper and fair operation of all institutions. 
"To demand only the chance to compete is to embrace the status quo in 
a way that tends to sanction - oppressive arrangements [and] to ask only
for equal opportunities to compete is to obscure the fact that the
restrictions presently imposed on individual women are functions of 
• • II l3 
class charactensncs . 
The Assimilationist view 
As if to cure the faults and pitfalls in the liberal feminist theory of equality, 
assimilationists present a more extreme version of equality between gender. According 
to the assimilationist theory, in issues between gender, there is _no justice and equality 
12 Ibid, p. 427-8. 
13 Ibid, p. 427. 
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if and where distinctions are made on the basis of sex. 14 Their thesis is therefore for 
the existence of a sexless social, political and economic order where differences 
between the sexes - whether biological, 15 physiologi(::al, 16 emoti9nal or psychological, 
etc, should be given no relevance in deciding the is�ues: roles, rights or entitlements 
of persons. In the words of scales, what assimilatiorusts want us to look at in sex and 
justice is this: treat the sexual characteristics and differences like the eye colour of 
individuals in society: no distinction of justice would be based on eye colour. It is a 
matter that is just incidental to the description or identity of person just as skin colour
is - so the same should be the case of sex.
Thus, if liberal feminism is an absolutism of all sorts, assimilationism is its extreme
fonn. For, in an assimilationist society, there are no sex roles nor accommodation of
the demands of natural differences. Their argument is for a society that similarly
assimilates all differences whether by any means available or by striving to find such
means so that people are freed from the tyranny of sexual distinction. This is because,
14 Ibid, p. 428. See also Wasserstonn, "Racism, sexism and preferential
Treatment: An Approach to the Topics". (1977) 24 U. C.L.A Law Review, p.
581 & 604. 
15 Because assimilationist theory wants to see absolute equality or similarity
between the sexes it argues that even pregnancy can not be used as a unique
distinction to enforce different treatment between the sexes since through _
advanced medical knowledge such as "artificial reproduction [and] extra
uterine_ gestation" this can be avoided. See Scales, "Feminist Jurisprudence",
(1981) 56 Indiana Law Journal, 429. See also Wasserstonn R.A., "Racism,
Sexism, and Preferential Treatment" (1977) 24, U. C.L.A Law Review, 612.
16 For example, see Wasserstonn, R.A,_ "Racism, Sexism, and Preferential
Treatment" (1977) 24 U. C.L.A Law Review at 611 where assimilationist argue
that: "The industrial revolution has certainly made any of the general
differences in strength between the sexes capable of being ignored by the good
society in virtually all activities".
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assimilationists argue that distinctions based on sex, necessarily impose limits - and 
restrictions on what one can do, be or become. 17 
As we can see, assimilationists arguments of justice between the sexes are open and 
quite exposed to·serious criticism. First, it can be argued that the notion of absolute 
equality is "frighteningly" unreal for it is blind to the nature of persons and the world 
they live in. Even among women there are differences that are worth calling for 
consideration. There are things we can not change. Moreover, when we identify 
sexual distinctions to consider in issues of justice it does not mean to be biased in the 
negative sense. 
As we noted earlier, to treat people on the basis of sexual distinction per se is not an 
injustice, 18 what is wrong is to use these distinctions by one gender to dominate, 
oppress and subordinate the other - as has been the case in general legal and non legal 
tradition. Thus to argue that the right thing is only for all to be similar is unnatural 
and it "trivializes sex differences which in fact have [significantly necessary] 
• II 19 repercussions
11 Scales, Ann. C. 'Feminist Jurisprudence' (1981) 56 Indiana Law Journal, p.
430. 
1s Compare with Wasserstorm's _arguments for. and against assimilationism in
"Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: Approach to the Topics". Op.
cit., pp. 605-11. 
19 Scales Ann, "Feminist Jurisprudence" (1981) 56 Indiana Law journal, 429.
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And, by insisting on the need to 'nullify' certain inherent sexual differences like 
pregnancy is to insult the relevance of particular natural human function of the sexes. 
Therefore like liberal feminism, assimilationist theory is also inadequate because it 
relies on conceiving justice in terms of (equivalence) to the male norm. For example, 
as Scales20 demopstrates, to argue that pregnancy sho';lld be nullified so as to make the 
female similar to the male is like saying that males should be equipped with the means 
to conceive and bear children! 
The Unique Differences Doctrine - ("Bivalent View") 
Perhaps by arguing that the treatment between the sexes be cognizant_ of real significant 
crender difference is what could provide an alternative to both the liberal and 0 
assimilationist theory. This is what the 'bivalent' view represents for it is based on 
the premise that between the sexes, there are differences that are unique enough to call
for application of justice based on a non-abstract use of the physiological, biological
and other relevant characteristics of each sex. This is because it is neither vital nor
necessary to nullify or disregard certain particular differences of the sexes. After all,
11 it may be more possible for us to treat people of different sexes alike than it is for us
to treat a baby as an adult, or elderly man as a youth. Some differences can not be
discounted" . 21
20 Ibid, p. 430. 
21 Ibid, p. 431. Compare this with the argument that we cannot heavily rely on 
just�ce based on difference between the sex, for, those differences which 
appear natural and right in one generation or culture may not be so in the next 
culture or period. See "Toward A Redefinition of Sexual equality" (1981) 95 
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Thus, the bivalent view bases its argument on the fact that it is irrational to think that 
by disregarding differences between the sexes, justice and pure equality will result. 
Therefore, it proposes in the alternative: that we recognise that between the sexes there 
are certain gender distinctions that command the need to assign special rights related 
only to these distinctions. This means that under the l?ivalent view, political and social 
arrangements should be (to some extent) based on the differe_nces between the sexes. 
The argument here is that between the two sexes, equalisation of the sexes· is qn 
unrealistic phenomenon. This means that to deliver justice between gender, the law 
should take into consideration the fact that: "the two sexes are not fungible; a 
community made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of 
both". 22 A view of justice in terms of recognition of unique sexual differences is vital. 
But the problem with this view is that it does not tell us which differences to regard
and disregard, or how to determine which distinctions are relevant or not. Thus,
though the bivalent view gives regard to historical situation of the sexes, it fails to
provide a concrete alternative to the other two.
Theories of justice and feminism: some observations 
Though it is easy to argue that feminist critique of law and legal theory is an emerging 
field of its own which is part of what is now called post modem jurisprudence, it is 
Harvard Law Review, p. 497.
22 Ibid, p. 432. 
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also important to note how influential existing writings on law and justice have been 
in determining this emergence. 
• 
For example, if we start with Plato and Aristotle we realise that though they have been 
blamed for their-"declarations on woman as partial m,an" ,23 it is their theories that form 
the background in the methods of feminist form_ulations of justice Qetween gender. For 
instance, through Aristotle's argument that conceptions of justice be cognizant of 
difference and similarity (sameness) of persons, feminist reaction has managed to come 
out with an argument for justice based on similar but modified lines . 
. . The noticeable difference between these two is that while Aristotle only emphasises 
reliance on treating equals equally and unequals differently, feminists insist that it is 
not enough in gender justice to rely on the differences and similarities of people: we 
have to question whether these classification are relevant. But generally legal feminism
aorees with Aristotle when it conceives the law in terms of the doctrine of classification0 
as an important method of social justice. This is particularly vivid under the assertion
that the "law, like the language which is its medium, is a system of classification" and
that to characterize similarities and differences among situations is a key step in legal
judgements. 
23 Scales, Ann, "The emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence. An Essay". (1986),
95, Yale Law Journal 1374.
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Thus, feminism like Aristotelianism is in this regard "a theory of differentiation", but 
unlike Aristotle, its authors are more concerned about the "moral crux" upon which 
this theory is based than about differentiations per se.24 This is (I think) why feminist 
critique of law and justice has combined Aristotle's doctrine of classification with 
Hart's relevant difference and relevant similarity qpproach. Through the use of 
Aristotle's dQctrine of classification, legal feminism acquires a basis to argue for a 
coruideration of "special rights" unique to women and by adding to it Hart's relevance 
approach,it manages to keep at bay the arbitrary use of human differences a1'd 
similarities to further inequality. 
In retrospect, under feminism the requirement is that where women are within 
determinably and relevantly similar situations like men, treat everyone the same. But 
where there are determinable and relevant differences between the two, then we treat .. 
them differently. Consider the case of pregnancy. Because women are the only ones 
that are biologically suited to bear children in the wombs, and because pregnancy calls 
for unique health needs, this is a sex difference which is relevant for consideration of 
different approaches to justice between women and men. 
Following Aristotle, these differences (it seems any difference) would of course justify 
unequal treatment between male and females since as we have seen, he does not care 
which difference is relevant or not. Another thing that we can consider under 
Aristotelianism in relation to feminism is the equation of justice to conformity with the 
24 Ibid, p. 1387. 
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law. Here too, if we apply the Aristotelian justice to issues between the sexes, we 
have to adopt some kind of modification. This is because in his conception of justice 
as conformity to the law, Aristotle fails to realise that we are living in a genderised 
society in which it has been the tradition to formulate the law and justice according to 
male terms, norms and standards. 
Similarly, under Piato' s conception of justice in terms of placement according to 
capacity, it can be argued that gender justice would both be promoted and undermined. 
It is promoted when we adopt a moderate application of the doctrine: place everyone 
according to where their capacity suit them best. This too, (like in the modified 
Aristotelian doctrine) requires the need to recognise relevant differences in terms of 
burdens and rewards of the various capacities involved. 
If there are certain capacities which are akin to one sex, but impose or are associated 
with particular burdens or rewards which would create unfair imbalances between the 
sexes; then feminist arguments would require the assignment of special rights to cater 
for this imbalance. Again, a case in point here is that of pregnancy and child birth. 
During pregnancy and after child birth, a woman's body health requirements may 
demand that the female be treated or placed differently from the male. This is because 
at this time her capacity to function as normally as others would do is different. This 
for exampl-e, may justify giving maternity allowances or leave to women instead of 
paternity allowances or leave to men. But if we apply a strict use of Plato's argument 
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of placements (entitlements) according to capacity, then situations like this where the 
sexes are not similarly situated, will leave some people adversely disadvantaged where 
others enjoy the same conditions. 
Even in situations where women and.men are similarly situated, it cannot be held that 
abstract application of justice according to capacity will deliver the true meaning of 
justice between the sexes. This is because, in the genderised society of today, men 
have made a giant leap ahead of women not based on Plato's yardstick of achievement 
according to capacity, but because of the traditionally institutionalised gender system. 
And it is interesting to note that under this system women have been dominated and 
impoverished because they were relegated to the "private sphere" generally because of 
arguments based on capacity. For, under such arguments women have always been
perceived as the weaker sex or just "mothers and wives" whose proper place of
occupation is in the home. But not so has been the case for men. Men have always
been considered the stronger sex - not just husbands but as the family heads and bread
winners whose proper place of occupation should therefore be beyond the home.
Now, Plato's doctrine of desert according to capacity does not consider whether one 
is a woman or man - which is good in a way. But in gender justice, we cannot apply 
it whole sale without regard to prevailing positions and situations between the sexes. 
In view of the imbalance created by the traditional institutionalisation of gender, any 
concept of justice in relation to gender issues has to pay some regard to the need to 
restore women to that station in which they ought to be as equals with other human 
• 
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beings. Of course this calls for some· consideration of the Aristotelian restitutional 
justice. But more importantly, it is what brings us to the world of modern theory 
whose emphasis is the requirement to redistribute burdens and rewards so that the 
least welloffs are brought in line with the better-offs. 
However, it must be realised that contemporary theory, though more 'sympathetic' to 
gender justice, has also found it difficult to escape the feminist critique. Thus, a close 
examination of major twentieth century theories of justice reveals not just an inclination 
to the use of male generic terms in postulating justice but a male oriented conception 
of justice. Take for instance Rawls' s A Theory of Justice. In explaining the model of 
people in the original position (P.O.P), Rawls assumes that it is just and right for the 
male term 'he' to represent the rational conception of justice. So he uses such terms 
as: "his place in society", "his rational plan of life", "his conception of good", etc, to
explain the rational model in A Theory of Justice.25
And, though elsewhere in his A Theory of Justice, Rawls discusses the concept of
justice in non gendered language, it can still be argued that these terms of reference
make us ask: "Does this theory of justice apply to women or not"?26 Moreover,
from gendered language, Rawls still reflects a gendered tradition in the way he argues
the workings of the original position.
2s J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971),
p. 137. See also S. Moller Okin, op. cit. p. 173.
26 s. Moller Okin, op. cit., p. 172.
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· For example according
,._
Susan Okin, 27 Rawls' s discussion of justice within the family
disregards real disparities between gender. This can be seen where Rawls assumes that
in the original position and when the veil of ignorance is removed, all parties will
be participants in the paid labour market. Yet, the reality is that many women's labour
particularly in the 'third world' is unpaid or underpaid as compared to men. And, as
Okin further shows when we look at the family as part of the basic structure,
Rawls' s assumption then will be that, in the original position people do not reach
agreement as members of the family but as "heads of the family" who represent the rest
of the family.28
There are two or-three problems with this. Supposing heads of the families are those 
who are influenced by a gender biased culture, whether they are women or not, their 
decisions and agreement will not be in the interest of gender justice but the culture 
that influences them. The unfortunate thing is that such decisions, will by way Qf 
representation, be imposed on all members of the family even though there may be 
among them some who would want them to be otherwise. 
And there is the argument that Rawls' s concept of family justice inadvertently 
assumes a male head and not a female head. This is particularly evident when Rawls 
refers to a female head only in those instances where a male member is absent -
27 
28 
Ibid,p.172-3. 
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, op. cit., p. 128. See also Okin, 'Justice and
Gender', op. cit., p. 173.
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giving the impression that families with male members_ are headed by males and not 
females.29
But on the other hand, when we consider Rawls' s theory beyond semantic impressions 
and terminology, it can be argued that it reveals a concern for --gender justice. · For, 
example, under tlle difference principle, the requirement of equal basic liberty and 
that of· fair equality it can be seen that Rawls' s theory would not stick to the 
requirements of a gendered social tradition, history or context. 
Instead, under these principles and requirements , Rawls would only entertain gender 
bias if it would be of the greatest advantage to the least well offs - who as we know, 
in gender relations are the women. Thus, generally, Rawls's theory of justice departs 
from that of a gendered tradition in which women are subordinated and suppressed. 
For, it argues for fair distribution of opportunities and the respect for basic liberty 
between men and women. 
Let us also consider a situation where justice is conceived through a set of ideal 
standards. Here the argument is in looking at issues in a uniform manner - that is, 
"justice as blindness to difference". The problem is, when we come to the application 
of justice between gender, we realise that there are certain things we need to consider 
if gender justice is to ensue. The reality is that women, whether in the developed 
world or not, are living under institutionalised dependence which subjugates and 
29 Okin, 'Justice and Gender', op. cit., p. 114. 
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victimises· them. And the family structure is such that, there are two spheres in gender 
justice: the private sphere to which women are generally restricted, and the public 
sphere which men control and reserve for themselves. 
In the real world, women have little control over the means of acquiring a decent life 
but they hold heavy family commitments. This puts them in a _'llllnerable position 
under which they can not successfully claim or attain their dues. Yet in the world we 
live in today, "a woman who has no adequate entitlements of her own and 
insecure rights to share in family property or income, will not always be coerced but 
is always vulnerable" . 30 
Thus, the woman of these days operates under unjust institutions in which "those who 
control her means also control her rights to justice". Particularly in the developing 
world, the woman is unable to earn as men do, or if she does, she does not enjoy what 
she earns as her male partner does, since she is expected to be more in charge of the 
family than men. This makes her more vulnerable to injustice and subordination. In 
the more developed world, though women can earn and have some kind of level to set 
terms with men, they still lack membership to the status quo to which men belong, and 
are still dependent in the assignment of roles and tasks. 
30 Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order. (Routledge: London, 1992), p. 
71.
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Therefore, whether in the developed world or in the less developed nations, the 
application of gender justice demands that we recognise the vulnerability, dependence 
and subjugation to which women have been subjected. This means we have to revise 
all those theories which idealise justice as a concept that 1s blind to particular 
differences. 
Women are different and unequal to men, not in the biological or physical sense. They 
are different and unequal because, over the years, they have been victimised by 
institutionalised discrimination. In order to restore women equality with men, both 
idealised and relativised concepts of justice have to change. This is because, by 
shunning the concept of a shared world with shared principles of justice, relativised 
theories of justice legitimate women's vulnerability and become an injustice to gender. 
And, by neglecting the concept of difference, idealised concepts neglect women's 
vulnerability and they too become an injustice to gender relations. 
Feminist Justice: A Summarv 
The discourse on gender and justice is an argument for equal shares between peoples 
of different sex. And like any discussions on justice it is triggered by the existing 
relations between peoples which are seen as · 1.,.1nf. ii- to one group. These relations 
have been of dominance, suppression and alienation or subjugation of females by the 
males - hence, the existence of a male standard and norm as the window of justice. 
Men and women are taught to see men as independent, capable and 
powerful; men and women are taught to see women as dependent, 
limited in abilities, and passive. 31 That is why the law and nature 
herself has always recognised a wide difference in the respective 
spheres and destines of man and woman. That is why the man must be 
the protector and defender of the family, and the woman a timid and 
delicate being whose proper office is the function of home tasks: as wife 
and mother. 32
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This is the traditional culture of justice between the sexes. It is (or has been) a culture 
in which there is the deliberate refusal to recognise the relevant similarity between men 
and woi:nen, but one that is also based on the obstinate denial and benign neglect of 
unique difference of persons as men and as women. 
There is no new culture - nothing much has changed. What is emerging however, is 
an intense struggle to dismantle traditional culture and institute a more favourable and 
fair tradition. The methods have been as varied as the struggle has been intense. One 
way has been to approach the issue by bringing women in line with the men's world: 
asking no more than for "the adoption of traditional male roles and equal share of 
rewards and burdens between men and women. Thus women are convinced to demand 
no more as long as they are allowed to assimilate with men". 33
31 Wasserstom, R.A. "Racism, sexism, and preferential treatment", UCLA Law 
Review, op. cit., p. 588. 
32 Scales, Ann. C. "The Emergence of Feminist jurisprudence", Indiana Law 
Journal, op. cit., p. 1378. (Emphasis added). 
33 "Toward a Redefinition of sexual equality", (1981) 195 Havard Law Review, 
p. 487.
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The other way is to argue for the need to liberalise the traditional relations between the 
sexes by a moderate equalisation of women with the male world. Where men are 
allowed to be what they are or determine what they want to be, the same should be the 
case for women. Here too the emphasis is that we must look at the existing world: the 
male's world in order to know what the woman's world should be· like. But just as one 
can assert.that people be treated equally because they ·are extremely similar in nature, 
we can also argue that these same people have unique characteristics which make them 
remarkably different. 
Therefore, the right approach to justice between gender would seem to be one which 
is based on the argument that as long as we are not "over inclusive" or "under 
inclusive" of the similarities and differences between the sexes, it is vital to take into 
account the relevance of unique gender characteristics if justice is to prevail. It is not 
enough to call for the right to be treated as an equal (to men) or to be treated in the 
same way like men; or tailor women's rights in accordance with (to match) the rights 
and roles of men. 
Sometimes the right to be treated differently is no less important than the right to be 
treated as an equal or that of entitlement to equal treatment. An assumption of absolute 
equality between the sexes is therefore wrong because it presumes complete sameness 
of individuals - men and women. Yet "equality does not mean sameness" 34 for, as 
34 Ibid, p. 417. 
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Aristotle illustrates, "injustice [will arise] when equals are treated unequally and when 
unequals are treated equally" . 35
Therefore, the issue of ju�tice and gender is an intricate matter which requires that we 
need to realise and consider the interrelations between the two sexes. It does not 
require the complete differentiation of the sexes nor cfoes it mean that "little girls shall 
be boys" or vice versa. What it requires is the consideration of diminished rights of 
women or children as human beings. In other words, it means that sometimes we must 
consider and weigh classification "in terms of the real world". "What is at stake is not 
a right to be free from classifications, but rather a right not. to be classified in a 
degrading [or better say unfair] manner" .36 Thus, though justice _between gender 
means looking at people as human beings with human (not female or male) needs, 
rewards and burdens, it also means due attention to the cry: please treat me as what I 
am: a woman or would you please stop viewing me in male glasses. The reverse is 
also true. 
35 
36 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V also cited by Scales, Ann. C. "Feminist 
Jurisprudence", (1981) 56 Indiana Law Journal, p. 431. 
Scales, Ann. C. "Feminist Jurisprudence" (1981) 56 Indiana Law Journal, p. 
435.
CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL COMPARISON 
While there are various interpretations of the core meaning ofjustice there is also a 
web of relationships between the different views arid approaches to justice. T4fs is - .
because all views and theories of justice are born through definite cultural settings. 
First there is the classical culture dominated by purely Greek - Roman conceptions; 
. 
then there is the judaic-christian and Islamic cultures in which some religious 
(divine) approaches are channelled. And lastly comes what can be termed the 
modern cultural setting, in which dominance shifts from Greece and Rome,' to 
English; German, French and the American thoughts. This is what is now called 
modern western thought. However, this latter is a small branch of classical culture. 
The religious culture is the only most prominently distinguishable among these 
three. 
With the exception of a few areas in modern culture, all the cultural settings on 
justice, view the subject from a central idea. For example, while there is a little 
cross cultural identity or agreement on equality and inequality, as component 
aspects of justice, all theories of justice seem to agree on construing justice 
from the basic premise of giving people what is theirs or what they ought to 
have. This introduces the idea of dues or desert as a cardinal aspect of all theories 
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of justice. What differentiates one theory from another is the way in which justice is 
extracted from this aspect. 
For example, under the notion of desert we see a meeting between for Aristotelian 
views and religious (divine) views on justice. Both believe iri law as the measure 
which determines who takes what. But it (desett) is also a meeting place for 
disagreement. After all, Aristotle understands law as positive law while the divine law 
of justice is different. The desert then becomes a matter of whose law and what order -
and so does the concept of justice. 
Then there is the basic idea of naturalism. This too is evident in almost all theories of 
justice. In Aristotle and religion, it is in the conception of justice as a virtue. This is 
so because if justice as a virtue is the seat of perfection; then it has to be latently 
-natural or innate. Thus, when religions and Aristotelianism talk of justice as perfect
virtue, in a way they rule out distortion. And in a way this brings in these two to
relate to the platonic argument of putting things in their orders.
In this too is a tripartite ground for agreement between Islamic justice, Aritotelianism 
and Plato's justice, (as maintaining proper orders, putting each in its place and 
proportionate distribution). This argument is most prominent when we examine the 
two as basic ideas. Thus, ideally, putting everyone where they fit whether by and 
according to their capacity or status, is very similar to (if not the same as) treating 
227 
individuals according to what class they fall m: "Equals equally and unequal 
unequally". 
This is where we see a state of harmony between all theories of justice, because from 
here all agree that justice entails equality and inequality. This is true in all situations 
wh_ether we stress freedom, equity, truth, rights, iiberty, etc, for in any case this 
creates groupings which place people entitlements according to different resultant 
situations from such concepts. However, although there is always a basic idea in most 
conceptions of justice, it is the idea of particular contextualisation of various theories 
that creates departures from the basic idea. 
This is for example, because both modem and religious approaches have rationalised 
rights either as a divine or as a universality-based approach to justice. This can be 
seen in utilitarianism which has left rights wide open in order to portray justice as 
welfare. It is also true of marxism, which opposes individualisation of rights, and a 
communitarian stance towards justice as wellbeing. Both religious (particularly 
Islamic) theories and classical (especially Aristotelian) conceptions of justice lack this 
extreme trend. For them the idea of moderation directs the meaning of justice in rights 
and human wellbeing. 
However, it is the religious and modem theories that emphasize more than the classical 
approach justice as rights and welfare, in terms of not only social rights but economic 
ones too. Under the idea of freedom and liberty there is no conception of justice which 
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vehemently rotates around them, other than Nozick's libertarian entitlement theory and 
that of utilitarian philosophy. 
However, although these two are together under this argument, they differ in context. 
Thus, while Nozick's theory of justice is in this regard individualistic, that of 
utilitarianism ignores individualism in so far as it overemphasises justice as overall 
happiness. This means that modernistic approaches to justice, more than classical and 
religious approaches, emphasize both individualism and communitarianism. This is 
more vividly seen in Rawls' s principles of justice; Nozick' s theory, Marxist 
philosophy, Hume's rules of property, and to a lesser extent, utilitarianism. 
For example, while Rawls sees justice as equality and fairness, Nozick sees it as 
liberty. And while Utilitarianism and Marxism see it as the welfare of 'the community, 
Spencer sees it in respect for individual freedoms. And yet all these are and can be 
grounded in a space of five closely following centuries of legal thought. We can see 
that Rawls' principle of redistribution has more socialistic tendencies of liberality, as 
compared to Nozick's entitlement theory, which leans towards open competition and 
represents more of capitalistic justice. 
All this manifests one fact: justice today unlike the past, is not so much based on the 
content or qualities of virtue as a matter of the moral mind of social inclinations. De 
Jouvenel agrees: 
11 • •
• Justice today is not a habit of the mind which each of us can acquire 
in proportion to our viffi1;e; rather it is an organisation or arrangement 
of things. For this reason the first part of the classical definitions which 
link justice with the human being, no longer finds a place in modern 
preoccupation, which link justice with society. People no longer say 
with Aristotle that justice is the moral attitude of the just, or with the 
jurists that it is a certain exercise of the will, for these talk of an innate 
quality of the soul. The justice now recommended is a quality not of a 
person and people's actions, but of a certain configuration of things in 
social geometry, no matter by what means it is brought about 11• 1 
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Perhaps, with the exception of Islam, what seems to be the major theme among.all 
theories of justice is the problem of property and entitlement. But even within Islam 
the concept of entitlement, appears to be constantly domineering. The major theme,·-in 
all theories revolves around the idea of entitlement and property. 
Hume's theory is quasi egalitarian and quasi utilitarian. He is against practical equality 
but accepts both utilitarianism and egalitarianism on grounds of morality.. For 
example, he says that whenever we depart from the equality of goods, we rob the poor 
more satisfaction than we give to the rich. But he also asserts that any frivolous vanity 
which gratifies the individual, costs others dearly and is thus unjust.2
To provide an alternative to egalitarianism, he advocates evaluating entitlement, based 
on his rules of possession, accession, occupation, succession and prescription. As a 
moralist, Hume is therefore a utilitarian in so far as his rules of justice are concerned. 
2 
De Juveneile, Sovereignty. An Inquiry Into The Political Good. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1972, p. 140. 
David Miller, 1979, Social Justice, p. 170. 
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·This is because these rules portray a utilitarian picture of society.3 But unlike classical
utilitarians, Hume looks at justice as a matter of public welfare and will sacrifice
maximisation of satisfaction for the general good of all. This is apparent from his
argument that in times of scarcity, his rules of justice can be abandoned for the general
good of all.
Both, Hume and Aristotle consider justice a virtue of overwhelming stature. The 
difference is that Aristotle's consideration of justice as a virtue is on an individual and 
natural context based on ideas of merit, while Hume relates it to artificial mechanics 
contained in established conventions. For Hume, it is not merit or desert that 
determines justice;· justice is contained in conventions which individuals habitually 
adopt. 
Hume views the allocation of entitlement based on merit as a thing which will 
destabilise property and therefore.he rejects merit in toto. So when Hume asserts that; 
'It is necessary to know our rank and station in the world', he is in effect explaining 
justice with Platonic overtone. That is, he echoes Plato's conception of justice as 
maintaining the status quo: fitting oneself where natural abilities fated him or her to be. 
Strictly observed; Hume, Aristotle and Plato are philosophers whose theories are based 
on and promote a world in which there is no competition or conflict. This is the justice 
of an 'ordered' social community and stable property: talking about preserving the 
3 Ibid, p. 170. 
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natural order in different tongues. 4 Aristotle viewed the society of just property as one 
in which everyone is accorded their due, Plato as that where everyone fits where they 
were naturally destined and Hume as that in which entitlement is based on established 
rules of convention. So, all the three had in some way a belief in positivist dictates. 
The difference is that while both Aristotle and Plato are influenced by belief in natural 
·forces, Hume holds strongly to the force of artificial virtues habitually developed by
human conventions.5 Rawls approaches justice from a universalistic conception. In
this, he meets Kantian arguments of justice mirrored in universal perception. In his
distinction of absolutist notions of justice into particular and general categories, Rawls
is building upon Aristotelian conceptions. In fact, seen from a wide view of
contending conflicts, Rawls is a disguised Aristotelian for in normal circumstances and
in absence of the least advantaged, he would appear to prefer meritocracy to other
systems.
Rawls, like Aristotle and Plato, attempts to find and postulates a universal principle of 
justice. But for him, his arguments are wholly based on rational justifications. This 
is the only way we can put him in a quasi universalistic conception of justice. 
4 
5 
Aristotle's opposition to (natural) heredity would put Hume's rules of 
succession to task. 
Islam, Rawls, Barry and ·Nozick are different; for they accept competition, 
albeit the first three accept it so far as it fits within certain limits. 
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Conceptually, Rawls has been considered a ·disguised utilitarian. 6 However, I think 
this is greatly diluted by his basic principles of justice. 
In claiming that in normal circumstances, equal liberty for all is the supreme guiding 
approach to justice, Rawls succumbs to egalitarianism. His embrace for egalitarianism 
is further seen in his argument that we should allow incentives and assistance to the 
weaker sections of society, even though that appears to reduce the well being of the 
wealthy sections. 
So, his difference principle would definitely be opposed by Aristotle because it neglects 
merit. Perhaps Plato would also disregard it because it pays little attention to one's 
' status quo' of abilities. But, the argument that careers should be opened to talents 
based on equal exposure to available opportunities ·raises questions of merit. This is . .
somehow echoed in Rawls' s principle that each is to have equal opportunity to the most 
extensive basic liberties. 
6 To utilitarians unfair distribution of wealth is okey as long as it derives the 
greatest satisfaction for the greatest majority. To Rawls, sacrificing the 
pleasure of the few for the joy of others would only be acceptable if it works 
for promoting equal liberty and/or advancement (betterment) of the least well­
off. It is a question of utility only if this proviso is required. To the 
Utilitarians it is not merely a proviso, it is the basis of their theory. If it is 
absent, the whole theory becomes non-existent. See also Kamenka & Tay, 
Justice, 1979, p. 185. 
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Nevertheless, Rawls is to be considered a liberal7 advocate of justice based on the 
promotion of individual liberty equal to all, albeit his theory works under exceptions 
that promote equality. So, he argues that liberty is supreme but equality and just 
inequality are inevitably vital. But, Rawls' s theory is repugnant to the ideas of 
egalitarians and libertarians whose theory of justice entails the propagation of free 
enterprise and the condemnation of interference in the rights and freedoms of the 
individual. So, the notion that there should be redistribution of wealth is met with 
strong resistance based on the fact that such will deter individual rights and liberties. 
Nozick argues that the conflict between liberty and equality cannot be reconciled. To 
him, freedom is_ an end in itself. Justice based on equality or redistribution, to benefit 
the least well off, would be like imposing a non existent moral duty to protect the poor. 
In Islamic view, Rawls' argument for redistribution of wealth conforms, at least in 
principle, to Quranic justice. But his model of justice is unacceptable to the justice of 
Islam. After all, Islam disallows putting hands on one's face so as to act upon 
ignorance and thereby follow that which is not perceived.8
Utilitarian and marxist theories harbour collectivistic notions of justice which give 
priority to the society. In this, these two conform to Hob be' s argument that the 
7 
8 
Liberal theorist are those who believes in the redistribution of wealth, social 
welfare and social engineering to maintain equality. 
The Qur'an Commands: "Follow not that where thou hast no knowledge". 
See Al Qur'an, 17:36. 
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general will always prevail over the individual. In the same sense, collectivist notions 
of justice. become compatible with those of Islamic conceptions of justice. 9 
However, under utilitarian and marxist theory the individual is used as a means to 
attain familial or societal goals. This is objectionable to Kelsenian theory of justice. 
Kelsen would also oppose Rawls's differential principle because in it individuals (the 
rich) are used as·means but not ends. However, Kelsen would oppose almost all those 
who tend to approach justice with a universalistic view. Thus, views of Aristotle, 
Rawls and Kant: universalistic concepts of justice, would be intolerable to Kelsen. 
In summary, we can also look at theories of justice in the light of positivist and 
universalist perceptions. Positivists view justice as a relative term that is uniquely 
variable. Thei: cause is perhaps chaired by Kelse�. The positivist argument seems 
unacceptable to the universal and general views of Rawls and Aristotle. To positivists, 
justice is a highly subjective concept incapable of absolute and eternal conception. 
To Rawls and Classical theorists, like Aristotle and Plato, justice is within absolutely 
determinable reach. However, for Rawls, in a just society in which his two principles 
are fully effective, he would seem to come to terms with positivists. This is bec'ause 
in a just society like this; Rawls would not give chance to any disobedience to the law. 
This brings us back to Aristotelian. Islam too does not seem to conceive justice along 
9 This can be seen in the strong position Islam attaches to the concept of 
"Maslahah" (Public good). But it must be remembered that· in justice, Islam 
aims at striking a balance between the two; ie. the _individual and the society.
235 
positivistic lines of argument and thus opts for universalism also. However, Islam's 
universalism here, is uniquely different and dissimilar to that of Kantism, Rawlsianism 
and Marxism. 
Comparing Islam with communism, one prominent scholar has argued that Islam is the 
undying goodness of humanity which approaches human life under a comprehensive 
view that unites one's spiritual desires with their bodily appetites, and one's moral 
needs with their spiritual needs. 10 Therefore, unlike other systems, Islam is seen 
here as the only system in which justice is accorded an all embracive perception in 
which life is always interdependent and entails such things as mercy, love, help and_ 
mutual responsibility among all individuals and societies. 11 
Marxism too approaches justice in view of social responsibility and collective 
consideration but the approach here like in other theories is different from that of 
Islam. In Islam, justice is a matter of human equality and balancing values, both 
visible and invisible, as well as material, economic, bodily and spiritual .. Justice 
includes all values moderately attained and balanced. Islamic or not Islamic, all 
(practically surviving) theories of justice have in some way conceived justice as a sort 
of human social order that realises both the existence of human differences and human 
universality. 
10 . Qutb, Social Justice in Isla_m, 1970, p. 24. 
11 Ibid, p. 24. 
�.JV 
From a comractarion point of view justice is derived when p
eople are similarly situated
in positions that help them extract.general principles of 
justice. This is similar to
Judaic-Christian and Islamic comractJ.ri:mism. This is because
 in these religions. :here
is a stress on communality of situation and goals.· How
ever the difference is that in
Judaic-Christian and Islamic· �ontractarianism unlike in other
 contractarianisrn, people
are not placed in hypothetical situations, bm are in real pra
ctical positions based on in-
depth beliefs. 
For example, though Rawls's device of the original position. 
is only for justification I it is implausible to think of 
any people who will really operac· e 
· 
h in t e resultant
Rawlsian contractarianism, behind a vei'l of ignorance which 
forces them to shun self interestedness, and foster mutual 
interestedness so as to extract rational principles of 
justice. In Judaic-Christian and �$lamic contractarianism,
people ar� placed under divine covenants I which are real: 
facts between the profane and the di�ine, and are contracts 
that bring believers together in faith and law without the 
need of force. 
Finally, there is the field of post modern legal theory o
f justice and gender and justice
and internationalism. Here. the fundamental compar
ison we can make fs mainly this:
that both traditional and modern theory have neg
lected women's due place in the
conceptions of justice. Only :i. few theories panicu
larly redistributiv� theories such as
that of Rawls have provided ;.i broaJ formul
ation through which justice can be
channelled to all. 
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But generally all theories have in language and norm been guilty of gender bias in their 
conc:ption of justice. But in so far as theories have formulated universal-based 
conceptions, the demand for consideration of the issues of justice and internationalism 
has not been neglected. What is lacking here, is the need to incorporate issues of 
international concern into the realm of the major theories of justice. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TOW AE.DS A UNIVERSAL CONCEPTION OF 
JUSTICE 
Most Jurists, in their attempt to define justice, have restricted themselves to either 
the 'is' or the- 'ought', the real or the ideal, or "confuse" a combination of either of 
these two concepts. This has placed the conception of justice in a twilight zone in 
which its identity becomes as illusive as ever. Therefore, if we are to define 
justice with exactitude, then the answer lies in formulas that lead to a universal 
conception of justice. Perhaps the Kantian categorical imperative theory 1 and 
Aristotle's division of justice into general and particular justice would be of use if 
and only we build on these views and theories, ·in light of conceiving justice as a 
whole virtue. 
Justice is a universal phenomenon, which admits of no boundaries. It is not that 
which is in our interests or enhances our interests. Justice in fact is more of that 
which dictates our interests and is therefore not limited to our interests and welfare. 
- Emanuel Kant's argument in categorical imperative postulates that an act is
just only if it is the same thing that others would do when placed in the same
situation as yours. This can be compared to the theological universalisation
of justice contained in the ma'(im: "Do not do that which you would not wish
to be done to thyself".
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So when countries like the U.S.A. today label others such as Sudan to be unfit for U.N 
international aid simply because they are associated with terrorism which affects 
American interests, it distorts the real meaning of justice. For here justice is then 
limited to our good and not to what is good for others. Justice is transcendental and 
entails considerations of all interests, ours as well as others' . 
One way of achieving this is to take justice as basically an ethical matter that is all 
bound and exists with superiority over all values. Looking at justice as an all 
encompassing virtue will therefore automatically rule out any irrationally restricted 
conceptions. In this way, justice is contained in both the 'is' and the 'ought' ; as well 
as in the ' real' and the ' ideal' . 
Thus, as an ideal, justice carries a correlative e1ement of reality that can only be 
realised through a marriage between the is and the ought. This element of justice must 
then be seen as that which allows one to attain the purpose of their existence in relation 
to the world they live in. This purpose is uniquely similar in every person and its 
attainment will not mean a dismantling of the universality of justice. For example, the 
justice of the soul is contained in each person's duty to do justice to himself or herself. 
This is what we may call spiritual justice which exists in everyone. 
Justice resides in the commonalty of the humanbeing - inwardly and outwardly. The 
natural feelings and desires of rational beings have a common pointer and justice is 
contained in adjustment of all pointers to conflicting interests artificially created. 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that some commentators have considered justice as the 
will of God2 or that of cosmic forces and providence that regulates the designs of 
individuals. 3
However, the transcendence of justice should not be perceived in religious terms for 
this will limit justice to relative conceptions; religion being a question of faith . 
Transcendence here refers to the recognition of the fact that justice as a matter of 
substantial value contains an element of inherent commonalty unsurpassable 
whatsoever. 
To find this element, we have to apply that which strikes a balance and promotes 
natural rights. For example, the right to life is sensed similarly in all rational beings. 
Thus, as an ideal, justice is that which must walk along all social orders with rationally 
perceivable clarity and force. 
Justice is that which invalidates or validates all rationally immoral orders of people, 
whether social, political or otherwise. This is because in the inner self _of the 
individual, justice commonly resides as a moral value. But this should not mean to 
elevate concepts of morality above the virtue of justice. 
2 
3 
Khadduri Majid, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 1984 p. 3. 
Kamenka and Tay, Justice, 1979, p. 1. 
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Therefore, to· arrive at an ideal conception of justice, we must recognise that all social 
arrangements ought to have a dependence on natural factors of the common belonging 
of humans. This is illuminated in the familial nature of humans and their dependence 
on common conscience and common feelings. 
Thus, justice invariably resides in the recognition of logical, empirical and 
psychological priorities to all. This is to say that justice is that which sorts out the 
logically fundamental priorities equally needed by all. Under a common order of 
humans, an objectively acceptable concept of justice can hence emerge. Therefore, 
justice as an idea_ should be perceived in terms of all intelligible laws of nature - with 
jus.tice being the end �or which nature subjects people to the laws. 
That is to say, justice being the end of human endeavour, it aims at attaining rational 
equality of individuals. This does not mean that justice simply is the existence of a 
state of equivalence among people. But rather, the realisation of that virtue whose 
essence forms the end and core of meaningful human existence. Such realisation may 
as a matter of formality entail the employment of various methods; some through 
inequality and others ·through equality. In terms of balancing claims, justice must be 
conceived as the virtue of all moral claims. That is, it is that virtue which-gives 
meaning to all morally valid claims. Put in other words, it is that which defines moral 
behaviour, moral aims, moral laws, and their moral applications etc. 
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Therefore, it would not be wrong to assert that justice resides in the ascertainment of 
right from wrong or affirmation of equality of consideration, in which case, human 
beings are viewed as ends in themselves and not as means. In the broad sense of the 
word, justice consists in the governing of human relations under objectively 
'acceptable' standards. For this acceptability to exist, there must be some external 
force which commonly subsumes people's feeling. For example, the role of natural 
common conscience in humans or the idea of God in theologians. 
Generally, all humans share certain internal perceptions that subject them to certain 
standards and therefore, the essence of justice must (on this basis) rely on the very 
nature of the common wealth of persons. This rests in the sentimentality of virtues; 
justice being the primary virtue. This may appear to equate jlistice to human equality. 
What it means is that the individual as a familial animal, shares common but 
fundamental feelings, which dictate a universal perception of the virtue of justice. 
Thus, the real meaning of justice is not in the furtherance of equality, but in the basis 
of equality and fair play - discoverable in the common nature of humans. Under this 
argument there are certain elements of justice to consider in order to have fair play. 
For human beings have internal common feelings. This is where the conditions of 
need, effort, merit, desert, etc, have to be operative forming part of the avenue of 
justice as a whole, and not just singularly. 
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Justice cannot be limited to relacive n.otions. In-the same vein it cannot be objectiveiy 
argued that justice is limitable to the attainment of equality or the preservation of 
liberty and freedom. Justice is an all encompassing virrue to which all values must be 
subjected. It is a virrue 'concerned with problems of balancing and adjusunem' .. and 
not emphasising priority of-rights or freedoms, society. or the i?dividual_, etc. Its 
province is in the balancing and redefinition of natural rights against anificial 
establishments. Thus, justice can be equated to righteousness· alone. In this way, 
justice as a concept is accorded the broad and eternal meaning that it deserves. 
Afrerall, substantially, justice is an ideal concept whose value is the end of all rational 
laws. In fact, scholars are right when they argue that justice is the end of the law. 
Thus, justice precedes the law and c::mnor therefore be ·limited to meanings of the law. 
Laws are mere means by which justice may be attained. There are other ways in 
which justice can be attained. So it cannot be said that the law is justice and justice is 
the law. For example. justice can be looked at in the character or habits of indi'v'.iduals 
even when such character or habit is not bound by or derived from the law. 
As an idea. jus�ice is contained in the way of doing things which begins from qm;stibns 
of substance. From the idea, we emerge into the form and application of attaining the 
objectives of justice. 
Ibid. p. 59. 
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In sum, justice is a rational and uniYersal idea whose province is in the fundamental 
structure of r�ality5 and human nature. It transcends human convention and cannot be 
identified in the naturally irrational wavs or habits of humans. It is an intelli2:ible and - - -
ideally universal virtue whose conception must be sought in the very fundamental 
structure, nature and meaning of the universe . 
. CONCLUSION 
Justice is therefore, a transcendental measure based on knowledge. It is trans-rational. 
trans�ultural and trans-pragmatic a�d resides both in the equal and varied or diverse 
nature of humans under the universal dictates of the universe. Its meaning and value 
c::m best be derived by examining and understanding the common edifice of humanity 
as a lonely si.t'lgular being. 
In secular theories of justice we can attempt co achieve a universal conception of justice 
through the concept of juris Naturale. which is related to the .equalisation of thing� ie: 
aequitas. This w_orks under the natural and common nature of persons which dictates 
that justice has to be living in accordance to the equal riarure of humans and . · 
natural c:quity. This means that where we need to treat people differently. we should 
5 It has been argued that this reality is manifested in the fact that justice is 
orounded in the rational and social structure of humanity. Sc:e Sturn, "Narural 
law, Liberal Religion and freedom of Association", The Journal of Religious 
Ethics. 1992. Vol '20(1). p 181. 
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only do so if such treatment is fair and equitable and rec<?gnises the basic needs natural 
and common to the welfare of all humans. This also means that we have to adopt some 
kind of modified stoic philosophy. 6 This then allows us to operate under a universal 
rationalisation of concepts. However, it also requires a basic plane upon which this 
universalisation operates. 
6 Stoic philosophy has the central idea of justice as behaviour in accordance to 
natural law, but at the same time allows this_ to operate under dictates to 
special circumstances. This latter concession permits unfair inequalities to be 
entertained. 
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